[MD] Philosophy is deadly

david buchanan dmbuchanan at hotmail.com
Tue Sep 21 13:51:12 PDT 2010


Ian said to John, Andre, DMB:
 Increasing value is a better empirical view than causation, but this isn't any easier to explain (eg to a MoQish judge)



dmb says:

Huh?

I'm going to assume you're talking about the way the MOQ replaces "cause" with "preference".

As Pirsig points out, "preference" is an empirically meaningful term and it is more appropriate to quantum physics because of the way it fits the actual observations. Causality makes more sense in a mechanistic, law-like Newtonian universe where causal relations are imagined in terms of substances bumping into substances like so many billiard balls. But down in the subatomic realm particles can interact at a distance and you can interfere with way events unfold even after they've taken place. 

"The only difference between causation and value is that the word 'cause' implies absolute certainty whereas the implied meaning of 'value' is one of preference. In classical science it was supposed that the world always works in terms of absolute certainty and that 'cause' is the more appropriate word to describe it. But in modern quantum physics all that is changed. Particles 'prefer' to do what they do. An individual particle is not absolutely committed to one predictable behavior. What appears to be an absolute cause is just a very consistent pattern of preferences. Therefore, when you strike 'cause' from the language and substitute 'value' you are not only replacing an empirically meaningless term with a meaningful one; you are using a term that is more appropriate to actual observation." (Lila, page 104)


But there is more to it than that. Usually, causation is projected upward so that you get various kinds of determinism with respect to human behavior. In this view, all of reality is one long chain of causality from top to bottom and there is no such thing as free will, as if we can do nothing except obey the laws of cause and effect. By contrast, preferences are projected from the top down. We know what it's like to jump off a hot stove, to like peas rather than carrots, to read a clear and concise explanation as opposed to a confusing and long-winded one and when we observe other animals and life forms - even down to single-celled organisms - it certainly appears that they have preferences too. It fits our experience as it is lived and felt and it fits our experience in terms of scientific observation. 

And of course he wants to push preferences all the way down because that means quality goes all the way down. In other words, "preferences" are not just more appropriate way to describe the data in physics, it has a unifying power within the MOQ. It gives says that the ability to respond to Quality is completely ubiquitous throughout reality. Doesn't that make you feel at home? Go ahead, pull up a chair. Put up your feet. 


You like carrots and I like peas.You like parrots and I like keys.


  		 	   		  


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