[MD] Pragmatic truth is neither nor

[Ian Glendinning]

DMB,

Like I said, the fact that Weed says " that Rorty has taken the
empiricism out of James's theory of truth and replaced it with mere
conversation." doesn't make it true (by any use of the term true).

Yet who (here, Matt or Steve say) is arguing for the for "the
deflationary view" you describe in your concluding para ?
"The deflationary view is so empty and trivial that it's almost funny.
It's true that "snow is white" if and only if snow is white. This is a
neat little trick if one is trying to untangle the liars paradox but
otherwise it is just an epistemologically and ontologically neutral
version of the correspondence theory. It doesn't dare to be so bold as
the make any actual claims about the color of snow or even the
existence of snow. It vaguely tells you that a proposition is true if
it corresponds to a state of affairs but it doesn't tell you anything
about that state or the truth of the proposition. By design, it is
purely formal and conceptually empty. It could be written as an
algebra equation. And so the imagery is perfect. Snow is cold and
white is blank and analytic truth is also cold and blank."

Is there anyone since (say) Wittgenstein who would disagree ?
You seem to be disagreeing with straw-men, or tilting at windmills.
Ian
PS I agree with you - clearly experience IS excluded from conversation
(unless we dramatically expand our understanding of conversation to
include participatory experience as well as the reporting and
imagining of it.) I doubt that's what Steve actually meant.

On Mon, Jan 3, 2011 at 5:42 PM, david buchanan <dmbuchanan at hotmail.com> wrote:
>
>
> Steve said to dmb:
> Of course conversation is not excluded from experience, but what you fail to get is that nothing is excluded from conversation.
>
> dmb says:
> It's not that I fail to understand that nothing is excluded from conversation.