[MD] Apologies for Dropped Threads

[Matt Kundert]

Hey Ian,

Ian said:
My summary is (again, but in alternative wording) - you/we are in 
fact "agreeing" on what the definitions and distinctions ARE (between 
the different forms of "truth"), but some of us are failing to see the 
SIGNIFICANCE which others (particularly Dave) see, in our MoQ 
context. The "Yes, but so what ?" conclusion. (Given the pragmatic 
rider .... for all practical purposes .... a rider of Dave's you actually 
clipped-off a quote that I agreed with.)

Matt:
Sure, absolutely.  I hopefully articulated that I understood that you 
and Dave have failed to see the significance of what Steve and I are 
trying to impart.  What Steve and I haven't quite figured out is how 
we haven't articulated a clear practical purpose for the distinction 
between "justified" and "true" in a particular context.  Your 
re-summary above gives you the leverage to say "ah, semantics!" to 
the distinction between justification and truth in the realm of praxis.  
What I tried to say previously was something like "yes, for most 
purposes, it doesn't make a difference, but here's a context in which 
it does."  You can find these contexts by locating situations in which 
"justified" and "true" are not interchangeable (and this will often 
happen in sentences where both words appear while performing 
two different semantic functions).  One generates these situations 
by the use of thought-experiments, so we might reflectively pursue 
the question of "what might I want to say were I in this imagined 
situation?"  This helps hone our sense of our own actual beliefs, 
for beliefs are habits of action, _instincts_, and so to reflect on them 
you want them to come out into the open.  And one habit of action 
is one's instinct to say one thing and _not_ another.  

You want an answer to James' great question, "What's the difference 
that makes a difference?"  Here was my last description of the 
position Steve and I seem to find ourselves in if you think there is no 
practical difference between truth and justification:

"how do you reformulate, then, the clear and perspicuous meaning 
of the English sentences: 'what you say might be justified, but it 
might not be true' or 'what you say might be true, but you've 
presented no justification for thinking so.'  This Steve has supplied 
clearly as the existence of, on the JTB formula of knowledge, 
'justified beliefs' and 'true beliefs' respectively.  The request has 
been for an account of what those two things are if you collapse 
justification and truth into a single heap."

It's not that we don't think you can do it, though we have our doubts.  
But to effectively pursue the philosophical strategy of thinking there's 
no practical difference between truth and justification, Steve and I 
think you need to give us an account.  (So, there are several levels 
at which one might disagree with us: e.g., denying that we deserve 
an account.)

Here is a schematic of the two main practical contexts:

Context A - You think someone is wrong, but can't put your finger on it.
Response: "What you say might be justified, but it might not be true."
Use: Cautionary
Context of Resolution: a future in which it becomes clear that the 
person was justified, but wrong.
Context of Use: Universal (it is always apropos, though sometimes 
annoying)

Context B - You think someone doesn't have good reasons for 
believing what they do.
Response: "What you say might be true, but you are in unjustified in 
thinking so."
Use: Demand for Reasons
Context of Resolution: a future in which you think the person has 
good reasons.
Context of Use: Universal (it is always apropos because you might 
never become convinced that they have good reasons, and ipso facto, 
are unjustified)

One practical context that you and Dave are focused on is something 
like this:

Context C - Somebody gives a series of reasons for believing X.
Response: "That's true." _or_ "That's justified."
Use: Endorsing
Context of Resolution: a future in which it becomes clear that neither 
of you are right.
Context of Use: Universal (it is always apropos, though--like in a 
Platonic dialogue or sitting next to a Dittohead listening to Rush 
Limbaugh--sometimes annoying)

However, there is yet another context hidden in this last one:

Context D - Somebody says something without any reasons.
Response1: "That's true."
Response2: "That's justified."
Use: Endorsing
Context of Resolution1: a future in which it becomes clear that 
neither of you are right.
Context of Resolution2: a future in which you offer good reasons.
Context of Use1: When you don't necessarily have any good reasons 
for thinking so.
Context of Use2: When you do have good reasons for thinking so (or 
at least would like to give that appearance).

There is one last practical context, and that's the context of giving a 
theory of truth.  This, one might want to say, is not a real practical 
context.  That, of course, is false technically according to the canons 
of philosophical redescription offered by pragmatism.  However, the 
sense is easily discerned even if it's said by a self-described 
pragmatist: it is a severely _limited_ context, unlike the near universal 
contexts above).  However, given one's entrance into this context of 
constructing a theory, the purpose of the theory is to offer a 
description of when a sentence is true.  Here we get the 
correspondence theory ("when it corresponds to reality"), coherence 
theory ("when it coheres with the rest of your beliefs"), and the 
pragmatist theory ("when it is good in the way of belief"), and all the 
involutions and variations.  The dialectical response to all of them is 
to explain practically what each of their main verbs are doing (so that 
we may know when it is done): "corresponds," "coheres," and "is good."

The only other major entry into the debate has been the semantic 
theory of truth (sometimes called the "deflationary theory" or the 
"disquotational theory"), the Tarski-style explanation of when a 
sentence is true: "X" is true if and only if X.  E.g.: "There's an apple 
on the chair" is true if and only if there's an apple on the chair.  
_Completely_ tautological, but it explains how to use the word (it's 
_semantic_ function).  And by explaining the "when" in such a 
boring, obvious fashion it seems to "deflate" the epistemological 
aspirations the request for a theory might have had.  (And the 
action of the theory is to remove the quotes from around the 
sentence to find the conditions of its truth, or "dis-quote.")

This context then is the semantic context, unlike the above contexts 
which are pragmatic contexts.  The semantic context, like all others, 
is a pragmatic situation, but it is clearly a very odd situation in which 
you are asking how "true," divorced from context, works.  And, in 
this semantic context, "true" is _not_ interchangeable with "justified."  
Witness:

"There's an apple on the chair" is justified if and only if there's an 
apple on the chair.

What if you are hallucinating or dreaming, and there only appears to 
be an apple on the chair?  Are we only justified if there really is an 
apple on the chair?  We all remember Descartes went mad with this 
question, but Descartes' question is _not_ apropos when "true" is in 
that sentence.

A: "There's an apple on the chair" is true if and only if there's an 
apple on the chair.
B: What if you are hallucinating the apple?
A: Yeah, what about it?  Then, clearly, it wouldn't be true.

The Cartesian Madness is demanding that we are _only_ justified if 
things are as they are.  But since our investigation into how things 
are only comes in the form of justifications, we'll never satisfy the 
requirement because the Cautionary Use of True will continue to 
always be apropos, forcing us to continually concede, "Yes, yes, 
Neo: we might all be hooked up to a giant machine in goo.  Until 
then, could you get me some staples."

Upon hearing this argument, one might respond, "Geez-ez Christ 
Matt: I'm not a goddamn Cartesian or Platonist.  Quit accusing me 
of being one!"  But this is why an account is needed.  For the form 
of the collapse is the same as the Platonic collapse, even if the 
emphases are very different (this is what my "Rhetorical 
Universalism" tried articulating).  A Collapser may not be caught up 
in the Cartesian Anxiety of the never-ending process of inquiry, so 
that instead of Universally Withholding truth _and_ justification until 
the moment they both come, one Universally Applies truth _or_ 
justification in appropriate situations because the two are the same.  
However, what is the account of the difference between truth and 
justification such that it makes sense to ask Descartes' question 
about "'X' is justified iff X" but not "'X' is true iff X".  The difficulty 
Steve and I are trying to point out is that if you've already 
suggested there is no practical difference, then it seems difficult to 
practically account for the difference.  So we are entering Context 
B and saying, "What you say might be true, but you are unjustified 
in thinking so [until you've suitably addressed the above concerns 
and contexts that we have]."  We are displaying contexts in which 
there seems to be perspicuous differences between truth and 
justification.  We are asking for an account that dissolves this 
appearance of difference.

For example: "Matt and Steve--you are hallucinating these differences."

Matt