[MD] free-will

[MarshaV]

 Ms. Albahari's project is to examine self/non-self, but she offers a way of looking at the issue that is very interesting.  She addresses the self in terms of 'self' and 'sense of self'.  She happens to offers free-will as an example of the way the problem can be approached.

     "...Let us suppose that hard determinism is correct and that there is no such thing as libertarian free-will (such free-will is incidentally a feature commonly ascribed to the self that will star in later chapters).  That is, we are supposing that it is not the case that, given a situation where we seem to exercise agency, we could have actually chosen (all other things being equal) to do otherwise.  Every action is fully determined by factors of which none pertain to an agent's freedom to act otherwise.  Libertarian free-will does not exist.  Yet we can still entertain the idea that many people do harbour a deep-seated sense/belief/assumption/feeling that, given an identical situation, they could have chosen to act otherwise.  This assumption of being a free agent, of having free-will, may well be real  ---  despite the fact that free-will does not, on this scenario, exist.  So while (on this given scenario) the sense or assumption of free-will exists, libertarian freewill does not exist: the deep-seated assumption turns out to be a mistaken one.  The hard determinists will attempt to explain the common belief in free-will not in terms of actual free-will  ---  which would subjectively seem to explain it  ---  but in terms of cognitive and psychological factors that do not include free-will...)"
 
        (Albahari, Miri, 'Analytical Buddhism: The Two-tiered Illusion of Self ', pp.17-18)
 
 
I can also see this tying into what Lila says in Chapter 14.   Anyway, it might be interesting to look at 'sense of free-will' compared to 'free-will'.  
  
 
 
   
 
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