[MD] The Quality of Free Will

[david buchanan]

dmb said to Steve:
...Forget about the metaphysical differences for a minute. First, just think about LOGIC of the claim. Logically speaking, there cannot be moral responsibility IF we are not free. Our actions cannot be morally praiseworthy or blameworthy IF our actions are determined. This logic obtains no matter which metaphysical premise you begin with. ... It's just simple logic and I HAVE tried to explain this to you several times already.


Steve obliviously replied:
You've jumped to the conclusion that if we don't have free will then there must be determinism. The MOQ does not accept that conclusion. It only says that that seems to be true under SOM.

dmb says:
No, Steve. You've completely missed the point once again. I'm not even asserting ANY conclusion. I'm simply pointing out the LOGICAL relation between freedom and moral responsibility. The point is purely formal, which is to say it is purely about the logical relations between the terms. The logic obtains regardless of whether you want to deny or affirm the existence of such freedom. The point is that either position has logical consequences.

I'm insisting on this point of logic because your position violates this logic and is therefore incoherent and contradictory. 

Steve said:
... What is to be praised is what is good. What is to be condemned is what is bad. If a human being is a complex ecology of patterns of value, then what is to be condemned are the bad patterns in that forest of patterns. What is to be praised are the good patterns. ...There is only the self which IS this ecology of patterns.

dmb says:
Is there such a thing as bad patterns of quality? Again, logically speaking, this is nonsense. And what about the capacity to respond to DQ. Isn't that part of the MOQ's reformulation of the self too? Isn't that exactly where the freedom comes into it? And even if we were just static patterns, doesn't the MOQ say some patterns are more evolved and therefore more moral than the older, simpler patterns? That where our actions become morally praiseworthy and blameworthy. We are not so one-dimensional such that we simply follow static patterns because those pattens are in conflict and we cannot act on all of them at the same time. If we follow biological patterns that conflict with social and or intellectual values, you are morally blameworthy and if you follow DQ over intellectual patterns your actions are morally praiseworthy. The whole thing is a moral hierarchy, including both DQ and static quality. That's what we are in the MOQ. This is neither the Cartesian self nor the nihilistic position that there is no self, no freedom, no will and no morality. The latter doesn't even count as a position on the topic. It just avoids the whole thing by asserting an absurd, logical impossibility.

You haven't realized it yet, and maybe you never will, but your position has already been defeated many times in several different ways. 


Steve said:
... Where we disagree is with regard to the importance of "the will" to the MOQ.

dmb says:
Okay. The dispute seems to be over whether or not "the will" is the exclusive property of the Cartesian self or not. Can the idea have any meaning within the MOQ's reformulation of the self? Can "the will" be conceived as the human capacity to act freely, to act in response to Dynamic Quality. I really don't see why "the will" has to be superglued to the Cartesian self. I don't use the term that way. Pirsig isn't talking about the Cartesian self when he says "one" is not free to the extent that "one" is controlled by static quality and the extent to which "one" is free to respond dynamically. The MOQ can reject the classical dilemma without denying freedom, control, the self, morality. Why is "the will" so incapable of being re-conceived along these lines? Your insistence on banning the concept altogether strikes me as quite petty and unimaginative. And what happens as a result of this artificial superglue is that you end up adding SOM and the Cartesian self to any sentence that contains the term "will". That's just a silly game. I could do that to you or anyone else whenever a pronoun is used. "Ah, but you said "I" disagree. Obviously there is no Cartesian self to disagree and you're just a SOMer who doesn't have a glue". That sort of thing is way too easy and it doesn't really mean anything. It's lazy and dumb. 

dmb said:

Pirsig says "Dharma is Quality itself" but we can see that he is talking about Quality as both Dynamic and static. ...This is perfectly in line with Pirsig's reformulation of freedom and constraint in the section on the dilemma of Free Will and Determinism. There are static constraints to some extent and there is also a capacity to respond to DQ. In that section, he describes freedom as the capacity to move toward undefined "betterness". Rightnesss is static and betterness is Dynamic and Quality is both. We are both. Freedom and constraint are not only quite viable within the MOQ, this is absolutely central to Pirsig's whole picture.

Steve replied:
Right, but where exactly does "the will" come in to this MOQ picture. In SOM it is a possession of the subject. What can it mean in the MOQ?

dmb says:
Yep. That's what I'm talking about, right there. Why can't "the will" belong to the MOQ's self? You keep saying it can only ever be a possession of the Cartesian self but you never say why. Since the MOQ's self does have the capacity to act freely, in what sense is this not a matter of one's will? The "will" doesn't have to be a metaphysical concept at all. It is simply the name for one's capacity to decide, to make a choice or initiate action. The MOQ does not deny that capacity. It only denies that this is the capacity OF the Cartesian. Instead, it is the capacity of the MOQ's self. This is really so simple and obvious that I cannot believe anyone is disputing it.