[MD] The Dynamics of Value

[Ham Priday]

Greetings Mark, also to Tim and John who are "watching" --

This will be my first monograph specifically addressing the dynamics of 
Value as viewed from the Essentialist perspective.

Lest I be accused of straying too far from the MoQ, I should like to point 
out that the SOM perspective has been in contention on this forum for as 
long as I have followed it.  I believe Essentialism offers a credible way to 
reconcile these two "modes of reality" and provide a valid metaphysical 
foundation for Pirsig's Quality thesis.  In order to achieve this, however, 
it will be necessary to conceptualize the MoQ fundamentals somewhat 
differently than the author presented them, which calls for stricter 
definitions of the basic terms, including some which the author either 
failed or declined to explain.

 I have already suggested to Mark that the meaning of "exists" is 
paradoxical when applied to metaphysics.  Individuals and things relate to 
each other in existence, and are appropriately termed 'existents'.  Quality 
(Value) is not an existent, nor is the primary source from which it is 
derived.  How we express this distinction linguistically influences how we 
conceptualize Reality.  In effect, there are two "realities" -- empirical 
and ultimate.

Rather than acknowledge an ultimate Reality, the MoQ posits a Dynamic/Static 
split between "pure" Quality and the Quality that is experienced empirically 
(as "patterns").  According to A. McWatt's Ph.D. doctorial thesis, "Pirsig 
thought 'Quality' was better divided metaphysically into the Dynamic and 
static - primarily because the aesthetic, mystic and scientific aspects of 
reality can be taken account of by this dichotomy and, as the Dynamic is the 
essential nature of the static, there remains, essentially, only one reality 
of Quality, not two."

The logic of the notion that "Dynamic is the essential nature of the static" 
escapes me.  Moreover, the postulation of Quality as an entity unto itself, 
independent of conscious discernment or relative measurement, refutes the 
epistemology that "something cannot be valued without a consciousness".  The 
need for conscious realization does not mean there is no value without a 
conscious agent.  But it does mean, as Pirsig himself noted, that what is 
not valued (positively or negatively) does not exist.  We know this because 
all the properties of 'beingness' are valuistic; that is, sensible to the 
individual who experiences them.  Empirical reality is known only in terms 
of the values we are capable of experiencing and the conclusions we 
intellectualize from this experience.

The philosophy of Essence starts, not with quality or experience, but with 
the premise 'ex nihilo nihil fit' [nothing comes from nothingness], 
attributed to Lucretius.  It posits Essence as the "absolute potentiality" 
of all that is or appears to be.  Essence encompasses the "virtues" of 
Sensibility, Order, Beauty, Truth, and Goodness, as well as their antonyms, 
in the Oneness.of an uncreated Source.  So that these values may be realized 
from the perspective of an "other", and since there is no other within or 
outside of Essence, conscious agents come into existence by negation from 
(rather than as an addition to) an omnipotent source.  The order and 
dynamics of relational existence reflect the perfect balance of the Absolute 
Source, while its qualitative properties represent Essential Value 
differentiated by the negated self whose proprietary nature is 
value-sensibility.

The primary dichotomy of existence is not Static/Dynamic but 
Sensibility/Otherness; and otherness is objectivized experientially from the 
Value realized by the cognizant agent.  The only "split" or division of the 
Source is its potentiality to create "otherness" negationally.  That 
Essence-denied versus Essence-affirmed is the paradigm of creation suggests 
that there is a valuistic purpose for man's existence.  The Essential 
ontology affords each individual self the freedom to create its own reality 
within the parameters of a predetermined relational system.  Thus, the self 
may be understood as the uniquely sensible agent whereby Essence is 
completed or "perfected" by an extrinsic perspective of Value.

It is my hope that this ontology will be viewed as a metaphysical extension 
of Pirsig's Quality thesis, rather than an attempt by an "antagonist" to 
invalidate the MoQ for his own purposes.  I anticipate questions and 
criticisms from Mark, and others who may be "standing by", which I shall try 
to answer to the best of my ability.

And thanks for the opportunity,
Ham