[MD] The Quality of Free Will

david buchanan dmbuchanan at hotmail.com
Thu Jul 21 07:35:18 PDT 2011


dmb said:
... I'm saying that the MOQ reformulates the issue so that freedom and constraint are just about the MOST relevant thing in the universe. I'm correcting the distortions which render it irrelevant and meaningless, such as Steve's. I'm saying freedom and constraint go all the way down ....Steve, you don't seem to understand that asserting a dependent self - as opposed to an independent self - is not at all the same as saying there is no self at all.


Steve replied:
...I've been consistent with my position since my original entry back in April: "...The MOQ does not posit an extra-added ingredient above and beyond the patterns of value and the possibility for patterns to change that are collectively referred to as "I" about which it could possibly make any sense to ask, "do I have free will?" This question gets dissolved in the MOQ to the extent that it needs to be unasked. ... We can identify with our current patterns of preferences and the extent to which we do so we are not free. We are a slave to our preferences. Rather we ARE our preferences. ...

dmb says:
Right, this is the position I'm complaining about. I think you're way off the mark and the fact that you've pressed it consistently since April only makes matters worse. Your "defense" would only lead me to expand the charges against you from assault to aggravated assault. It's true that the MOQ does not posit an independent self above and beyond DQ and sq. We agree on that much but then you make the crucial mistake that I'm complaining about. Because the independent Cartesian self has been rejected, you say, questions about freedom and constraint couldn't possibly make sense and we have to unask those questions. That's the move that renders freedom and constraint irrelevant and meaningless. That's the move that leads you to such nihilistic conclusions. I'm saying that these questions could not be more relevant or more meaningful. You're saying the very opposite BECAUSE you don't seem to understand that the MOQ's dependent self is the "one" (the person, the individual) who is free to some extent and controlled to some extent in Pirsig's reformulation. Like I said, that is the self for whom freedom and control is anything but irrelevant. That's what what the whole evolutionary battle is all about.

Steve replied:
That is utter nonsense. How could a "dependent self" be free (independent)? That is a simple logical contradiction.



dmb says:
Oh, I see. You're equating "free" and "independent". That conflates two different senses of the word "independent". In that case, it's no wonder you're confused. By extension, I suppose you are also equating "dependence" with unfreedom or with being controlled like a slave. If I were using the terms that way, my claim would be nonsense. But I'm not using them that way.
The Cartesian self was seen as independent in the sense that it stood apart and was ontologically distinct from the "external" and objective reality. It was independent in the sense of being an entity that is discontinuous with the outer world and stands over or against it. This is what Pirsig calls the metaphysics of substance wherein reality is made of two distinctly different kinds of substance, namely mind and matter or mental substance and physical substance. In the MOQ, this independent gets ditched in favor of a dependent self.
When I say "dependent self", it does NOT mean this self is unfree or that it is a slave. It means just means that this self is NOT discontinuous with the rest of reality. It's not made of a different kind of substance or a metaphysical entity. Instead, this self is dependent in the sense that it exists in relation to the evolutionary moral framework of the MOQ. Mind and matter are not opposed ontological categories, they are names for the levels of evolution. As Pirsig puts it, they have a matter-of-fact evolutionary relationship, which is to say mind DEPENDS upon the social, biological and inorganic patterns from which it evolved. These patterns contain the MOQ's dependent self and that is the self about whom we are asking questions. That's the "one" whose will is both free and determined to some extent. That is the "one" who is free to follow DQ to some extent and the "one" who is controlled static patterns to some extent, as in the Pirsig quote you like so well. 

"the MOQ...denies any existence of a "self" that is independent of inorganic, biological, social or intellectual patterns. There is no "self" that contains these patterns. These patterns contain the self. This denial agrees with both religious mysticism and scientific knowledge. In Zen, there is reference to "big self" and "small" self. Small self is the patterns. Big self is Dynamic Quality." (Annotn. 29)


 		 	   		  


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