[MD] The Dynamics of Value

[Ham Priday]

Dear Mark --

On Wed. Feb 23 at 4:32 PM, Mark <ununoctiums at gmail.com> wrote:


> If we sense Value or Quality, it is because it exists outside of us.
> Perhaps what you term negation is what I term Quality.  I would
> have to assume that such negation is outside our personal ability
> to generate it, it is thus given us.  If so, this negation must have a
> source of its own.  That source could well be Quality, as I have
> presented it.  By my thinking, however, nothing needs to reside
> behind Quality, no further source for its existence.  Why do you
> need to claim some other side?  How does this explain what is?
>
> Again, I would say that it is a matter of perspective.  Is the water
> cold, or do we make it cold by feeling it?  I would subscribe to the
> former.  Water has a cold Quality to us, that is outside our
> subjective power to create.  But, in the end, it could well be two
> sides of the same coin.  I believe we are flipping the same coin.
> Perhaps we should see if we can discuss the coin itself.

You're making me work overtime to resolve our deadlock, Mark.  But since the 
nature of Quality (Value) seems to be what's at issue here, I'll take your 
cue and analyze "the coin itself" in language that (hopefully) we can both 
relate to.  After all, we are discussing the Dynamics of Value in an attempt 
to determine how Value (Quality) creates or actualizes differentiated 
existents.

> I am not trying to be clever.  I am trying to relate to your Value as
> I understand it.  For me, Value is one (human) form of Quality.  So,
> don't get too caught up in the semantics.  For one to value Grade A
> eggs more than Grade B, there must be something inherently providing
> the observer with a difference between both types.  What is that thing
> that separates the quality of eggs thus defining them relationally?
> Let's call it Quality.

Let's not.  Let's call it "difference".  Whatever separates entities--by 
time, space, or attribute--is the experiential differentiator.  The entity 
itself, in Plato's lingo, is a "Form".  I'm abstracting here from 
Wikipedia's write-up on Plato's theory of Forms:

"Form answers the question 'what is that?'  Plato supposed that the object 
was essentially the Form and that phenomena were mere shadows mimicking the 
Form under different circumstances.  The problem of universals was solved by 
presuming that Form was a distinct singular thing but caused plural 
representations of itself in particular objects.  Matter was considered 
particular in itself.  Forms are the essences of various objects: they are 
that without which a thing would not be the kind of thing it is."

But, with apologies to Plato, Form (or shape) is only one aspect of an 
objective thing.  Things have sensible attributes, for example, such as 
texture, color, smell, taste, or sound.  There are the quantitative 
(measurable) characteristics of size, weight, density, material composition, 
fragility, and temperature.  There are also functional properties that 
determine the thing's use or purpose--by itself or in combination with other 
objects. Now, which of these criteria or attributes, do you think, describes 
the "essence" of a thing?  All or none?  Or would you say that a thing's 
essence or Quality is determined "comparatively", that is, by its relative 
value compared with other things?

My personal view is that, while Being may be considered "the essence of 
existence", things (existents) don't have "essences", they have "qualities". 
And what distinguishes a particular thing from undifferentiated otherness is 
neither quantitative nor functional data, but our cognizance of its sensible 
qualities.  All the other descriptors are intellectualized or intuited from 
our sensory perception of the object in question.  This is epistemically 
logical, since all experience is derived from our five senses.  Where then, 
you ask, does Value come into the picture?

You'll note that I included the phrase "from undifferentiated otherness" in 
the above analysis.  I anticipate that you will equate that otherness with 
Quality (DQ),  And you will argue that everything else in this scheme, 
including the observing subject, is a "pattern" of that Quality.  Right? 
Well, indulge me for a moment while I try to convince you that this is 
not--cannot be--the end of the story.

You previously alluded to the "attention factor" necessary for a "certain 
thought to present itself" to a conscious subject.  I was uncomfortable with 
the way you decribed it, but couldn't quite figure why.

[John previously]:
> So, what causes a nerve or pattern of nerves to fire?  I would have
> to say that it is the distinction between things, not the things 
> themselves.
> We cannot willfully demand that a certain thought present itself.
> It is this active separation which I term Quality.  It is not some
> supernatural force, but it is the basis for our consciousness.

When I stopped focusing on the "difference/distinction" thrust of this 
assertion, I realized the problem.  We DO "willfully demand that a certain 
thought present itself."  That is precisely what experience is and does.  It 
converts the sensible Value we feel for otherness to the appearance of a 
thing or things that represent our particular thought at the time.  In other 
words, we "will" that a certain thought present itself as the being of a 
thing.  In that way we use our experience incrementally to actualize 
physical existents from the Value of otherness.  This, I submit--as well as 
"the distinction between things"--is the basis of conscious awareness.

Let me also add that "Negation" does for distinction what "Value" does for 
our affirmation of appearance.

I don't know if all this constitutes a valid counter-argument to your 
epistemology, but would be interested in getting your reaction to it 
...especially if you think it has any chance of breaking through the 
impasse.  In any case, it has been a helpful exercise for me.

Cheers,
Ham