[MD] Does Lila have free will?

[MarshaV]

On Jul 9, 2011, at 8:59 AM, Steven Peterson wrote:

> Hi Marsha,
> 
> On Sat, Jul 9, 2011 at 3:45 AM, MarshaV <valkyr at att.net> wrote:
>> 
>> Hi Steve,
>> 
>> To answer you question specifically, in Chapter 14 Lila states that she
>> is not anybody.  If this is a rejection of the self, a self that is created though
>> repeatedly identifying with static patterns of value, my guess would be
>> that Lila, the character, does not have "free will."
>> 
>> More generally, from my MoQ point-of-view, whatever that means, my
>> answer stands as I neither accept "free will" nor reject "free will" so MU.
> 
> 
> Steve:
> I think that is an excellent answer. Rather than saying that the MOQ
> rejects both horns of the dilemma, I should have said, "mu" (as I have
> when I was being more careful). The MOQ does not accept either horn
> (determinism or free will), but instead it says that neither is right,
> and they're not even wrong. The whole question as traditionally posed
> is thrown out as based on a premise that the MOQ does not accept. The
> MOQ replaces this question with, "to what extent are our actions
> static and to what extent are they dynamic?" In this replacement
> question about freedom, the term "will" is no where in the picture.
> 
> Best,
> Steve

 
Hi Steve,

It seems to me that you have been saying MU, so I agree with you.  It does, 
though, exist as a static pattern of value, a pragmatic illusion. Maybe its 
outgrown it usefulness?   Maybe if Reality were experienced as Quality, 
such a pattern would no longer be useful.  


Marsha

 
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