[MD] From Psychology to Empiricism
MarshaV
valkyr at att.net
Sat Sep 4 00:05:27 PDT 2010
Marsha:
Radical Empiricism is a reified concept.
On Sep 3, 2010, at 5:44 PM, david buchanan wrote:
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> Marsha said:
> I do miss Bo. Because he kept the discussion centered on the MoQ's being beyond SOM, and the MoQ's understanding transcending subject/object metaphysical thinking, and as Wikipedia clearly states: "Robert M. Pirsig's philosophy of the Metaphysics of Quality is largely concerned with the subject-object problem." ...And surely you wouldn't expect my understanding to change because dmb, Arlo, Ron, Dan or the Pope think differently. My mind doesn't work like that. ...Intellectual Static Patterns of Value are reified concepts and the rules for their rational analysis and manipulation. Intellectual patterns process from a subject/object conceptual framework creating false boundaries that give the illusion of independence, or 'thingness'. The fourth level is a formalized subject/object level (SOM), where the paramount demand is for rational, objective knowledge, which is free from the taint of any subjectivity. As far as I know intellectual patterns are as I stated above, and I have seen no evidence to the contrary. ..Where is your evidence? Let's see you demonstrate an intellectual pattern that does not reify concepts, that does not create a self involved in analyzing such concepts, or does not represent the rules for such manipulation? You cannot do it, because the minute you've begun you have divided and formed an object and an analyzing self.
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> dmb says:
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> This thread began with the evidence you're asking for and those quotes from James's biographer were centered on going beyond SOM. Pirsig and James are saying that subjects and objects are secondary concepts that have been reified. (Where did you ever get the idea that intellectual patterns ARE reified by definition? Concepts are not the problem, reification is.) Reification is the whole difference between SOM and the MOQ. In the former subjects and objects are reified and in the latter they are not. In the former they are not just concepts but in the latter they are just concepts. Radical empiricism is already a demonstration of an intellectual pattern that does not reify concepts. I mean, everything you're asking for was already in the initial post. Maybe you should read it again, but much more slowly and carefully.dmb says: Yes, Pirsig quotes James on this point and he equates his own Quality with James's "pure experience". In his second book Pirsig explicitly identifies with James's radical empiricism but he was already saying the same thing back in ZAMM.
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