[MD] Through a glass darkly

[Ham Priday]

Hi David --

On Sat, 2/19/2011 at 4:56PM, David Buchanan <dmbuchanan at hotmail.com> wrote:


> I think Ham's position is profoundly anti-pragmatic. It is the kind of 
> Platonism
> or "vicious intellectualism" against which James and Pirsig are 
> diametrically
> opposed. As they see it, common sense is a vast collection of concepts
> invented by our ancestors and handed down to us as we learn the language
> and become a part of the culture. Common sense is made up of those static
> patterns that work so unproblematically that they larger go unexamined.
> But when common sense concepts are taken up by more abstract intellectual
> pursuits like science and philosophy all sorts of problems seem to emerge.
>
> Chief among these problems is reification, the error of treating an 
> abstract
> concept as if it were an actual entity. Plato's forms are the classic 
> example
> and that's why they call it Platonism. For Plato, you'll remember, the 
> beautiful
> things and good things in this dirty old world aren't really real. What's 
> real is
> Beauty and Goodness itself but most humans live their lives down in a dark 
> cave,
> believing mere shadows are the real world. If that sounds a bit too lofty 
> and
> otherworldly, that's only because it's too lofty and otherworldly. It's a
> world-hating, life-negating, logic-confounding mistake.

As I scanned your post to decide whether to respond, it appeared to be an 
indictment of my position.  The classic pejoratives -- "anti-pragmatic", 
"vicious intellectualism", "otherworldly", "deifying the intellect" -- all 
seemed to castigate my essentialist stance.

Later, however, on careful reading, I found myself largely in agreement with 
what you said.  Essentialism is not a praxis for life, although I would 
categorize it as "A-pragmatic" rather than anti-pragmatic. Though hardly 
"vicious", it is a kind of "idealism" which, like Platonism, does not suit 
James' or Pirsig's existential approach.  And while I may be guilty of 
"reifying an abstract concept", I do not posit Goodness and Beauty as the 
realities of this world, but as the values from which our appearance of this 
world is constructed.  Lastly, Essentialism is founded on the concept of 
Essence, which I cannot deny is "otherworldly" in nature.

> And James and Pirsig also say that subject-object metaphysics makes
> exactly the same mistake. It takes practical, common sense concepts out
> of their context and then treats these abstractions as if they were the 
> very
> structure of reality, as if they were the real stuff behind our 
> experience.

If Essentialism were truly a subject-object metaphysics, it would be based 
on common-sense notions of reality, mistaking subjects and objects for "the 
real stuff behind our experience."  But it isn't and it doesn't.  The "real 
stuff" of experience is sensible value, and the reality Essentialism 
addresses is a primary source called Essence.

> Instead of confusing ourselves with abstract notions of Truth and Reality,
> let's remember that concepts are only be called true to the extent that 
> they
> can be used in our experience right here on earth. Ideas, they insist, are
> human inventions and they're supposed to serve human needs. Why should
> reality be something only a hand full of geniuses can understand? What 
> good
> is philosophy if it doesn't help actual people in their actual lives?

As far as human beings are concerned, Truth and Reality are relative (not 
abstract) notions.  They relate to --and indeed define -- the principles 
that work in a differentiated space/time system.  There is your 
"pragmatism", David.  Its knowledge is drawn from the well of scientific 
investigation, and its methods are directed toward problem-solving and the 
development of utilitarian tools.  This is not the goal of metaphysics, 
which serves to satisfy man's quest for an understanding of reality beyond 
its experiential manifestations.

What good is philosophy if it doesn't help actual people in their actual 
lives?  Let's not forget that spiritual fulfillment is a human need, too. 
Why should reality be something only a handful of geniuses can understand? 
I would submit that it is not "understanding" but "the willingness to accept 
a new concept" that your shadow-world cave-dweller lacks.  Apart from this, 
there are aspects of metaphysical truth which are not in the best interest 
of even "geniuses" to know.  For one thing, absolute knowledge is 
inconsistent with relational freedom, one of man's most cherished values.

> As health is a biological good and wealth is a social good, truth is a 
> species
> of the good. It is a high quality concept, not the answer to the riddle of 
> the
> universe. That sort of quest only makes sense if you believe that the 
> intellect
> has divine powers but James and Pirsig are looking at these issues with 
> the
> assumption that the human powers of intellect are a product of evolution.
> As the James scholar Charlene Seigfried points out, intellectualism had
> become vicious already with Plato and Socrates because they deified the
> intellect and denigrated the flux of life from which our concepts 
> originate.

Health and wealth have value to the individual because they make the 
life-experience more pleasurable, relative to illness and poverty.  But it 
does not follow that "truth is a species of the good."  Truth is a 
proposition expressing the actual state of reality, good, bad, or in 
between.  Also, although human intellectual capacity is an evolutionary 
development, its most significant "power" is the cognizance of the knower.

I still don't see why the Jamesians insist that intellectualism is "vicious" 
or why it "denigrates the flux of life."  All told, however, I think your 
analysis has done me a favor, David.  It has afforded me another opportunity 
to expound my philosophy in a way that clarifies the differences I have with 
both scientific objectivism and the Quality paradigm.

Thanks for the attention and best wishes,
Ham