[MD] self: agent of action & thinker of thoughts

[MarshaV]

On Aug 17, 2011, at 10:30 AM, Arlo Bensinger wrote:

> [Horse]
> And if this 'autonomous individual self ' is illusory then the conventional way of looking at free will is also illusory.
> 
> [Arlo]
> The way I see it, "free will" is intellectual pattern we use in an attempt to describe experience. Like "polar coordinates", it can be useful or not, and should be evaluated by how valuable a description it provides (is it pragmatically useful? or something like that).
> 
> As such, I think the "free will/determinism" patterns are far less useful (valuable) than "agency/structuration", also intellectual patterns we use to describe experience. Both are, of course, analogies, like "Cartiesian" versus "Polar" they are attempts to map experience.
> 
> The question I ask is, what is valuable about describing experience using "free will"? And can a better description (agency, for example) be more useful.

Marsha had written to Ian:

Yes, but Ms. Albahari's investigation is whether the 'sense of self' does, in fact, reflect a real 'self'.  A far more important investigation consider that RMP rejects an autonomous self.    

> 
> [Ian responded]
> Marsha, I don't call that rejection, but a warning as to the illusory nature of the autonomous individual self.


> [Arlo]
> I'm going to take exception to the term "illusory" and suggest instead that the concept of "self" has staying power because it is pragmatically valuable. It is an "illusion" only in response to the idea that it is some existential existant (is that redundant?). You sign your posts "Marsha" for a reason. From within a MOQ, a "self" is not an illusion OR an existant, it is a pattern of value, and should be evaluated as such.

Marsha:
Yes, I sign my posts 'Marsha' because it is a useful label.  But my investigation is into no-self (anatta).   As far as I am concern the 'sense of self' is real enough, but it does not reflect a real 'self'.  RMP used the word 'illusion'.  

"The MOQ, like the Buddhists and the Determinists (odd bedfellows) says this “autonomous individual” is an illusion."
      (RMP, Copleston) 


> So the "existential self" would be an illusion fostered by a concept such as "free will". And that's one reason why I think "free will" is not as valuable as term as "agency" (keeping in mind that "agency", like "free will" is also an intellectual pattern of value).

Marsha:
I agree  'free will', 'agency' and 'self' are intellectual static patterns of value, yet I am still interested in examining the strong 'sense of self' I experience and how it relates to a real self.  I want more than just RMP's words or the Buddha's, for that matter, I want to see for myself (as best I can).   


> "Agency", I hold, is a term that we can use to describe the range of potential responses any pattern has to its environment. It can apply to rocks (very, very, very little agency) and dogs (a greater range of agency) and humans (the greatest range of agency within a MOQ view). Whereas "free will" is a term that makes sense only (really) on the "human" or "self" scale, "agency" can apply across the MOQ hierarchy in a quite sensible way.



Marsha 


 
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