[MD] Free Will

[david buchanan]

 Steve said dmb:
 Of course I would never say that are follows laws. The laws of physics are intellectual patterns of value, and the fact that we can predict the behavior of things in no way impedes choice. This is why I thought you were talking about predetermination. I can't see how the fact that we can predict what will happen has anything to do with the possibility of choosing.
dmb says:
Other than the last sentence, I can't tell what you're trying to say. BUT, if you can't see how causality precludes moral responsibility then there are many, many explanations available for your edification and amusement. Nobody has to take my word for it.
Steve said to dmb:

Again, the MOQ does not replace causality, it explains it. What it does is answer Hume's question about whether causality is empirical. In short, Hume asked, we see ball A hit ball B and move away, but did we see ball A CAUSE ball B to move? No we did not, so causality in the mechanistic interpretation is not empirically known. But of course preference is known empirically.

dmb says:
Well, no. Causality and preference are rival ways to think about the same empirical facts. In Pirsig's alternative, our ability to express preferences is the starting point and then it's extrapolated downward. In determinism, the law-like behavior of physical nature is extrapolated upward. Both are equally plausible but one of them, yours, is a moral nightmare wherein freedom and responsibility are meaningless concepts.


And yes, empiricists since Hume have considered causality to a be a metaphysical concept, not an empirical one.