[MD] self: agent of action & thinker of thoughts

[Ham Priday]

G'day, Mark --



On Mon, 8/22/2011 at 12:53 AM, "118" <ununoctiums at gmail.com> wrote:

> I have no idea how you can say that a world free of s/o has no
> free will.  It is all free will in such a world.  Of course there is a 
> free
> agent, anybody who uses the word "I" has immediately agreed to
> such a thing.  Else-wise they would be referring to themselves as
> "this servant" like some kind of misguided monk.

At least we concur that there is a free agent which we can call the Self. 
What I'm saying is that without a conscious subject (self) no value is 
realized, hence free will is meaningless.  (The reality of physical 
"objects" is another matter; however, regardless of how these are 
constructed, they are an essential part of our existential reality.)

[Ham, previously]:
> I don't quite follow the logic of reversing the Protagoras axiom
> "Man is the measure of all things" to "Things are the measure of man."
> The fact that man's world is "provided to him" does not make the
> world a measure of his values or behavior. On the other hand,
> eliminating the agency of value denies man the sensible realization
> on which morality is based and IMO makes life meaningless.

[Mark]:
> I have railed against Protagoras for many an eon.  That two trees
> are separated by some distance, is not a creation of Man.  Those
> trees are there, and man experiences them.  What Protagoras is
> stuck in, is complete subjectivism.  Kind of like the "brain in the vat"
> idea that leaves very little room for free will.  Does man measure
> that something is Hot?  Or is it hot and he experiences it?  Your
> sensible agent must be given something measurable.  Such a thing
> must therefore already have measurements.  We cannot create
> these things.

Okay, that brings up the "other matter" I referred to above.  Those trees 
are there BECAUSE man experiences them.  This is the objectivization of 
otherness that I call "actualization".  All the empirical data for anything 
in the experienced universe are derived from Essential Value.  When we 
differentiate this value by sensing it, we construct the objects that 
represent it.  Experiential reality is proprietary to each self as is the 
value realized from experience.

<snip>

[Mark]
> The Self is a free agent, the body/brain is not.  Have you ever tried
> to hold your breath forever?  There is very little that is free about
> our thoughts occurring.  What we do have freedom with is assigning
> an importance to those thoughts.  Such a thing occurs outside of the
> physical.  The self can absolutely act outside of causal criteria.  We
> do it all the time.  Ever change your mind for no reason what-so-ever?

Glad to hear you say that.  I even agree that "little is free about our 
thoughts OCCURRING".  However, since our experiential construct of realty is 
valuistic and proprietary to each self, as a qualitative precept, each 
self's reality is different from every other's.  In other words, the 
relation of a particular self (value-sensibility) to the essent (otherness) 
is a unique experience.

This may be an issue for another time.  I'm more interested right now in the 
"free agent" concept and the Pirsigians' opposition to it.  It would appear 
that I have your agreement that the agent itself is free to "assign 
importance" (relative value) to what it apprehends.  Causal criteria 
notwithstanding, valuation is what Protagoras meant by "the measure of all 
things".

Give that some contemplation, Mark, and see if it doesn't make sense in the 
context of
an essential ontogeny actualized (differentated) by free agents.  (I'll be 
happy to entertain any alternative concepts you may wish to offer.)

Valuistically speaking,
Ham