[MD] Morality and Prudence

[Matt Kundert]

Hi Carl,



Carl said:

To make an important distinction here, psychopath and sociopath 

are not interchangable words.  A psychopath experiences a break 

with reality, whereas a sociopath has no conscience.

...

Based on the definition ["...a pervasive pattern of disregard for, and 

violation of, the rights of others..."] provided by the American 

Psychological Association, it would appear that ALL morality is based 

in the intellect.  One definition of evil is intelligence without 

compassion.  I think that the intelligence part is necessary.  A tiger 

that kills an antelope isn't being evil, it's being a tiger.



Matt:

I think this is a wonderfully insightful note.  For one, Pirsig has a 

deeply ingrained suspiciousness of psychology, and more especially 

the profession.  However, there doesn't seem to be in the above any 

violation of Pirsigian insights about the philosophy of insanity (in other 

words, it's a nice restorative for our trust).  The psychopath, in fact, 

appears as Pirsig's insane brujo, outside the mythos (which makes it 

easy, then, to apply Pirsigian insight as a restorative to psychology).  



Second, however, it gives us a hint on how to help Pirsig distinguish 

between breakers of patterns, which Carl, I think, has brought out 

well.  There are two keys: 1) "compassion"--this is a feeling, and 

though we don't have a theory yet about emotions, I would submit 

cursorily that they are a biological/social hybrid (which means at the 

very least they are _at_ the social level).  However, 2) "the rights of 

others," Carl says, are "based in the intellect": rights are conferred 

because _we confer them_.  They are intellectual patterns, abstractly 

manipulated.  We made them up to express something: perhaps our 

compassion.  However, they are quite precisely distinguished from 

compassion (bio/social) for the exact purpose of dealing with 

someone like the sociopath: a person who just doesn't have that 

bio/social pattern.  Society used to kill such people to protect itself, 

but now our society has advanced to the stage where it doesn't have 

to: we have something explicitly external to follow, with sanctions in 

case you don't.  Follow these rules, and you can stay out of jail.  You 

may be a horrible human being, but you can have your freedom.



_Should_ we do this?  I think we must, and for Pirsigian reasons.  

The trick is to first understand that our society is not about 

reproducing the perfect human being.  A _perfect_ pedagogy, in 

fact, wouldn't produce a _single kind_ of human, because as Pirsig 

taught us, we _need_ variation in the hopes for a _more perfect_ 

human we can't yet envision (it's also built into our Constitution and 

made splendidly relevant by the former Senator from Illinois in one 

of the greatest speeches I've ever heard).  In other words, room for 

betterness (which calls into question the very idea of "perfection" or 

"bestness," though not the striving).  Dave's right: it would suck to 

have sociopaths.  But we shouldn't expect our pedagogy to wipe it 

out.  In fact, we need a moral philosophy that allows for their 

existence in society even while condemning the pattern for 

pedagogical reasons.  



Okay, so _why_ would we do this?  In case some sociopath is the 

next brujo.  That's the answer that Pirsig additionally offers to typical 

Millian liberal morality, which just says that you should leave people 

alone as long as they don't mess with other people.  Pirsig helps us 

to answer _why_ Mill was right: because leaving people alone to 

their own devices might help everyone in the long run.  Even though 

I doubt sociopathic behavior would be essential to his or her 

brujoness, i.e. lack of compassion would doubtfully be the next 

Dynamic leap forward, some sociopath might have a great role to 

play (or rather, create).



As the perfect example for my purposes: the new Sherlock Holmes 

by the BBC.  (Three excellent episodes on InstaFlix.)  The new 

Holmes is a puzzle-solver, a bored inference-machine that gets off 

on dispelling mysteries.  He's very similar to Monk (a show based 

itself on the Sherlock Holmes myth), but not only is he socially 

retarded, he's somewhat mean-spirited about it.  He's very quickly 

identified to us as a "freak" by police officers, and at one point a 

"rival" calls him a "psychopath" and Holmes snaps back "I'm a 

high-functioning sociopath, idiot, read a book."  The above 

description is exactly what he means.  One of the officers also notes 

that Holmes is a serial killer just waiting to happen, and it will 

happen when he gets bored of saving people.  And this prophecy 

scans with Holmes' behavior.  And after being a dick to numerous 

people, and repeatedly to Watson (played by the adorable Martin 

Freeman), in the third episode his lack of compassion--we almost 

by this point want to say "humanity"--erupts in Watson snapping at 

him on just this point.  Holmes scathingly asks whether compassion 

will help solve the puzzles and the people, and Watson wearily 

hangs his head in response.  To which Holmes sarcastically notes, 

"Oh, I see...you're disappointed in me."



Watson's disappointment is us judging Holmes harshly--and 

correctly--as a sociopath, though it has no effect on _his_ behavior.  

The scene just ends, with Holmes having the last assholish word, 

thumbing his nose at compassion, without which the world as a 

whole would be a Hobbesian nightmare.  The brilliance of the 

show is that Holmes _doesn't_ reform.  But people are still saved 

through his actions.  In punches up this seeming dilemma perfectly 

(as Carl put it): "Based on the above, this would NOT be moral 

behavior.  For the behavior to be moral, it must stem from inside the 

person, rather than from an outside agency.  From this perspective, 

would it be possible for someone to behave in a moral manner 

without feeling anything for the person their dealing with?"



All we need for this inside/outside is a sense of "inside" that is an 

internalization of the outside (which I called "autonomy" and offered 

a description of the process in the last post).  And this Holmes does 

lack.  And yes, it does seem possible for someone to "behave in a 

moral manner" and still _not_ be a moral person (along our 

assumed definitions).  And what the dilemma punches up is this: 

acting morally doesn't always matter.  It is still the thing we want, 

and should teach, but it doesn't always matter.  And--what's 

more--this isn't just a dose of realism, a lesson about the way the 

world works.  It's the way we _want_ the world.



Matt