[MD] Freedom within structure.

[Ham Priday]

Steve, Dan, DMB, and All --

On Tuesday, 8/30/11 at  9:04 PM, "david buchanan" <dmbuchanan at hotmail.com> 
wrote:

> Steve said to Dan:
> ...Correct me if I am wrong, but I understood that you disagree
> with dmb's claim that Pirsig's conception of freedom is about the
> capacity of a rational agent to freely choose among a set of options.
>
> Dan replied:
> ... Did dmb say that a rational agent does the choosing?
> That sounds a lot like Ham.

Yep, it sure does!  It's interesting how this truth keeps popping up in the 
discussion, only to be drowned out by the dogma of the MoQ.  A while back 
Steve complained that "Pirsig does not talk about empathy, compassion, and 
love to explain morality."  This led to Matt's recounting of his wedding 
vows.

It isn't easy to explain human values, emotions, and desires when you reject 
the self that experiences them.  If all we are is a set of static patterns 
with no core libido, who or what is it that possesses these feelings?  Who 
is the Knower of Freedom, Quality, or compassion?   And where is Steve's 
"rational agent that does the choosing"?

David emphatically denies that he conceded anything like a free agent to 
Steve.  But here is what he did say:

[dmb to Dan]:
> If Pirsig can reject the Cartesian self or SOM's self and STILL say
> that one's behavior is free to some extent, then why can't we?
> I mean, don't the Pirsig quotes prove that the question of free will
> can be answered without committing yourself to the metaphysical
> framework we've already rejected? The question of freedom is still
> a question about you and your life, don't you think?

Doesn't "one's behavior" imply an agent or self?  And if the "question of 
freedom is about you and your life," how is that life identified other than 
as a proprietary 'self', 'subject', or 'free agent'?

Sooner or later the patterned illusion that Pirsig refers to as one's 
"perception" or "experience" must give way to the autonomous 'I' that knows 
itself, its values, and the reality it experiences.  Only by acknowledging 
the free self can the MoQ survive as a viable and comprehensible philosophy.

This is only my opinion, of course, and it will no doubt incite an effort to 
prove me wrong.  But I sense that others in this community are coming to the 
same conclusion.

Thanks for the opportunity to express an alternative view.

On behalf of individual freedom and personal responsibility,
Ham