[MD] Free Will

[Ham Priday]

Dan, Ron, John and All --

On Fri, Apr 8, 2011 at 9:02 AM, X Acto <xacto at rocketmail.com> wrote:

> Hello Dan, you had stated to John
>>> I think the confusion is thinking that having a choice is freedom.
>>> Conventionally, that is so. But we are not talking conventionally
>>> here. We are using the framework of the MOQ. To have a choice is
>>> follow intellectual patterns of value and when we are dealing with
>>> static quality, we are without choice.
>
> Ron:
> Static Quality is nothing but choice and having choice is freedom.
> To have intellectual choice is to follow intellectual patterns of value
> which effect social and biological patterns of value which effect
> inorganic patterns of value.
> I make the intellectual choice to drink nothing but single malt scotch
> whiskey, this choice effects more choices, social outcast as a drunk,
> biological dependence and the breakdown of healthy tissue,chemicals
> change their bonds. Our emotions are a complicated set of molecular
> values and what are we if we are not our emotions, our values.
> The illusion of these processes is that they are static.

[John, on 4/7]:
> Quite a corner you've got yourself painted into there Dan.
> One is only free to the extent that one follows DQ, but since
> all experience is immediately translated into sq, the only time
> one is truly free is in that tiny slice of time which is the pet of
> existence to Radical Empiricism.  Personally, I'd like a bit
> more freedom than that.  You need to reformulate, I think

[Dan then defends his position]:
> Here is the exact quote from LILA:
>
> "To the extent that one's behavior is controlled by static patterns of
> quality it is without choice.  But to the extent that one follows
> Dynamic Quality, which is undefinable, one's behavior is free."

I have been following this thread with increasing frustration, as it 
confirms my suspicion that neither Mr. Pirsig nor the MoQists can justify 
Free Will in a reality controlled by Quality.  As a consequence, they've 
concluded that it's either insignificant or "illusional".  This denies the 
very meaning of existential awareness in relation to ultimate reality which 
I understand it is philosophy's purpose to explain.

Being forced to follow an undefinable course is coercion, not freedom.  It 
means that man is channeled to a prescribed set of behaviors--even when he 
"thinks" he has a choice--which is hardly the expression of Free Will by any 
definition.  If we are "controlled by patterns of quality" and are compelled 
to follow DQ by cosmic law, as the good book says, then free will is a myth. 
Subject to these conditions, why should the issue of moral values even 
arise, let alone be endlessly debated in a philosophy forum?

In order for man to be a free agent, he is created as a 'being-aware', an 
individuated entity that stands apart from the Creator or Source.  He can be 
neither indigenous to it nor the essence of its value.  But so that he may 
realize this value without the bias of absolute knowledge, the psychic core 
of man's being is value-sensibility.  In existential terms, cognizant 
awareness is a non-entity: it cannot be localized, quantified, or directly 
observed.  The individual is a choice-maker only by virtue of the fact that 
he is an autonomous entity.

I don't know how this translates in MoQ terms, or whether a cognizant self 
made of quality patterns can even be considered "autonomous".  I could care 
less whether "Pirsig says" or "Dan says" something different.  I do know, 
however, that unless man is an independent creature, capable of realizing 
value for himself and free to act in accordance with his choices, human life 
has no purpose or meaning other than to complete the evolutionary process of 
an insentient universe.

I'm sorry if this offends any of you, or if it qualifies as apostasy to the 
"official dogma".  But I hope you'll let me know if it doesn't make sense to 
you.

Essentially speaking,
Ham