[MD] Psychology and Philosophy

[Matt Kundert]

Hi Mark,

I think we are largely talking past each other.  You have associations 
with the discipline I largely don't, which isn't to say I "agree" with 
psychology, but more that these horrible things you ascribe to 
psychology (and I agree sound horrible), I don't ascribe.  If I had to 
press the one difference that makes the most difference at the most 
abstract level, it's that you treat "psychology" monolithically, as this 
one object you ascribe things to.  I don't really treat it that way.  I 
deal more at the level of individual psychologists (for example, 
mistreating and misdiagnosing patients) and individualized research 
programs (some of which can be pernicious, though I think most of 
the pernicious ones have withered away).  But here's some 
scattered remarks:

Mark said:
Yes, perhaps I am taking the term psychology too literally.  However, 
modern psychology claims that our feelings are simply a result of the 
environment, or our DNA.  It is this reductionist notion from 
psychology that is detrimental to MoQ in my opinion.  It takes 
determinism into the subjective.

Matt:
I'm not sure all research programs do this.  (I should also remark 
that I should differentiate "research program" from "therapeutic 
program," but I'm not sure how much it matters.  Therapists, in my 
experience, are usually pragmatic in their approach, and choose 
whatever tool from a research program, like from Jung or Adler, 
that works.  They don't it seems to me really care that much about 
pressing for one program's ultimate truth over another.)  However, 
I also don't really know how wide you are casting "simply a result 
of the environment."  It would perhaps help to know what you 
thought the missing element(s) are in addition to environment and 
biological makeup.

Mark said:
I forget exactly what he said (and I couldn't find it, so maybe I made 
it up) but is was something to the effect that our philosophy is rooted 
in our psychology.  This is saying that science or reason can explain 
why we do science and reason.   When I hear psychological terms 
bandied about, I become concerned.  That is, when "such and such" 
explains why we do things or feel certain ways.

Matt:
It might have been me, too, but I guess I don't see what's so 
inherently pernicious-sounding in the root metaphor.  (And when did 
"motive" become a narrowly disciplinary term?  I'm not sure I saw 
the bandying you did.)  And remember, "our" psychology.  Why 
wouldn't our motivations for opening our mouths matter to what 
comes out?  I guess I still have a very vague grip on what you mean 
by "psychological terms" and what I should feel stand-offish about.  
Maybe I just don't fear reductionism as much in this area because I 
don't hear the reductionism in the formulations (or the members of 
the discipline).

Mark said:
A comment to you list of names.  There is a difference between 
drawing from all these men, and finding that what they profess is 
resonates with what you feel.  If something written by these people 
resonates with you, it is not because you are being unduly influenced 
by these writers, it is because what they say is in harmony with you 
at that particular time and place.  Nobody can dictate the reality of 
things, they can only share their reality.  If it sounds good to you, it is 
because you are in the right place.  If it is a round peg which fits your 
round hole, then that is good.  If it happens to be square, then it is 
nonsense as far as you are concerned, until perhaps you get there.

Matt:
I'm not sure I catch the purport of these remarks.  It sounds like 
you're making the transition between a square hole to a round hole 
mysterious.  Because if I were to be asked how I transitioned from 
the square hole of non-philosophical thinking to the round hole of 
philosophical thinking, I would say, "Pirsig's ZMM."  But then, I give 
a lot of credence to Percy Bysshe Shelley: "Poets are the 
unacknowledged legislators of the world."

Also, if you think the above, how could you also think that the 
discipline of psychology has changed our psychology?  Perhaps I 
don't understand what you mean by "unduly influenced" as it is 
assimilated to "nobody can dictate the reality of things."

Matt said:
What is this study?  Hard to say, but if you accept the proposition that 
philosophy is a human response to life, then you will be concerned 
about the state of the mind when it responded in a particular fashion.  
That doesn't mean the "particular fashion" (e.g., "philosophy") can 
be _reduced_ to the "state of the mind."  But pragmatists were really 
big on emphasizing the continuity of philosophy to other tools 
humanity had constructed to help itself deal with reality (like fire, 
airplanes, or science).  And because of that it verged into uncharted 
territories about what certain kinds of beliefs do for us, in all kinds of 
facets of "do for us."

Mark said:
Well, I do not accept that proposition as written.  For it is incorrect to 
separate philosophy from life.  I would prefer to say that philosophy is 
one aspect of life.  

Matt:
I guess I don't see the difference between what you said and I said.  
To supply an analogy, you do separate "philosophy" from "life": one 
is spelled one way, the other another way.  If they weren't different 
in some fashion, we wouldn't continue to need two words for them.  
If there weren't different in some fashion, you wouldn't have the 
traction to make the distinction you do want to make.  For I agree, 
philosophy is, as you say, an aspect of life, just as I pointed out fire, 
airplanes, and science are.

Mark said:
The term "a state of mind" if used as a term for reduction is on the 
road to modern psychology.  If we are reducing philosophy to the sum 
total of what has happened before, then this is an oversimplification.  
For, as the "before" was happening we were in a process of 
evaluation of that happening; I do not believe that our way of 
thinking can be simplified in that way. It is like saying that the mind 
is a machine and stuff goes in then comes out depending on how the 
gears are oiled.  But to deal with the broader context of your 
paragraph, it is hard to differentiate between "dealing with our 
reality", and "creating our reality".  But, yes, so long as we see all 
these things as tools that we can take or leave, then perhaps we 
have a modicum of freedom.  However, after fourteen years (to start) 
of education, how much freedom do we really have.  We are taught 
how to march; how then can we dance?

Matt:
Maybe this is another difference: I don't see the "free will vs. 
determinism" debate as an issue that could muck up what we do in 
life.  I don't think our actual freedom is ever at risk by philosophical 
positions.  Or, perhaps I should say that if people really were 
convinced that they were a slave to a certain thought-process and 
could not do otherwise (which seems to be what you are conceiving 
of the evil of reductionist psychology), then yes, they wouldn't be 
able to free themselves.  But I think such an outcome highly unlikely, 
and I would present the analogy of the history of Western religion, 
in which creedal dogmas eventually lost their efficacy.  (A wonderful 
book to see the kind of cultural process I see at work is Chinua 
Achebe's Things Fall Apart, though ironically (and for its author, too) 
it is the fading away of indigenous Igbo beliefs in the face of a 
usurper Christianity.)

What you describe in your paragraph as "an oversimplification" is, I 
agree, exactly that.  I don't think either Dave or I wanted to imply it, 
and my invocation of Hegel is designed to ward off that specter, as 
he conceived of "experience" as a process (at least on Robert 
Brandom's reckoning) which required us to take into account the 
output in addition to the uptake.  In fact, when you say it is "hard to 
differentiate between 'dealing with our reality' and 'creating our 
reality,'" I quite agree and think it is another version of the 
conundrum I didn't think it terribly important to worry over, about 
whether we altered because we better understand or we better 
understand because we altered.

Mark said:
Again, it is the intrusion of a quasi-science into the realm of the 
subjective that I find inappropriate.  For, by making the subjective 
objective we create a reality which leaves out the self.  These times 
present much credence into science, to the point that we believe 
what the "great scientists" say just because they say it.

Matt:
Maybe you and I live in different "times," which is a function of being 
part of different local communities.  I don't see so much blindness, at 
least no more than the kind everyone shows.  And I start there as a 
reply to this bit because I don't know what you mean by 
"quasi-science" or "realm of the subjective" or "leaving out the self."  
I think I would understand them if I were using presuppositions from 
SOM, but it would be inappropriate of me to willy-nilly attribute that 
to you.

Mark said:
As I see it, the discipline of psychology as it stands has little to do 
with philosophy.  It is trying to use equations to predict one's reaction 
to a sunset.

Matt:
I think we're acquainted with different psychology books and 
psychologists.

Mark said:
What ever happened to experiencing reality without having to read 
how to do it.

Matt:
Yeah...I don't know who does do that, so I guess I don't get the 
thrust of your rhetorical question.

Mark said:
I do not believe that psychology has anything to do with 
understanding ourselves.  Again, I am using the term as it is taught 
in universities.

Matt:
We must have gone to very different universities.

Mark said:
Yes, psychology is creating our understanding of ourselves because it 
is in vogue and we read about it in books.  Is there really a "science" 
behind understanding oneself?  Did people not understand themselves 
in the past?  Are we now so much better at understanding ourselves?  
Or are we just going along with the head trip?

Matt:
Depends on what you mean by "science."  If you use it like a 
materialist-SOMist, then no, there can't be a science of the self.  If 
you use it like a Greek would, then sure, there can be a science of 
self, though it's doubtful it could ever be codified and systematized 
(too many different selves).

I don't know.  I guess I do think we understand ourselves better 
nowadays.  Part of this is because of fields like psychology, though 
it's also because of every other branch of knowledge (from physics 
to literature).  I can't think of why I should view psychology as evil 
nor why I shouldn't view us as having made strides in cultural 
progress.

Matt