[MD] The Quality of Free Will

[Steven Peterson]

On Mon, Jul 18, 2011 at 11:13 AM, david buchanan <dmbuchanan at hotmail.com> wrote:
>
> One minute, Marsha says:
>
> In the MoQ, there is no subject and there are no objects.  If there is no subject - if there is no self - then there is no subject/self to have freedom of the will, and likewise, there is no subject/self who has a life that is determined.  The issue is meaningless.
>
> The next minute Marsha says:
> For me, the MoQ's self is a collection of ever-changing, interrelated, impermanent, static patterns of inorganic, biological, social and intellectual value in a field of Dynamic Quality.
>
> dmb asks:
> So, which is it. Does the MOQ say there is no self or not? And if the MOQ does say a self exists, why is freedom and morality meaningless?
>
> Steve applauds Marsha's back-tracking contradictions:
> Exactly. Well said. And we can add that this does NOT render talk of freedom meaningless. Pirsig obviously had a lot to say on the subject. In the MOQ, freedom is associated with DQ rather than with "the will."
>
> dmb says:
> As Marsha just construed it, the MOQ's self is a collection of static patterns in a field of DQ and as you have just construed it, freedom is associated with DQ rather than "the will", and by "will" I guess you mean the will of a Cartesian subject.
>
> But why is Marsha's static self IN A FIELD of DQ? Isn't it true that DQ is not external to the MOQ's self? And since we are talking about the relative freedom and constraint of the MOQ's self, why do you insist that the MOQ's self can have a "will"? What sense can we make of the MOQ's "betterness" without some kind of will?
>
> Seems like it doesn't matter how many times I try to explain this but the problem with your position isn't really metaphysical or philosophical. It's just logically bogus, sometimes even to the extent of maintaining opposite positions.


Steve:
I previously asked what could be meant by "the will" in the MOQ, and
all you've said is that the MOQ depends on there existing some kind of
will and therefore to deny it is "logically bogus."  You are just
dodging the question and slipping of the Cartesian Self in the back
door of the MOQ if only because you can't see how else to think of
morality. But in the MOQ, "the will" is an SOM term that drops out
once you think of a person as a forest of patterns of value with the
capability to respond to DQ. If a person IS her values, then we don't
have to insert this extra added ingredient to explain choices since
choices are simply a manifestation of one's values. Talk of
"willpower" or "strength of will" is talk about the suffering (the
negative quality) associated with being a forest of sometimes
conflicting value patterns.

Again, if you withhold the narcissistic judgment that what you can't
make sense of is simply incomprehensible, you might have a chance of
understanding what others are saying to you.