[MD] Free Will (footnotes to Plato)

[Ham Priday]

Hey, Mark --


Evidently you didn't see the connection between the 'Hiddenness' essay and 
my recent post on Free Will, thereby missing my point.  (I had wanted to 
combine the two, but realized it would exceed the word limit.)

Quite simply, the life-experience of a human being is a proprietary 
manifestation of the essential Source as differentiated Value.  The 
realization, actualization, and willful interpretation of Value is the 
cognizant awareness of a free agent.  So that the individual is free to 
experience this manifestation without bias, and exercise choices in 
accordance with his/her value-sensibility, the cognizant self must be 
autonomous, that is, a subjective entity independent of the Source.  To 
ensure absolute independence and autonomy, direct knowledge of the Source is 
inaccessible ("hidden") from valuistic experience.

[Ham, previously]:
> A philosopher who believes in determinism will find himself paradoxically
> denying that it is in any way meaningful to strive for a better life, 
> avoid
> accidents, punish wrongdoers for their crimes, or otherwise behave as if
> there is anything to gain by choosing an initiative for action. He will
> instead have to concede that when he makes an (apparent) decision,
> wants to punish criminals, etc, this is also a result of the predetermined
> makeup of the universe.  Although it is logically consistent, most people
> find this fatalistic system deeply disturbing, if not emotionally 
> destructive,
> and man's concept of social justice would never accommodate it.

[Mark]
> I would agree that Meaningfulness is paramount in any metaphysics.
> Determinism is nihilistic and provides little personal meaning.
>
> Often when mathematicians get involved in philosophy there are
> interesting results.  Pirsig brings up the thoughts of Poincare to
> some effect.

[Ham]:
> But this argument is flawed, whatever the calculation used to support it.
> For even if it were theoretically possible to know in advance what you
> will do tomorrow, you would then have no free will.  If I have a crystal
> ball that tells me you will have fried eggs for breakfast tomorrow, and
> the ball is 100% reliable, the fact that I choose not to look at it would
> still mean you cannot choose to have any different breakfast.

[Mark]:
> I think the argument is flawed in another way.  Lately I have reading
> up on infinite set theory.  The future in your scenario must also
> contain that one looked at a crystal ball.  This kind of reasoning
> tries to place the reading of the future within the future, and we end
> up with a paradox which is like going back in time to kill your father.
> This is also why we can never have an equation for everything, because
> such an equation must have the equation itself incorporated into it.
>
> As such, determinism has no meaning whatsoever.  If we are determined
> to believe in determinism or to believe in free will, such speculation
> suddenly makes the speculation meaningless.  It is like saying that
> everything is cheese.  Yeah, and so what if everything is cheese?
> What does that mean?  I know this is not clear, I have an awareness of
> what I am writing about, but it is difficult to put to words.

[Ham]:
> Such arguments posited by philosophers and intellectuals seemingly doom
> humans to live under the illusion of having free will. All of existence is
> a theatre. Even though we actually feel we make choices, this is an
> illusion. When you choose A, be it such a trivial thing as what to eat for
> breakfast or a more life-altering decision, there is no possibility for 
> you
> choose B.

[Mark]:
> Yes, and there is no possibility for such a possibility, and on and on.
> The whole argument becomes one of a snake eating its tail.

[Ham]:
> Although we generally consider the naturaI world deterministic, quantum
> mechanics has experimentally confirmed that, on the quantum level, the
> universe is not at all deterministic. Events happen according to a
> statistical distribution that comes out of quantum equations. It's
> inherently impossible, for example, to determine with certainty how a
> sub-atomic particle will behave, other than by statistical probabilities.
> While Einstein and some contemporary physicists argue that there must be
> an actual underlying deterministic system to quantum mechanics, no such
> system has ever been found and there is little evidence that it will.

[Mark]:
> I would be careful when you use the word confirm above.  That is
> Scientism.  The QM model is a mathematical structure.  It cannot
> confirm anything except what it creates.  Such confirmation is
> teleological.  So, I think that the Heisenberg uncertainty principle
> is a product of the math, not a product of reality (what ever that is).
> But, your point is well taken, that is, there are mathematical constructs
> that argue for free will.

[Ham]:
> The deterministic argument against free will can also be refuted at 
> another
> level: it prevents the exercise of free choice.  But it's a 
> misunderstanding
> to say that nature constrains human choices. The "laws of nature" only
> describe what happens, and that includes every action you make.
> The "law" is merely an inductive generalization of the past, and it is 
> based
> on the unfounded premise that because the universe has behaved in a
> certain way up to now, it will continue doing so.  Every time you make a
> choice and act on it, you create another tiny subset of a universal "law 
> of
> nature". To even talk about "breaking the laws of nature" is absurd, since
> these laws describe everything that takes place in the universe,
> including what you do.

[Mark]:
> Yes, you have better stated what I was alluding to above.  We are all
> part of the unfolding.  I have said in the past that we ARE the Big Bang.
> It is not something that happened, it is something that is happening at
> this very moment.  Our actions are indeed involved in what is happening.

Well, I'll reveal a little secret, Mark, if you promise not to tell anybody.
I plagiarized a considerable portion of an essay on the subject by Jan 
Haugland, which can be found at 
http://blogs.salon.com/0001561/stories/2002/11/17/freeWillVsDeterminism.html.

[Mark]:
> This ball of Free Will is tossed around a lot.  I will go back to the
> meaningfulness of one's own interpretation.  This is why I state that
> I choose free will.  (I am borrowing from the rock group Rush on this
> one).  I honestly think that I do choose [due] to the attitude I present.
> The attitude is like a window looking into this world.  I have spoken
> of this before, but I thought I would keep trying to promote this
> metaphysical concept.  If I consider being predetermined to think
> this, the soul completely disappears, and I have not seen that happen
> yet.  But perhaps "It is written" ("Maktub" in Arabic)

Existence is Value differentiated by an autonomous agent.  The 'will to 
action' is the exercise of free choice in accordance with one's 
value-sensibility within the space/time parameters of existential reality.

Have we actually achieved congruence on this issue?  If so, it will be a 
first time for me.
(Of course, our agreement will have no meaning to the Qualityland folks who 
don't acknowledge selfness and regard all experience as predetermined 
patterns of an all-controlling but undefinable source.)

Free-willingly yours,
Ham