[MD] Hot Stoves and What To Do About Them

[Ham Priday]

Greetings, Steve --


> Hi All,
>
> I wanted to clean the slate by starting a new thread to discuss the
> relationship of the association of free will with dynamic quality
> based on a few quotes from Lila.

Thanks for opening this discussion to the Group.  I commend you for having 
effectively demonstrated the problems inherent in Pirsig's morality thesis, 
especially as it concerns the exercise of free will.

Daniel Dennett and others have made the case that rational decisions can 
only be applied in a system that is consistent and predictable, and the 
"determinism" of natural laws makes this feasible.  In the interview with 
Reason magazine that I quoted back on June 21, Dennett said: "Determinism is 
not a problem.  What you want is freedom, and freedom and determinism are 
entirely compatible.  In fact, we have more freedom if determinism is true 
than if it isn't.  ...If determinism is true, then there's less randomness. 
There's less unpredictability.  To have freedom, you need the capacity to 
make reliable judgments about what's going to happen next, so you can base 
your action on it."

The core problem with Pirsig's Quality theory is not that Nature is 
deterministic, but that QUALITY IS ALSO.
Obviously if the Self that makes the decisions is only a pattern of Quality, 
and no decision can be made that is not controlled by Quality, then Free 
Will is non-existent.  No matter how you try to get around this paradox 
semantically, the logic is such that Free Will is unsupportable.

We simply cannot participate as free agents in a perfectly moral universe 
when that universe is directing all our moves.  As I see it, there are only 
two possible solutions to this problem.  Either Nature (the universe) itself 
is amoral, or the agent of morality (i.e., the measure of Value) functions 
independently of Nature.

[Steve, quoting Pirsig]:
> ... All the social sciences, including anthropology, were founded on
> the bed-rock metaphysical belief that these physical cause-and-effect laws
> of human behavior exist.  Moral laws, if they can be said to exist at all,
> are merely an artificial social code that has nothing to do with the real
> nature of the world.  A "moral" person acts conventionally, "watches out
> for the cops," "keeps his nose clean," and nothing more.
>
> In the Metaphysics of Quality this dilemma doesn't come up. To the extent
> that one's behavior is controlled by static patterns of quality it is
> without choice.  But to the extent that one follows Dynamic Quality, which
> is undefinable, one's behavior is free.

There are several fallacies in the author's analysis.  While it is true that 
moral laws constitute a "social code", man's sensibility to Value has 
EVERYTHING "to do with the real nature of the world."  Reacting 
"conventionally" is a conditioned habit, not moral behavior. This is true, 
incidentally, whether the action is jumping off a hot stove (because the 
Quality is low) or tipping one's hat upon greeting a lady (because that's 
what he is told to do.)

Also, as many times as this has been quoted, can I be the only one who sees 
the absurdity of this statement?
"To the extent that one's behavior is controlled by static patterns of 
quality it is without choice.  But to the extent that one follows Dynamic 
Quality, which is undefinable, one's behavior is free."  What Pirsig is 
saying is that one's behavior is controlled either by static patterns or by 
DQ.  Which can only mean that behavior IS NOT free!

[Steve, valiantly trying to circumvent the dilemma]:
> If getting off the stove is following DQ and if there was no conscious
> decision to get off the stove, then it was not a voluntary act. It was
> not a willing. So it would seem to be a serious error to call it free
> will when it doesn't involve will.
>
> On the other hand, if we can find examples of taking voluntary action
> to successfully follow DQ, then such examples would be examples of
> exercising free will based on Pirsig's formulation and the volition
> implied in the word "will." Can you think of any examples? One problem
> with finding such examples may be that DQ is pre-intellectual. Does
> that inhibit the possibility of making a conscious decision to follow
> it that could be correctly regarded as willing an intention?
>
> Again, since there seemed to be so much miscommunication, I started
> this new thread to hopefully reboot the conversation to make sure it
> is about Pirsig's philosophy instead of the personalities of the
> participants.

Steve, ALL conscious decisions are based on the value-sensibility of a free 
volitional agent (as opposed to Quality controlling a pattern or patterns). 
I shall say no more now, lest it be considered a reflection of my 
essentialistic "personality".

Valuistically speaking,
Ham