[MD] Three Hot Stoves

[John Carl]

Hello Ham,

It's been a busy season and sorry for the tardiness in reply.  Hopefully
I'll make up for it with some careful consideration as opposed to my usual
slap-dash, off-the-hip response.

On Wed, Dec 22, 2010 at 10:35 PM, Ham Priday <hampday1 at verizon.net> wrote:

>
> Hi John --While this is largely a matter of semantic overlap, it's
> important that we agree on the concept that our words are describing.  So,
> in the interest of clarity and consistency and with help from
> Merriam-Webster's, here is how I define and use these terms:
>
>
John:

I've got no problem with "standard definitions".  But of course, philosophy
does require a somewhat more careful digging than we'll find in the
dictionary so I'll try and do a little of that with you.

Ham's dictionary says:


> Realization: "the state of understanding or becoming aware (of value)"
>


John:

This is good, as far as it goes, but of course there's an awful lot more to
the story in my book. For the realization of value IS our realization of
reality.  How we "realize" patterns carved out of the whole are our
conceptualizations with which we interpret and manipulate our world.
Everything, in other words.

Ham's:


> Sensibility: "the capacity to realize or respond emotionally (to value)"
>

John:

I tie in "sensibility" to "sensation".  That is, a "percept" - something
that coincides with our nervous apparatus.  A noise we can hear with our
ears, a sight we can view with our eyes.  These are what I consider
"sensible".  Those patterns which coincide with our neural being.

Ham:



> Conceptualization: "to intellectualize a concept or interpret realization
> structurally"
>

John:

I take "concept" as one step below "intellectualization", if you don't
mind.  Intellectualization is the thinking about concepts - the use of them
in further reflection and logical manipulation.  A pure conceptualization is
just a realization of a distinct pattern - the realization occurring through
correspondence with our neural receptivity.  Thus even a plant has a sort of
concept of "light" even though only man thinks about such things more
deeply.

Ham:

Cognizance: "to notice or give attention to something"
>

John:

Cognizance then is intellectual.  It's what humans do, as opposed to what
plants do.

Ham:

Recognition: "acknowledgment; especially to know or feel that something
> relates to what has been encountered before"
>

John:

Right.  RE-cognizance.  A further development of the intellect.


Ham:

Actualization: "to make or become actual or existentially real"
>
>

John:

Well even with an extended opportunity to think this through, I'm not sure
about "making real".  It seems to me that realization IS actualization and
that's all there is to it. Plain and simple.

Ham:



> Thus, I would express cognizance of "differentiation" (in your prismatic
> example above) as "recognition" (of a pattern) rather than "realization" or
> "conceptualization" (of a color).  I would also distinguish the concept
> formed from a realization as "intellectual", rather than equate realization
> with conceptualization.  Incidentally, the only terms in this list whose
> common meanings have special significance to my ontology are Sensibility and
> Actualization.  The former relates specifically to Value-realization, the
> latter to experiential objectification.
>
>
John:

Well, as you say, these semantic differences need not be complete
blockages.  But I think you need to explain how non-intellectual animals can
have apparent realizations and I think you need to explain how experiential
objectification occurs with non-physical objects, just to make things more
clear between us.

Ham explaining actualization:

If I'm not straining your mental faculties too much, actualization (as in
> objectivizing) does imply intention.  One might say that what one
> objectivizes represents the realized value that he "wills to actualize" as
> being.  The point I'm trying to make here is that we actualize our world of
> differentiated beingness in accordance with our value sensibilities. Whether
> this invokes "intentionality" or is "automatic", that man is the co-creator
> of the universe is a major premise of my ontology.
>
>
John:

So you don't view actualization as "automatic".  I know you're a big fan of
Ayn Rand, and according to my recent readings on her philosophy, this is a
BIG point of her philosophy.  But also, according to my reading, this is a
BIG problem with her philosophy, so I think you're wise to avoid it.

John Prev:

 I haven't thought much yet about the way I'm using
> "concept" and what I've heard as a "percept" but that seems closer to what
> I mean - a "perception" of the difference between night and day as opposed
> to a "precept" which I agree IS a purely intellectual building block of
> knowledge.  Thus, the difference between night and day is a percept, and
> humans actualize this by precept.
>

Ham:


I am putting you to the test with this premise, John.  Thus far you've been
> skirting the issue, expressing your "like" or displacency for this concept.
> Now is the time to challenge me with your objections.  Pirsig is on record
> as asserting that Quality "patterns" existence at the static level.  Do you
> accept that ontogeny, or do you feel, as I do, that the cognizant subject
> plays an active role in the creation process?
>

John:

"Creation process" seems to me to say it all, Ham.  You can't have just one
entity in a process.  There must be, as Wallace says, entanglement between.
I agree the cognizant subject plays an active role in the process, yes.  But
this leaves a lot of explaining, still to do.  For instance, how much do the
things being realized constrain the cognizer?  It's not, as you say,
"automatic" so the creative function in this process is much deeper than we
realize.

Ham:

If everything that is "real" is conceptualized, existential reality is a
> concept and there is no "unreality".
>


> I Take it this is what you've concluded.



John:

Yes. There is nothing unreal.  Even imaginative being with no corresponding
physicality has as its reality, an imaginative, conceptual being.  And even
if there is such a thing as "unreal", it doesn't do us any good to talk
about it, so functionally, pragmatically speaking, we might as well ignore
it anyway.

Ham:


> My question to you, then, is: Does existence constitute all there is to
> reality?  Is there a "metaphysical reality" that transcends existence and
> cannot be (or at least hasn't yet been) conceptualized?
>
> Or, do you still argue from your pragmatic stance that "it doesn't really
> matter"?
>
>
John:

Well, both perhaps.   But I would say that the conceptualization of reality
is an ongoing and infinite process.  We never conceptualize it all.  But I
place no significance on that which is unrealizable, and a great deal of
significance on that which hasn't been realized *yet*.



> Essentially pressing,
>
> Ham <http://moq.org/md/archives.html>
>


Idealistically responding,

John