[MD] Realism and anti-realism

[Matt Kundert]

Hey Steve,

I'd never really thought about it before, but since you juxtaposed 
Rorty's redefinition of objectivity with Pirsig's, one can see how 
Rorty dovetails here with what Dan was calling Pirsig's idealism.  I 
don't take this idealism to be opposed to realism, but rather that 
third way.  Dan fancies bringing it to bear with a strong Cartesian 
and Berkeleyan flavor, which I think is misleading, but it does come 
out in Pirsig in those contexts when he's is facing down those 
scientistic and materialistic elements, so it shouldn't be that 
surprising.  Ultimately it has to be Hegelian-Deweyan to be the third 
way, which is where I think Pirsig ends up.

(And with no segue:) One reason I've lost more and more interest in 
philosophical disputation is that once one realizes that a stated 
philosophical position--any ism, say--may not be what the stater 
thinks it is, then it becomes more and more difficult to diagnose and 
analyze properly a position.  This shouldn't be surprising for a 
pragmatist because philosophical positions are just covers for habits, 
which is to say that a position only ever comes into existence 
between two conversants.  (Not exactly true: only as a reaction to a 
state of affairs.  But often it is a person saying something.)  So 
really, analyzing an ism is analyzing a set of habits, which is to say a 
whole set of people who have reacted a certain way.  But if you want 
an example of how squirrely people can be, just look at Mitt Romney 
in his recent interview with Fox.  It can be hard to figure out what a 
position is sometimes.

My favorite formulation of the issue is Richard Bernstein's, from his 
book Beyond Objectivism and Relativism.  Bernstein's first move in 
the book is to describe the condition that creates the two kinds of 
responses: Cartesian Anxiety.  As a good Deweyan, he wanted to 
describe something like a psychological condition for a philosophical 
response because in a certain way (that we still don't have a good 
grasp of), psychology and concepts dovetail.  Philosophical 
problematics are as much a response to life as building a fire, prayer, 
and belching.  My loss of nerve when it comes to disputation comes 
from the fact that it has become difficult for me to find the center of 
gravity to stated positions, such that they attain a relevant coherence 
as responses to life.  I can't figure, for example, if a person really 
does have Cartesian Anxiety, or they're just saying a thing 'cuz it 
seems like the thing to say.

Matt