[MD] The Dynamics of Value

[Alexander Jarnroth]

In reply to Mark:

I've been thinking even more today (and as I've said before, much of this is
new to me, and so I'm still in a process of internalization). What dawned on
me today, while being out walking (I like to do that, makes me think
better), is that MoQ and Systems Theory within the limits of ordinary
epistemology becomes each other's DUALS, in a kind of mathematical sense.
That is, statements made within one becomes dual to some other statement
made within the other.
This hangs together with the view that the one is overcoming the Cartesian
dichotomy by turning everything into subjects, while the other does just the
opposite.
You could also see the dual relationship comparing the divisions. MoQ
states:
Primary experience is divided into
1. Dynamic Quality
2. Static Quality
The second is then divided into:
2.1 Physic
2.2 Biological
2.3 Social
2.4 Intellectual

In Systems Theory you divide what could be described into:
1. Concrete Systems
2. Abstract Systems
Next, both types can be divided into:
A. Closes systems
B. Open Systems
And finally open systems are measured according to a scale ranging from
B.1 Dynamic
B.2. Mechanic (static)

And thus the one tells you exactly that which the other doesn't.

You could also, concerning MoQ
Say that physical patterns of value confines biological patterns, while the
latter informs the former and so on to dynamic quality.

I think the mind ha a tendency to overestimate the value of words. As noted,
language and linguistics are social patterns, not intellectual. Many a time
I've felt that I've been knowing what I would like to express, however not
being able to formulate it linguistically in a proper way. Also, language
being linear in one spatial dimension, that is, being a sequence, whose
value varies with time. That is: everything communicated by means of words,
must be sequentially ordered. Primary thought, I believe, operates in more
dimensions. But of course, sentences are also systems of interpretation and
the meaning of a word is not determined only by the word itself, but also by
its grammatical relations to other words within the sentence.
And, in some respects, you categorize things by assigning them names, but
you always know that you can redefine the words and categorize in many
different "sets" simultaneously (thus creating both proper subsets, disjoint
sets, intersecting sets and so on).
So I think that, while being the social pattern upon which intellectual
patterns most heavily rely upon, language shouldn't be assigned to great an
influence over mind. But perhaps it might have not considered social
implications not obvious at first glance.

Talking about cells. There are these cells normally living disjoint in a
state similar to amoebae. However, when they lack nutrition, they clump
together forming a kind of "spore-body", which later send away some cells
packed as spores. Most cells, however dies in this process. Also in a
multicellular organism, most cells will ultimately be dead ends. Only a few
of the gametes will continue the life of the organism by creating a new.
These cells are, somehow, already from the beginning offering their lives.
Thus there is a kind of pre-social division between individual cells and
organisms consisting of the cells, analogues to the division between
individual human beings and social systems consisting of such individuals.
There actually is an analogue to the division between the social and
intellectual systems among humans, among cells. The organism consists of
cells and dominates them, but it is the cells containing the genome, which
transfer the "knowledge" of the cell from one generation to the next.
Perhaps it is here we should seek for the value of language, being also a
kind of "code" transferring knowledge from one generation to the next.

/A