[MD] Psychology and Philosophy
Matt Kundert
pirsigaffliction at hotmail.com
Mon Dec 12 20:50:57 PST 2011
> dmb says:
> My suspicion is that Mark's problem with
psychology is personal, not philosophical. I suspect Mark is here
largely because he is sympathetic with Pirsig's criticisms of psychiatry
and/or Pirsig's defense of insanity as a kind of adjustment period.
It's between the lines, but the man is complaining about his own
personal encounter with psychology.
Well, that's what we all do, to a certain extent, right? It all begins
personally. Pirsig's philosophical journey began personally. I find it
hard to negotiate such personal encounters philosophically for that
exact reason. Ultimately, we are all thrown back on our first-person
encounters with the world. So what's the right mode to negotiate at
the philosophical level that neither violates the experience we've
accumulated nor is limited to the single window we've been
granted...?
I know while reading Mark I've thought about, for example, how I
would treat Pirsig's description of psychologists as not "kin."
Something about Pirsig's mode of transforming the personal into the
philosophical still scans in those sections, even if I don't have Pirsig's
personal apprehension about psychologists (I should rather say "the
narrator's," I suppose).
> From: dmbuchanan at hotmail.com
> To: moq_discuss at moqtalk.org
> Date: Mon, 12 Dec 2011 20:44:44 -0700
> Subject: Re: [MD] Psychology and Philosophy
>
>
> pirsigaffliction said to Mark:
> My suspicion, which puts us at odds, is that you have a reductionist view of the discipline of psychology, one that only focuses on reductionists. But I don't know. ...The problems you want to talk about seem to me much more discussable only when we don't talk at such an abstract level as you do. But I'm likely in the minority here, as Pirsig does discuss these problems at that level of abstraction. But either way, your conditional claim that "the intent of psychology to 'understand' the mind through rigorous data collection" doesn't seem right to me as history or conceptual substance. ...
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