[MD] Free Will

[david buchanan]

Steve said to dmb:
I have always held that Pirsig denies the determinism horn of the old supposed dilemma. ...Note you also quoted him saying, "In the MOQ this dilemma doesn't come up." The whole free will/determinism issue is a non-issue for the MOQ., since, "The "Laws of Nature' are moral laws."

dmb says:
Right, Pirsig says the dilemma doesn't come up. And in the very next lines he says, "To the extent that one's behavior is controlled by static patterns of quality it is without choice. But to the extent that one follows Dynamic Quality, which is undefinable, one's behavior is free." The dilemma WAS between two mutually exclusive horns, both of which would have devastating consequences. Determinism would exclude freedom and Free Will would undermine science and, as a matter of logical necessity, only one of them can stand. The MOQ avoids this dilemma by saying that our behavior is both free and controlled. The MOQ does not avoid this dilemma by REJECTING both horns but rather by saying they are not mutually exclusive options. The MOQ says freedom and restraint are both empirically known and they're both real to various extents. 


dmb had said:
The laws of cause and effect preclude any freedom or choice. So we can't righty understand causality AS a pattern of preferences no matter how stable. That's just not what the word "cause" means.

Steve replied:
And yet I do it anyway as Pirsig says we can...  Steve quotes Pirsig: In the Metaphysics of Quality "causation" is a metaphysical term that can be REPLACED by "value".  To say that "A causes B" or to say that "B values precondition A" is to say the same thing.

dmb now says:
Right, in the MOQ causation is REPLACED by value. I think it's pretty clear that the MOQ has "replaced" causation, meaning that something else has been put in its place. (Just as every empiricist since Hume has said, Pirsig is also saying that "causation" is a metaphysical term.) You SAY that you've been denying the deterministic horn but it seems to me that you're converting "value" back into some kind of determining factor and then use that misconception to also say freedom of the will is an illusion. I think this completely undermines the whole reason for Pirsig's replacement. When he says the two equations mean the same thing, he's saying that they both describe the same action, they both refer to the same events. The dials and readings in the laboratory do not change. The difference is the way we talk and think about those empirical facts. Causality rules out freedom and morality while value does not. At the same time, replacing causation with value does not undermine science. The dilemma is averted because we can have BOTH science and morality. 



Steve said:
Unless you have any evidence to the contrary, he does NOT say that free will is needed for morality in the MOQ.


dmb says:
Isn't it simply a matter of logical necessity? If we are controlled by determining forces, if we have no freedom, it makes no sense to hold anyone morally responsible. Pirsig concludes this section by also saying that "not just life, but everything, is an ethical activity". He defines "betterness" as the "response to Dynamic Quality" in the context of describing the creation of life itself as something inorganic patterns did because its "better". This "betterness", he says, "is an elementary unit of ethics upon which all right and wrong can be based." (Lila 157) "To the extent that one follows Dynamic Quality", he says, "one's behavior is free". It seems quite obvious to me that he is connecting freedom and morality in a very intimate relationship here AND the next page is a new chapter wherein the levels of static quality are introduced as a moral hierarchy based on evolutionary stages of betterness and it's no accident that each level offers a wider range of freedom. That's the main reason why the higher levels are considered more moral. The book is largely about how morality can be served. There are just too many powerful reasons. I find your denial completely implausible.

dmb:
Determinism, which is predicated on causality, says that man is not free to choose and therefore cannot be held responsible. I have quoted the dictionary, Charlene the James scholar and now Pirsig on this point. (We simply cannot have an intelligent conversation on the topic unless and until the you use the central terms properly.)

Steve replied:
I've denied that the MOQ supports determinism all along. You keep thinking that it's either free will or determinism while the MOQ says, "mu."


dmb says:
But you have denied free will all along and suggested that we can be more compassionate now that we know moral responsibility is an illusion. That doesn't sound like a denial of determinism. Quite the opposite. We don't have any choice about our values, you keep saying, because we are our values. How is that NOT determinism? This is not "mu" nor is it "both" or "either". To use the analogy you borrowed from Sam Harris, you've been saying we are as morally culpable as a tornado. How is that NOT determinism? 
I have NOT been saying that it has to be one or the other. In fact, I've been saying that it is both. My questions and criticism are about YOUR stated positions. Like I said, the freedom I think you're denying is the freedom to act or not, the freedom to make choices. And how did you respond?

Steve replied:
...it is meaningless to add the word "free" in claiming "free will." We make choices. Sure, but what does it mean to say that your choices are free? They aren't free, they are manifestations of your preferences, and we don't freely choose our preferences. In the MOQ we ARE our preferences, so the MOQ clearly denies both horns of the supposed dilemma.


dmb says:
That's the move that free will altogether and thereby converts the MOQ back into a kind of determinism. See, it's not that I think it has to be one or the other. I just think you are defending determinism. You say we don't freely choose our preferences but that's not what Pirsig is saying. He says "moral judgements are essentially assertions of value and if value is the fundamental ground stuff of the world, then moral judgements are the fundamental ground-stuff of the world." What sense does it make to say we have no choice about "asserting values and making judgements"? Surely it takes a will to assert anything and what is judgement but a deliberate choice? I think it's obvious that the MOQ does NOT deny freedom of the will altogether, just as it does not deny restraint. We are both free and controlled to some extent. The MOQ does not avoid the dilemma by denying both horns so much as by accepting both horns in an empirical, non-metaphysical blend of both.