[MD] The Dynamics of Value
Ham Priday
hampday1 at verizon.net
Thu Feb 24 21:33:33 PST 2011
Hi again, Mark --
,,,and forgive me for mixing up the apostles again. (I really can't explain
how John got in there.)
> I also have to apologize to Plato, since what he is proposing
> does not necessarily provide much awareness to me. Yes,
> Form is one way of viewing the world, and we derive specifics
> of the form through our powers of differentiation. But there is
> no need to create such an overarching world. In answer to your
> question, I would say that Quality is discerned through our brain's
> (and body) interaction with the world. We tend to focus on the
> objects themselves instead of what differentiates them. We
> speak of relativeness, and say that we create such a thing.
> What we may create is our response to the differentiation, but
> do not create the actual differentiation itself. Such a process of
> differentiation is an active process, and not a result of the objects
> themselves. In this sense, Quality creates the differences.
As I see it, this is the crux of our problem. I chose Plato's Forms to
connote "existents" or objects because they are usually identified (i.e.,
distinguished) by their properties, rather than by their differences. Value
and Quality in common parlance are also usually associated with "positive"
characteristics, even though measured or calibrated by a relative standard.
The world presents itself as a pluralistic system of relational components.
Yet, you say "there is no need to create such an overarching world." Where,
then, do the relational components come from? Are they implanted in our
minds, or do they have independent existence? Is the existing world only
stratified inorganic and biological substance from which we create the
actual entities? Or is the universe that we experience a fully pre-created
system of multiple objects, just as the physicists desribe it?
My own take on this resembles Plato's 'Universal Forms', except that it's
the design itself, rather than the finite entities, that is "pre-created".
The design encompasses what man intellectualizes as the natural and physical
laws of genetics, energy, mass, and motion. The potential order of this
"undifferentiated otherness" affords man a consistent and reliable
environment in which to cooperatively explore, reason out, and build upon,
as his value sensibilities drive him. What he perceives as desirable and
moral become the objects of his aspiration; what is perceived as deleterious
or evil is avoided or becomes the objects of contempt. These motivating
values are not intrinsic to the universe; they are differentiated by man's
proprietary sensibility.
> I view things in the same way, except that they do not contain
> qualities in themselves, but are a result of qualities. This is
> perhaps a difference. For I am proposing a unifying underlying
> concept for things. This was the reason I brought in the Higgs field
> analogy a while back. I am suggesting a single concept which
> builds out the rest. Otherwise, I agree with your comment on
> descriptors. Such descriptors are a representation of something
> more fundamental.
The "underlying concept" is what I call the inherent design of "otherness".
And things do not contain values (qualities). So we are in agreement here.
> By my understanding of what you term undifferentiated otherness,
> I would not call it Quality. My sense of Quality is more as an active
> force, if you will. Some kind of flux or something. Undifferentiated
> otherness seems more like a "potential for being". Somehow we
> extract from that what we sense. I do not have much preference
> for the use of pattern, and do not quite understand what others are
> proposing in this context.
Excellent! That will avoid a lot of problems in future discussion. I do
not call otherness Value, either. And, yes, we do extract the relational
values that we experience, leaving "being" in the wake of actualizatized
otherness.
[Ham]:
> When I stopped focusing on the "difference/distinction" thrust of
> [your] assertion, I realized the problem. We DO "willfully demand
> that a certain thought present itself." That is precisely what
> experience is and does. It converts the sensible Value we feel for
> otherness to the appearance of a thing or things that represent our
> particular thought at the time. In other words, we "will" that a
> certain thought present itself as the being of a thing. In that way
> we use experience incrementally to actualize physical existents
> from the Value of otherness. This, I submit--as well as "the
> distinction between things"--is the basis of conscious awareness.
[Mark]
> All I can say, is that if I dig down deep and try to determine if and
> how I am controlling my thoughts, I do not find a controller.
> Perhaps such "will" cannot be discerned by my brain, and is off limits to
> logical investigation. When a sudden though arises, I don't think that
> "I" can take credit for it. After it does arise, I can act by way of
> choice.
Good point, Mark. This primary will is the "psychic desire" of the
conscious agent to acquire the Value it senses. Value is essentially
"affinity" or attraction; so the desire is inherent to value-sensibility
itself and does not become "intentional" (controlled) until value is
differentiated, making choice possible. It is most important to recognize
that WE are the "controllers" here. It is OUR value preferences and our
choices that actualize our reality. Any "external" control over this
process would undermine the power of a free agent.
> This is what I term attitude. I feel that the brain and the
> environment act in a more-or-less programmed way. Things
> come in, and the brain reacts a certain way. It is through
> judgement of the way that the brain is reacting that we have
> some control. I like some thoughts, I ignore others. I think
> that negative obsessions are a result of not being aware of
> that power. But I am diverging from the dynamics of value here.
> Although, in a general way, it is this concept of the brain being
> somewhat external to the subjective "I", that my current
> awareness is derived.
The brain is an objectivized entity, just as a rock or a tree is. As the
vehicle of your awareness, you might consider it an "intimate component" of
your environment. Although we tend to think of the brain as exclusively a
receiver of inputs (i.e, "affective"), it is my theory that the brain is
also an "effective" organ; that is, it is instrumental in projecting
differentiated value "outward" into the world of appearances. This is how
finite entities (discrete things) are actualized as constituents of our
objective otherness. And "attitude"--how we "feel" about something--is
indeed fundamental to value-sensibility.
Moreover, the fact that the individuated agent is a "negate" of Essence from
the start suggests to me that this projection is, in part at least, a
"secondary" negation. I happen to believe that all creation is negation.
Remember, the value we project into otherness is differentiated, which means
that the objective world we experience is fragmented or divided to represent
this difference. What I'm really proposing, in a roundabout way, is the
Sartrean view that "we penetrate Being with our own nothingness", thereby
dividing experiential reality into the "many and many things' that comprise
our relational existence.
Are you listening, Mark?
> Thanks Ham, in helping to define the coin. I do indeed have visions
> of what you are stating, but get stuck when I take my understanding
> of your ontology into certain directions. I do not have the same
> understanding of our degree of control in this existence. We are
> both providing concepts and rhetoric for the conveyance of awareness
> in terms of explanation. As such, your use of negation and value,
> provides a foundation for building. In the same way, I use the term
> Quality. All of these terms have some kind of mutually accepted
> definitions, which allow us to converse. In many ways, I see your use
> of negation as being equivalent to "creation", but I do see some
> distinctions. I believe we both agree that we cannot create, but only
> uncover. The mechanism for that uncovering and what is derived
> from it is where we still do not meet.
Perhaps we are making some progress. With your encouragement and
understanding, I'm beginning to see light at the end of the tunnel. At
least, I'm seeing things more clearly. What about you, Mark?
Essentially on track,
Ham
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