[MD] Digesting the world and burping Quality: An Analogy

[John Carl]

Hello Ham and Adrie,

I've taken your advice Ham and changed the subject line.  Yes, it was
bugging me too.  While I'm at it, I'm going to blend in Adrie's commentary
into this one, starting with:


=>two camps,one follows the philosophical line of reasoning
(Ham on his own).

=>the other camp , Mark and John, following the scientifical line of
reasoning.

John:

I don't agree, Adrie.  I don't see myself as following the scientifical line
of reasoning.  I'm not very oriented that way.  I'm more oriented along the
philosophical lines, but as I've mentioned before, I came to Pirsig from a
Deep Ecology perspective, which I've never abandoned.  Recently, I've added
the metaphysical formulations of Josiah Royce, as I see no conflict between
these three schools of thought.

And thanks for posting those quotes from Lila, Adrie.  For they succinctly
and precisely define the way I like to look at these problems that have been
uncovered in Ham's and my dialogue.  Which I now return to in full:



> [John]:
>
>>  But my problem with your epistemology remains,
>> for how does socially-defined morality arise if not from the
>> context of a society's relationship with its environment?
>>
>
>
Ham:


> I don't see any conflict here.  . Therefore the morality of a society
> reflects the individual values shared by the members.  They won't agree on
> every issue, but where there is sufficient agreement to achieve consensus,
> those issues will become part of the society's moral code.



John:

You left the most important aspect of my argument out in your reformulation,
Ham, to wit: "Society is comprised of individuals collectively relating with
one another and their common environment" - yes, I agree.  Therefore  the
morality of a society reflects the individual values shared by the members
AND  the consensus reached will be that which reflects their congruence with
that common environment.  Consensus in society is formed by the values
(quality interactions) of Nature.  This is how social morality evolves.  Not
out of man's head, but from the well-springs of man's being - his
relationship with his natural environment.  The only possible source of
consensus is this "common environment".  Robinson Jeffers puts it nicely in
the last part of his poem, Not Man Apart:

 A severed hand
Is an ugly thing and man dissevered from the earth and stars
and his history... for contemplation or in fact...
Often appears atrociously ugly.
Integrity is wholeness, the greatest beauty is
Organic wholeness, the wholeness of life and things,
the divine beauty of the universe.
Love that, not man apart from that,
or else you will share man’s pitiful confusions,
or drown in despair when his days darken."


Ham:


>
> What is Nature but an intellectual construct of essential value?



John:

Maybe in your head, Ham.  But to my thinking it's obvious that Nature is
much more than an intellectual construct.  For one thing, "intellectual
constructs" come from Nature, not the other way around.  Let's keep the
signifier "nature" and the signified separate here, for goodness' sake.

Ham:



> That construct comprises both the good and the bad.  It is man, the measure
> of all things, who distinguishes what is good (for him) and establishes a
> moral system that will foster it.  Like everything else in our experiential
> reality, morality is a representation of our sensibility to Value, which is
> an aspect of the Absolute Source.  So, why do accuse me of positing Value as
> springing from nothing?  The primary source may not be an 'existent', but it
> is far more real than man's concept of morality.


John:

I accuse you of focusing upon Man and his intellectual constructs, rather
than that from which both come into being.  Nature is the Absolute Source.
Any other intellectual construct you posit, is just words in your head.


John prev:


>  Ok, so morality arises from values.  Why the distinction then?
>> We're back to the fact that its just differing terms for the same
>> phenomenon, and calling the universe "amoral" is identical to
>> calling it "non-valuable".
>>
>
>
Ham:


> I assume you're asking why I distinguish morality from Value.  For the same
> reason that I distinguish intellection from sensibility.


John:

Right!  Because you want to, is the answer.  My deeper question then is "why
do you want to?"

 Ham:

Precepts like causality, contrariety, and justice are intellectualized from
> experience,


John:

I can't just swallow that without a lot more explanation.  For one thing, a
lot of experience is derived from an a priori understanding of causality and
contrariety.  Without such concepts, experience would be chaotic.
 Ultimately, these things might be seen to come from experience, but not
appearing by themselves.  Some other factor must be brought in to explain
how they arise.

Izzy Newton,
sittin' 'neath a tree
bopped by an apple,
The Law of Gravity!

There's more to the story than that, Ham.

Ham:


> whereas Value is our primary connection with the Source.  The individual is
> a sensible agent of Value.  Everything he experiences is a differentiated
> representation of Value.  Likewise, everything he creates -- art, music,
> literature, architecture, and morality -- are morivated by his value
> orientation.
>
>
>
John:

You say, "The Source" like a Jedi says "The Force".  It seems to me that
you've just got a postulate whereby you hang all your metaphysical concepts
without any evidence or reasoning behind it other than "well, something has
to be the source."  But it seems to me, if you're going to have faith in an
unsupported postulate, why not pick one that's got lots of history - God for
instance?  Or Brahmin or the tortoise-on-the-bottom?  It just seems
arbitrary.

Now me, I pick Nature.  For if you wanna talk "empircal evidence", Nature IS
the whole enchilada.


Ham:


>
There is no "magic" to my ontology.  If it doesn't make sense to you, it's
because either you misconceive it or are attempting to force it into
Pirsig's "Quality universe" paradigm.  That won't work, because if Quality
were "all goodness", as the MoQ suggests, there would be no measure of value
available to man, no way for him to recognize inferiority from excellence
and choose accordingly.  But that, in fact, is man's role as the free agent
of value.  In my opinion, the concept of the unverse as exclusively moral is
a serious flaw in Pirsig's ontology; it overlooks the significance of man's
Freedom as the choice-maker of existence.

John:

Quality and Choice are inextricably intertwined.  Where there is no Choice,
there is no Quality.  Perhaps Pirsig failed to explicate this fully becuase
it is just so darn obvious.   But you can't say then, that man's choice is
fundamental for the reverse is also true - without Quality, there can be no
Choice.  They co-exist, all the way down to the quantum level and that
really is the whole enchilada as far as we can see.



[John on 2/8]:

> You think value-sensibility is proprietary to the self, but how
>> can sensibility be proprietary when we only sense some *thing*.
>>
>
[Ham's response]:

 Your interpretation of sensibility as sensing some "thing" is
>> off the mark.  We sense Value differentially and actualize
>> 'things' experientially.
>>
>
 It is confusing using the word "thing" the way that you do.
> Is Value a "thing" or isn't it?
>

Value is most definitely not a "thing".

John:

I agree.  Value is the entanglement between.

Ham:

I'll overlook the "insanity" clause, except to say that anyone who can't
accept his own experience without society's endorsement has a huge authority
problem.

John:

  I'd say its the somebody who denies the role of intersubjective agreement
in reality creation that has "a huge authority problem" and perhaps this is
a clue to the deeper questions I'm asking you of why you persist so
stubbornly in your lonely Essentialism when nobody's buying it after all
these years.

Ham:

 I don't seek society's agreement on what I experience, nor do I believe you
do.  I experience snow exactly as the Inuits do (although I doubt that the
South Sea Islander has much the opportunity to experience snow).  The
difference lies not in the experience but in the language used to
communicate it, and semantics is of socio-cultural origin.

John:

Well, I wouldn't be so sure about that Ham.  While I do agree that semantics
if of socio-cultural origin, I'd argue that perception is as well. We learn
to percieve based upon our training.  This might very well be the crux of
our disagreement - the very old argumement as to whether or not there are
real universals and how they impose themselves upon our consciousness.  But
at the moment, I think we have enough on our plate that it'd be futile to
heap more.  Let's stick with our basic question of the definition of man as
something apart from Nature (as you seem to claim) or not, as I'm trying to
prove.



Ham:

I'm sorry about your digestive problems, but it is you who are still tauting
the SOM view with your "world out there, we're in here" description.  Apart
from acknowledging subjects and objects as what we experience, I've
maintained all along that everything is "in here" in that the universe is a
proprietary value construct.

John:

While "everything is in here" sounds pretty close to my idealistic leanings,
the question at hand we're addressing is - how did everything get in here?
And, what exactly is meant by "in here"?  My thesis is that not only is the
human organism inextricably intertwined with it's organic matrix, but the
intellect which you seem to think stands free and independent and outside of
nature, depends upon the perceptions of otherness for the very
conceptualizations of it's beingness.  Perhaps I've misunderstood your
stance, but then by all means correct me and explain to me how we can then
be dwelling in an "amoral universe".

Ham:


 I'm not responsible for how you interpret this statement.  Nor do I see any
need to defend the fact that my beliefs are "psychologically motivated".
 How, does that differ from being "psychically motivated"?   Indeed, what
belief isn't?

John:

True!  And once admitted, the aspersion dissapears.  What is fascinating is
how long you defend the fact that its not psychologically motivated but just
simply, "the way things actually are".  Once you drop the pretence, you're
(in hippy-speak) "owing your stuff, man" and we can work toward some kind of
consensus or at least understand whether we even want to.  For now, I'd like
to keep trying.

Ham:

That's enough for now.  I would comment on your (erroneous) statement
relating "the proper laws of Nature" to morality, and the fatal "hubristic
excesses" that befall those who "cheat or break those laws," except I fear
that would lead us into social polemics which is not my cup of tea.

Try a little sodium bicarbonate, John.  It's good for what ails you.

John:

Poetry serves the same function.  The rest of Jeffer's poem:


"Then what is the answer?— Not to be deluded by dreams.
To know that great civilizations have broken down into violence,
and their tyrants come, many times before.
When open violence appears, to avoid it with honor or choose
the least ugly faction; these evils are essential.
To keep one’s own integrity, be merciful and uncorrupted
and not wish for evil; and not be duped
By dreams of universal justice or happiness.
These dreams will not be fulfilled.
To know this, and know that however ugly the parts appear
the whole remains beautiful.
------

Yours,

John