[MD] Moral Responsibility without free will

david buchanan dmbuchanan at hotmail.com
Sat Aug 6 12:51:10 PDT 2011


Steve said:
...moral responsibility and free will are not linked as a logical necessity.


Pirsig said:
"This battle has been a very long and very loud one because an abandonment of either position has DEVASTATING LOGICAL CONSEQUENCES."  "In the MOQ this dilemma doesn't come up."

dmb says:
Why does it not come up? Because in the MOQ, one does not have to abandon either position. We are controlled to some extent and we are free to some extent. We don't have to pretend that morality is "merely an artificial social code that has nothing to do with the real nature of the world" in order to save the laws of science and we don't have to "deny the truth of science" in order to assert free will. The MOQ does not escape these devastating logical consequences by abandoning free will and then simply defying logical consequences of it. It avoid this dilemma by showing that you do not have to choose one position to the exclusion of the other. The MOQ's reformulation is a new kind of compatibilism. The freedom of DQ and the constraining order of sq are both necessary.

Wiki says:
Compatibilism is the belief that free will and determinism are compatible ideas, and that it is possible to believe both without being logically inconsistent.[1] It may, however, be more accurate to say that compatibilists define 'free will' in a way that allows it to co-exist with determinism. ...In contrast, the incompatibilist positions are concerned with a sort of "metaphysically free will," which Compatibilists claim has never been coherently defined. 





 		 	   		  


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