[MD] Dog Dishes and Direct Experience

[Matt Kundert]

Hey Dan,

Dan said:
You seemed to enjoy Ron's copy and paste job of the old Abbott and 
Costello bit. Wow. That must have been a tough one for him to come 
up with. What a wit. Anyway, I thought I'd throw in a little original 
humor... try and be a little constructive instead of destructive... too, 
you offered a thought experiment so I offered a thought experiment. 
I realize it's an old device to heap ridicule on others during a 
discussion, especially when one person cannot hold up their end... I 
expected it from Ron but I hoped for better from you... regardless...

Matt:
I'm bemusedly confused.  What I'm confused about is what the above 
prefacing paragraph to your response-post has to do with me.  Up 
front as it is, it's as though you thought I thought Ron's pasting was 
_really, really_ funny, and that my amusement was importantly 
connected to my reply to your thought-experiment.  The joke, after 
all, was a couple reply-cycles ago, and I made one small allusion to it, 
so why talk about it now?.  (Granted, my allusion was as preface, but 
where else was it supposed to go, as I didn't think it was that 
important?  Yours seems different on this point.)  It's as though you 
felt that my "Okay, Ron, now I find it funny..." required that you justify 
your choice in writing the thought-experiment, and that I've likewise 
disappointed you--either because you feel you need to justify yourself 
or because I had been amused by Ron.  "Hoping for better" seems to 
suggest the former, but I'd already taken your thought-experiment 
seriously and replied to it seriously.  And if it's for chuckling at Ron... 
I dare say I can't imagine I'm seriously to be required to justify my 
sense of humor.  (A sense, I might add, that usually does not get in 
the way of my conversation partners being able to take me seriously, 
which is something not everyone can say.)  Anyways, as you said, 
regardless...

Dan said:
I see you are still concerned with Don... I am (still) unsure though 
why Dave's explanation of the concept of object permanence would 
mollify his worries any better than my "what dish?" would... unless 
you are saying that objects have the "state or quality of lasting or 
remaining unchanged indefinitely." (definition of permanence, 
dictionary.com) in which case Don might well be happy and quit his 
whining. Still whining Donnie? Have you heard enough? I've had to 
listen to that for centuries. (Extra points for knowing the source of 
this quasi-quote.)

That is why I used the idea of a perpetual motion machine (clearly 
an impossibility) in my little story... something that never changes 
and goes on indefinitely. But now you seem to be backtracking... you 
seem to be saying that wasn't what you meant by the concept of 
object permanence... you throw a monkey wrench into the 
equation... all things being equal. But what is Don to think of this?

Matt:
I'm going to skip trying to convince you that I haven't backtracked to 
get to the substance.

What I'm unclear about is the problem you have with the relationship 
between the "concept of object permanence" and the Don's dog dish 
thought-experiment.  You say you're unsure why it would mollify 
Don's worries.  I'm unclear why you're unsure.  The really short 
paraphrase I made way for in my last post was

1.  Don forgets common sense.
2.  Chris reminds Don of common sense.

What the "concept of object permanence" is is a philosophical 
explication of the common sense we _take for granted_.  As you 
seem to agree, "common sense" is that which we take for granted.  
What we might disagree about is the philosophical utility of 
explicating what we take for granted.  But I'm not sure.  But on the 
other hand, your response to Don is

1. Don forgets common sense.
2*.  Chris asks, "What dog dish?"

I offered one explanation of what your question does.  (Calls 
attention to the presuppositional nature of reality, or at least common 
sense.)  Ultimately what I've been saying is that 2 and 2* don't 
conflict, they are rather two sides of the same philosophical project.  
However, it seems from your critical pushing that you either think 
they do conflict or you don't think my interpretation of what the 
question does is adequate.  But I'm genuinely still perplexed about 
what philosophical ground you wish to occupy.  I know you wish it to 
be the same ground as Pirsig's, but that's still up for grabs until I can 
understand what you're saying independently.

Dan said:
If I were Don I might have to wonder if ceteris paribus is all that 
informative when it comes to my dog dish existing or not when I 
leave the room. In fact, if I were Don I might suspect that is where 
my dis-ease arises... given the two choices, and all other things 
being equal, of checking on my dog dish or not checking on it, I might 
become more worried yet, being compelled to check on that dog dish 
time and again. All things being equal, I know nothing lasts forever. I 
know things get stolen all the time.

Matt:
I was hoping you wouldn't push critically on the ceteris paribus clause.  
I warned you that it might have devastating consequences for Pirsig's 
massively important use of it in Lila, Ch. 13: "In general, given a 
choice of two courses to follow and all other things being equal, that 
choice which is more Dynamic, that is, at a higher level of evolution, 
is more moral."  This is a fundamental claim in motivating the 
Metaphysics of Quality to work in helping us make moral choices 
(which, I have found, has been a claim many have found very 
important to hold, and every year or so trails across the MD in 
threads about the MoQ's utility for life).  (I should add, in case people 
become perplexed about the breadth of this claim of "many have 
found," that I have not done any research into the empirical basis of 
this claim about Pirsigians in the MD, and it is based on my mere 
impression from experience.)

Your push applies itself quick directly to Pirsig's usage as you've 
formulated.  (I can't help but think you did that on purpose, though 
I'm not sure why you then didn't direct yourself to the more 
immediate threat to Pirsig's philosophy.)  Pirsig's claim is that given 
two choices, all things being equal, it is more moral to choose the 
Dynamic over the static.  Your critical push of "all things being equal, 
I know nothing lasts forever" transforms into "all things being equal, 
I know people are wrong a lot about judging a thing Dynamic when 
it turns out to be degenerate."  This, like the OCD that never let's a 
person out of the house because they are constantly worried the 
stove is on, creates a situation in which you can never choose 
Dynamic because you can never make any choice at all.

Dan said:
(Geez, Matt... I can't get that dish off my mind now... explain to me 
once again about the concept of object permanence. What? What do 
you mean... it doesn't mean that nothing ever breaks! Are you 
serious? What if my dog dish breaks... Fido will starve to death and 
I will never know it. Thanks a lot for that... that really sets my mind 
to ease. Where is dmb when you need him?)

Matt:
I can't tell whether you are actually asking me a question, or are just 
fooling around rhetorically, but I'm going to pretend that you just 
straightforwardly asked me to recapitulate the idea I have in mind for 
"the concept of object permanence" (since it seems you still are 
having difficulty, as "nothing last forever" isn't a very good puncture 
wound to the ceteris paribus clause involved in the concept).  What I 
have in mind is the pattern of behavior we take for granted that tells 
us not to worry that the room disappears when we close our eyes.  
This was a real epistemological problem for Berkeley created by the 
Cartesian problematic.  It's called the Problem of the External World 
more generally.  The concept was to express why we don't in 
practice take that seriously.  Don suddenly, and for no reason, took 
the idea seriously that his dog dish's position in spacetime was 
threatened by his not looking at it.  So what do we do?  (I see two 
good options.)

Dan said:
What we seem to be discussing by introducing ceteris paribus is the 
concept of control. Your saying all other things being equal sets up 
specific parameters in which the though experiment will function. It 
reminds me of the Copenhagen interpretation. I pulled this quote 
from Henry Folse's book which Robert Pirsig used as a reference in 
his SODV paper:

"So sometimes a particle acts like a particle and other times it acts 
like a wave. ... Bohr is basically saying that nothing is real unless it 
is observed."

Is the dog dish being measured when it isn't observed? And if it isn't 
being measured, all other things being equal, does it exist? But... you 
say... the dish has been measured. We can attribute certain 
properties to it such as the ability to hold dog food, unless, of course, 
an elephant happens by and steps upon it (inadvertently of course) 
while no one is observing. It looked like a dog dish but now it looks 
like a platter. So which is it? Isn't it meaningless to ascribe any 
property to said dish when it isn't being observed, just as it is 
meaningless to say a particle is a wave or not? Isn't Don better off 
just dumping some food on the floor and saying the hell with that 
dog dish?

Matt:
"Ceteris paribus" as setting up parameters might be a good way of 
thinking about it.  The minor work I've done on its difficulties, though, 
leads me to believe that it sets up _necessarily implicit_ parameters, 
which means that the _context_ that is demarcated explicitly _cannot_ 
be expected ever to be explicitly demarcated _completely_.  The 
quickest way, perhaps, to articulate the thought behind this is to point 
at the unboundedness of Quality/DQ.  Experience will always be able 
to throw new possibilities to be taken into account.  Every explicit 
conceptual/static line is a mutable line drawn in the sand of DQ.

That doesn't give us a handhold, however, on either my use of it or 
Pirsig's.  I'll limit myself to the problem of perception.  In my use of 
it for Don, the concept of object permanence's ceteris paribus clause 
forces one to present _local and defined_ doubts to the 
object-in-question's status.  It rules out Cartesian global doubt about 
the reality of every extended thing by suggesting it isn't a real doubt 
because of the overwhelming evidence that, e.g., dog dishes don't 
disappear in kitchens when we leave them (based on, what you've 
called "circumstantial," evidence like our dog not dying and Chris 
being in the kitchen and saying, "Yep, still here").  In other words, 
the concept tells us that "leaving the room" is not a _good reason_ 
for having the doubt.  There are, of course, other good reasons 
bracketed out by the ceteris paribus: it would be unequal for the dog 
dish's 1,434th straight day in the kitchen if a burglar broke in and 
stole it.  (Not unequal, of course, in the fullness of time, but to me 
that tells against the utility of the notion of eternity, not the concept 
or ceteris paribus.)

You have, however, shown great resistance to the idea that Chris, or 
any other kind of "circumstantial" evidence," could give plausibility to 
Don's acquaintance to common sense.  I'm not still not sure precisely 
on what grounds.  As I've presented the issue, however, it does 
make your resistance identical with Cartesian doubt, which is a bad 
idea.

What about Bohr?  I think Pirsig gives us the conceptual resources to 
affirm what Bohr said without also affirming a Cartesian idealism.  It 
was the kind of answer I was sniffing around when I asked you 
weeks ago whether only people can have experience (something like 
that).  For what counts as "observation" here?  Pirsig has, after all, 
overturned the idea that only people have values and thus evaluate: 
everything does.  Does everything "observe" in some sense of the 
term?  I think the answer, for Pirsig, is yes, and trails down the road 
of what it means to be a particular kind of static pattern of value 
(not every kind of static pattern values/observes/interacts in the 
same way).

So should we not ever attribute properties to objects we aren't 
observing?  I take it you are moving toward a "no, we shouldn't" 
answer.  The only reason, it seems to me, that we should be forced 
to say this is if one's very own contemporaneous first-personal 
experience of an object is _the only thing_ that can justify the 
attribution of properties.  But how is it that I successfully plan a trip 
to the supermarket every Sunday?  I attribute, at the very very least, 
to the supermarket the property of "Open for business," and that 
supposition is confirmed every week.  In fact, if I didn't make that 
attribution, I would either 1) never go to the supermarket and so 
starve to death (along with Fido, who'd also never get more food) or 
2) show up at the supermarket at wrong times more often than I 
would if I could make the attribution, since I would just go randomly 
to the store (because I would be choosing blindly the time I went if I 
couldn't make attributions).

Matt