[MD] The Dynamics of Value

[Ham Priday]

G'day Mark -- 



> At this point, I have to say that I haven't learned enough yet, from my
> side, to be able to provide added response.  I believe you know what
> my problems with this ontology is, and I confess that they come from
> my side.  The interpretation doesn't provide much more than light
> negating dark.  However, I am always interested to read a new angle
> on this and ask questions since that is how I learn.
>
> So, can this Absolute Essence be seen as the background of what
> we are negating, or is the Essence actually differentiated itself, like a
> cobweb is visually differentiated with dew drops?

I would expect your problems with my ontology to "come from [your] side", 
Mark.  Let's try to identify them and come to some kind of agreement. 
Before we go any further, however, please understand that I make no claim to 
represent or imitate Pirsig's thesis.  When I parenthetically cite MoQ 
terms, it is intended only to provide a familiar reference point for the 
concept at hand.  Now to your question...

First of all, Absolute Essence is more than a "background".  It is the 
substance or "quiddity" of reality.  And, because it is absolute, it is the 
very antithesis of differentiation.  This is implicit in Cusa's First 
Principle (see my most recent post to Alexander).  Indeed, "Not-other" can 
have no other meaning than Absolute Oneness.

Negation is a troublesome term for many, and using it as a synonym for 
"creation" seems to confound the most logically astute in this forum.  This 
was a concept developed by Hegel who postulated that experiential existence 
is Appearance.  To actualize this appearance, "being" is negated - that is, 
reflected in an image or "recognized" - which implies subjective cognizance 
of an objective "other".  Value can be perceived only when it exists as an 
other to the perceiver, that is, when Awareness is differentiated from 
Beingness.  All otherness is differentiated appearance; and what 
differentiates it is the nothingness interspersed between finite phenomena 
in the process of experience.  Since the observing subject itself is a 
"negate", the experience of specific objects and events is the result of 
negation by a negate.  This "secondary negation" reduces essent-value 
relative to a particular being or object.

Now, experience is the process of appropriating essent-value for oneself and 
objectifying the being that this value represents.  In Sartre's vernacular, 
this exemplifies one's "desire for the being of the other."  Of course, we 
cannot have another's "being"; we can only have our own.  But what we can, 
and do, appropriate for ourselves is the "essence" of the other's being. 
And inasmuch as all beingness, including ourselves, is negated Essence which 
we only sense valuistically, what we really experience is "essent-value". 
which is to say the Value of Essence objectivized as finite "essents" --  
things and events that represent our value-sensibility.

As you and Alex have noted, I am persuaded that the dynamics of value play a 
significant role in creating our "real world" experience, and am anxious to 
develop and advance this concept, whether or not it is compatible with Mr. 
Pirsig's metaphysics.

Incidentally, have you any more ideas on the application of physical 
constants to express metaphysical axioms?  I know I haven't provided much 
support toward this approach, but still believe it has dialectical 
possibilities.

Thanks for keeping this thread alive, Mark.

Best regards,
Ham