[MD] The Hero's journey

[Matt Kundert]

Hey Dan,



[I began this post before you finished your own reply--you'll see the 

change-over, and perhaps the reason why I didn't reconfigure my 

response.]



I assume that you accidentally hit reply in the middle of your 
response,
 but I wish to stop you (if I could) to ask that you not go bit 
by bit 
through the post, responding as you think at the moment of 
reading, but 
read the whole thing and respond holistically.  For I've 
asked you to do
 one thing first and foremost if the conversation will 
move forward, and
 it should appear right up front.  I apologize for 
making demands, but 
it appears from the beginning of your response 
again that we would just 
keep spinning in the mud.  In response my 
suggestion that we bring 
unicorns into the mix you say, "But I did say 
why... I didn't 
recapitulate our discussion on NYC as I assumed 
(perhaps wrongly) that 
we made a little headway there, whereas by 
bringing unicorns into the 
discussion we are lowering the quality."  
-You- -are- -assuming- 
-wrongly-.  This has been the underlying 
thought behind my last few 
messages, which have began with 
versions of "I don't know what we're 
talking about."  I tried to 
consolidate what I thought about NYC and dog
 dishes, but your 
response confused me.  You insist that you have better
 assurance 
of NYC's existence then a dog dish in your own kitchen.  (If 
you even 
say you don't have a dog dish in your kitchen, you should just 
stop 
reading now and we can call this conversation quits.)  My attempts 

to figure out why have proven unsuccessful, and I think it revolves 

around the fact that I do not understand how you are consistently 
using 
words like "hypothetical," "imaginary," "experience," and 

"observation."  My thought experiment should've brought out some 
of 
those understandings, as would a comparison on the relative 
modes of 
existence of NYC, unobserved dog dishes, and unicorns.  
You think this 
would just lower the quality of the conversation, but 
I can't see why.  It would solidify a number of baselines for the 
parameters under which 
we could triangulate each others responses 
that we, apparently, each 
find suspicious (you for suspecting I'm a 
scientific materialist I gather; me for
 suspecting you're a Cartesian).



So, if you want to continue, please begin by responding to this:



Matt said:

I've been, for quite a while, trying to figure out what you think the 

relationship is between first-person experience and 
Quality-experience, 
and additionally rock-experience.  I haven't been 
able to figure the 
consistency of your usage, and you also haven't 
elaborated a theory of 
any kind.  Dave has had this problem, too, as 
we can tell from his last 
response and your brush-back in reply.  
(This was his "oh, I think I see
 the problem."  I had a similar light bulb 
go off about your use of 
"imaginary" three weeks back, but I've yet to 
figure out how you are 
consistently using that term, either.)



If you want to continue this conversation, you will have to supply an 

outline of how you will consistently use, for the sake of this 

conversation, the following terms: "experience," "imaginary," "direct 

experience," "indirect experience," "hypothetical," "presupposition," 

"observation," "common sense," "philosophy," "thought-experiment," 
and 
"independent of experience."  We can start there.  I'm sorry it 
has come
 to this, but given the wheel-spinning, there's no reason to 
converse if
 we can't consistently stay on the same page of the 
conversation.



However, since I've begun this post, I see that you've responded to 
those two bits like this:



Dan said to the first paragraph:

As far as I could see, his attempt at discerning the problem was not 

quite correct, as I attempted to explain. You seem to be asking for 

answers to questions but when I attempt to offer an explanation you 

either ignore what I said or claim I am being inconsistent. I supposed 

earlier in our discussion that we are both coming from vastly 
different 
background and that is one reason for our disagreements. 
As the 
discussion progressed, it seems as if you believe I have this 
all 
figured out and I am merely withholding that knowledge. In fact, 
I am 
pretty much making this up as I go along although (of course) 
I am 
drawing on the knowledge I have gleaned over the last dozen 
years of 
participation in this discussion group and the continued 
study of RMP's 
work.



Matt:

I'm sorry you thought I was ignoring you.  I thought I was engaging 
the 
answers you had given.  (Perhaps, in fact, in the mode of 
wondering 
about the presuppositions to your answers.)  That would 
be one problem 
in our conversation: you didn't think I was being fair 
to you.  The 
claims of inconsistency weren't mean to be malicious, 
but they are 
necessary, particularly if one doesn't have it all figured 
out.  I have 
absolutely no wish to pressure anyone to only speak or 
write when they 
"have this all figured out," whatever the "this" is.  
That is sincere. 
 But in the midst of conversation, isn't it imperative 
that we try and 
carve out the consistent space we call "the 
philosophical position I 
want to occupy"?  I have been trying to 
understand what your position is
 in regard to things like NYC and 
dog dishes (and now unicorns), but I 
don't get it.  You did attempt to 
explain, but it appears that we have 
each reached the end of our 
rope, where we have no more will to try 
again at either explaining or 
attempting to understand.



One thing I would insist, though, is that you not blame this on elitism,
 
which is what I sense you keep edging toward with "vastly different 

background" and "merely withholding the knowledge."  You're 
emoting a 
sense that I've done you an injustice, but I'm sorry: I 
explained what I
 meant by "reticence" and it is just that there are 
intuitions about the
 way the world works that I'm trying to elicit from 
you that I'm not 
getting and I'm at wits end to understand how to ask 
for them.  We are 
not on the same page.  And this is how you 
responded to that (which was my second paragraph above):



Dan said:

You're right... you would probably be better served directing your 

comments to folk like dmb and Steve Peterson. They seem much 
better at 
elaborating what it is you seem to be after here. For the 
record though,
 the dictionary definitions are a good beginning point 
for all the words
 you are seeking to identify.



Matt:

I was after what you thought, because it appeared that you 
disagreed 
with something.  And absolutely no, dictionary definitions 
are not a 
good beginning point because I wanted to know how _you_ 
were going to 
_use_ your words so that I could then only use them 
in that matter.  
Think of it like a contract: we would each attempt to 
stay consistent to
 them.  If I'm not mistaken, you said at one point 
that the unobserved 
dog dish in the kitchen was "imaginary."  But 
how does that stay 
consistent with the dictionary definition, which 
tends to reflect common
 sense and would reserve "imaginary" for 
unicorns?  Do you see?  I 
wanted not just definitions, but also an 
idea of how you would 
consistently _use_ the words to carve out a 
consistent understanding of 
Pirsig's epistemology.  Is there no 
difference between a unicorn and an 
unobserved dog dish?  I have 
no ability to predict how you'd respond to 
that question, or what kind 
of difference you would elaborate.  That's 
bad.  That means I don't 
understand you.  Predictability is of the 
essence when one aims for 
consistency.



I think part of this is attributable to your read-and-respond mode of 

engaging a post.  It appears that you write whatever occurs to you 
when 
you read a block of text.  When we don't have something 
completely 
figured out, though, this can cause a weather-vane 
effect, as one is 
blown in the direction of whatever intuition about 
the way the world 
works is cued up by the block in question.  The 
problem with this is 
that we can have conflicting intuitions.  It is the 
purpose of 
philosophy to help make them more consistent.  I've been 
trying to put 
together holistically your responses, to try and figure 
out what their 
center of gravity is.  I got nothing.  That doesn't mean 
it isn't there,
 it just means it's beyond my powers to understand 
where you 
philosophical "are" through the kinds of responses you're 
giving me.



I read an entire post before I go back and compose a response.  This 

allows me to soak the whole thing in and gives me a better chance to 

have a consistent line of thought in all of the itemized responses 
(how 
successful that consistency is is of course a separate question).

All this being said, and because you appear to have come to the 
conclusion at the end of your last post that I'm maliciously 
misconstruing you, I want to pull out one place where I think I can 
succinctly demonstrate that there is something you are doing that 
you are not acknowledging.  Whatever consistency there is might be 
further talked about, and I do not do this to be malicious or claim 
you're stupid or any other hang ups we might have in a conversation.  
We cannot understand what we are doing until we understand what 
we are doing.  Tautological, yes, but you've increasingly claimed that 
I already know answers to things I want clarification about.  What I 
want to know is the relationship you see between "observation" and 
"experience" (and really, between the "indirect" and "direct" kinds), 
but you think I'm jerking your chain.  I'm not jerking your chain.  I'm 
trying to understand you, Dan, and I'm sorry my frustration is 
bubbling over.  This is the series:

Matt said first:
However, maybe you misspoke, and meant that Don wouldn't have 
_that specific_ worry of "if I leave the room, maybe the dog dish will 
disappear!" unless he was mentally impaired, and that's what 
common sense tells you.  You'd probably be right then, but you'd have 
also short-circuited the thought-experiment before it told you anything 
interesting.  The interesting part only appears when you recognize 
Don's similarity to Descartes.

Dan said then:
So we have to entertain the Cartesian notion that the world of 
objects is independent of we as subjects doing the observing. Why is 
that interesting? It seems more like backsliding to me...

Matt said:
No, Dan, it's about understanding what a successful defusing of 
Cartesianism looks like.  One has to understand what it means to give 
a Cartesian response before one can understand how to avoid giving 
a Cartesian response.  (And note that you've conflated "observation" 
with "experience" again here.)

Dan said:
Huh. I don't see that I wrote "experience" so I assume you are 
assuming again...

Matt:
I have to, Dan, because you won't tell me.

If I'm not mistaken, you have been pressing the claim that Dave and 
I construe "object permanence" as "independent of experience."  You 
then shake your head, saying that doesn't make any sense from a 
Pirsigian standpoint.  We agree, so we've tried to explain what 
"object permanence" is _without_ relying on the anti-Pirsigian claim 
of "independent of experience."  The sense of "experience" in this 
phrase is the one you give here: "It isn't my experience. It is 
experience."  That's the sense of Quality=reality=experience=DQ; 
the sense in which it is the ocean our individual bodies is a boat in.  
We agree that nothing can be independent of "experience" _in that 
sense_.

But look at your construal of Cartesianism: "the world of objects is 
independent of we as subjects DOING THE OBSERVING."  Suddenly, 
so it seems to me as I've attempted to keep a tally on what the 
center of gravity of your philosophical position is, you've substituted 
your problem of anything being "independent of experience" with 
"independent of we as subjects doing the observing."  However, I 
don't know what you think the relationship is between 
Quality-defined-experience and subject-observing.  But because of 
the rhetorical condition of this answer (in which Cartesianism is the 
problem to be avoided), it appears as if you'd interchanged 
Quality-experience with subject-observation, thus making them 
synonymous in the philosophical position you are occupying in this 
conversation.  

I can't be sure about this synonymy because I still cannot predict 
your responses to questions about different modes of existence that 
NYC, unobserved dog dishes, and unicorns may or may not have.  
Therefore, I cannot properly evaluate whether I agree or disagree 
with you.  I may have misunderstood what you meant.  But you aren't 
telling me what the consequences of your statements are to our 
overall conversation or to your overall position, so I have to 
_assume_ some possibilities and field them in order to get a read on 
what you "mean."  And I'm getting tired of it, particularly as you seem 
to think I'm doing something malicious by trying to understand you.  

The above line of reasoning is why I suggested that your use of 
"observing" signaled a conflation of "observation" and "experience," 
despite the fact that you didn't use it.  Also, irrespective of your 
position, I would posit that Pirsig does not think that 
Quality-experience can be interchanged with subject-observation.  
(And this might be partly because I do not think the passage from 
Lila's Child that you furnished suggests that Pirsig thinks that, as you 
put it, "subject/object thinking is commensurate with subject/object 
metaphysics."  That would entail exegesis on both our parts, which 
I will forgo presently.)

Matt

> Date: Sun, 11 Dec 2011 13:58:00 -0600
> From: daneglover at gmail.com
> To: moq_discuss at moqtalk.org
> Subject: Re: [MD] The Hero's journey
> 
> On Sat, Dec 10, 2011 at 4:53 PM, Matt Kundert
> <pirsigaffliction at hotmail.com> wrote:
> >

> > Matt:
> > I believe that Pirsig does not see the situation as you put it.  You have
> > conflated "SOM" with "subject/object interpretation."  I would not do
> > this.  When Pirsig says the LC bit you speak of, I believe he's
> > suggesting that subjects and objects can be redescribed from within
> > the MoQ, which is what Dave and I have been after.  I do not believe
> > he is saying that common sense rests irrevocably on SOM.  I also
> > see no reason, irrespective of Pirsig, to think that common sense
> > rests irrevocably on particular philosophical interpretation.
> 
> Dan:
> I assume we are all after staying within the framework of the MOQ. sdermn