[MD] Freedom within structure.

[Ham Priday]

Hi David (with amenities to Steve)--


> dmb says:
> Yes, I definitely think that Pirsig's comments about "one's behavior"
> are comments about the actions of the self.  But the MOQ does not
> construe [that] our moral agency [is] essentially rational [nor] does it
> construe the self as autonomous or proprietary.  As Dan rightly
> points out, the MOQ's self is not independent of the context in which
> he or she exists.  Like James and Dewey, Pirsig rejects the notion
> that we are fundamentally different from the world from which we
> emerged.  We are part of the ongoing process of evolution.

If you will allow me to describe the agency of selfness as I view it, rather 
than as the MoQ construes it, I think it may have more meaning within the 
context you have outlined.

First of all, selfness is proprietary because the individual subject is the 
"owner" or possessor of his/her conscious mind.  To discuss the Self in 
terms of  "one's behavior" is too restrictive and can be misleading. 
Actions (behavior) are an objective manifestation of an individual's 
response to a situation.  We cannot get inside another's Self to learn what 
prompted a particular response, so we judge a person by the actions 
observed.  If they are rational, harmless, and conform to what is 
"conventional' by society's standards, we call them moral.

I have no problem with the fact that the Self is dependent on the context 
("structure") of existence.  However, that structure is in large part a 
creation of the Self; so the relation of Self to Otherness is actually a 
co-dependency.  Also, when you deny that "we are fundamentally different 
from the world from which we emerged," what is your referent for "we"?   If 
it's the physical organism that we identify and relate to objectively as a 
fellow human being, then I can't quarrel with your assertion.  On the other 
hand, with due respect to James, Dewey, and Pirsig, there is no empirical or 
philosophical justification for claiming that the subjective Self is a 
product of biological evolution.

> What I have emphatically denied are the various positions that Steve
> has falsely assigned to me - and there have been many of these false
> attributions.  At various points, he has wrongly construed me as
> advocating pre-destination, the existence of divine souls, moral
> agency as essentially rational in nature (Plato, Kant, etc.) and the
> Cartesian self, just to name a few. Steve, on the other hand, simply
> denies that there is any moral agency in the MOQ. For Steve,
> apparently, freedom consists in knee-jerk reactions like jumping
> off a hot stove or single-celled organism moving away from sulfuric
> acid.  He thinks the MOQ has nothing to say about moral responsibility
> and he follows Sam Harris in thinking that people are as morally
> culpable as tornados. I think that Steve's position is completely
> ridiculous. Like I keep trying to explain to him, it's logically 
> incoherent
> and he has to misuse all the central terms in order to maintain this
> nonsense.  It seems me that he has a real hard time "interpreting"
> dictionaries and encyclopedia entries, not to mention the MOQ,
> about which he is not even in the ballpark. If I seem too emphatic,
> it's probably just a result of the frustration that comes from dealing
> with such an incorrigible "thinker".

I would suggest that Steve's "frustration" is a result of having to deal 
with a "logically incoherent" philosophy.  His statements are certainly not 
intended as a personal vendetta, and his conclusions are no more confused 
than anyone else who attempts to configure his epistemology to Mr. Pirsig's 
evolutionary paradigm.
The "hot stove" was Pirsig's ill-famed analogy for "the Quality experience", 
as was the unfortunate application of "value decisions" to inanimate 
objects.  If everything --including the self--is tied to evolution (i.e., 
natural process) it follows that 1) life is predestined, and 2) fundamental 
Reality is undetermined.  I submit that Dynamic in this context is a fancy 
word for "unstable", and that the author failed to posit a "first cause" or 
primary (uncreated) source for existence.

In my opinion, the MoQ is incomplete as a metaphysical theory, and the 
hierarchical levels of evolution do not account for the emergence of 
proprietary awareness which is necessary for the realization of Value.  I'm 
well aware that these are serious charges, but it's clear to me that the 
Quality thesis in its present form falls short of providing a meaning for 
cognizant life and is an inadequate guide to human morality.

So now, Dave, you can either add me to your list of "incorrigible thinkers" 
or find some positive value in my criticism that merits your attention.  In 
any case, as one who respects your dialectical skills and logical mind, I 
appreciate this response to my recent post.

Essentially speaking,
Ham