[MD] The first division of the MOQ. - dynamic or Dynamic Quality?

[Ham Priday]

Greetings, Joe --

Nice to hear from you again.  According to my records, we haven't talked 
since December of 2009 when you began to find my ontology "humorous".  I was 
trying to market a serious book on philosophy at the time, and the comic 
attribution wasn't helpful.  But except for a brief exchange on 'the 
perennial philosophy' in May, 2010, you seem to have disappeared until now.

On Apr 4, 2011 at 6:00 PM, Joseph Maurer <jhmau at comcast.net wrote:


> Hi Ham and all,
>
> "uncreated, undifferentiated, and unchanging" denies DQ/SQ.
> The Metaphysics connected to dq/sq is about undefined/defined
> levels in existence not levels in imagination.  DQ exists in levels of
> evolution.  SQ is the manifest evolution in the order in existence.
>
> Imho Joe

"Undefined/defined levels in existence" may be a division of the MoQ, but 
"levels" do not constitute the primary division in metaphysics.  As the 
philosophy of reality, metaphysics aims at a doctrine that accounts for the 
division between the fundamental source and the defined particulars, between 
absolute potentiality and relational actuality.  Evolution and process are 
attributes of space/time existence, as are cause/effect and the 
subject/object (selfness/otherness) dichotomy.  Since what is manifest is 
defined, there are no "undefined levels" in existence.  Manifested "levels 
of evolution" is how we define the order of existence, not the primary 
source from which existence is actualized.

I don't know what "levels in imagination" refers to, as all levels are 
definable and there are no levels in my ontology.  However, I'm in agreement 
that unconditional reality (Essence) is incompatible with your 
interpretation of DQ/SQ.

Essentially speaking,
Ham


> On 4/4/11 10:45 AM, "Ham Priday" <hampday1 at verizon.net> wrote:
> <snip>
>> The transitional world we live in is differentiated into solids, liquids 
>> and
>> gases; animals, vegetables and minerals; and a multiplicity of objects, 
>> all
>> of which can be defined and described.  We call this our "reality" and 
>> Mr.
>> Pirsig calls it a "subject-object metaphysics".  But, to borrow from 
>> Hegel,
>> it's really a world of "appearances".  Underlying these appearances is a
>> fundamental Reality that is uncreated, undifferentiated, and unchanging.