[MD] The other side of reified

[John Carl]

That was a good one, Marsha.  Shows the value in wading through my old
unreadthreads when we get a stormy day like today and I'm off work.  I like
the way this guy thinks and expresses himself, but you know that.  Here he
makes explicit a criticism of James that I've never formulated so rigorously
myself, but recognize as a problem I've had with him from day one in an
 intuitive way and a reaction against him.  Specifically what caught my
attention was what the author himself labels "crucial" that "neither
conceptual framework is inherent in the nature of pure experience".

This is key!  Thanks for bringing it.

John

On Wed, Jun 1, 2011 at 11:34 AM, MarshaV <valkyr at att.net> wrote:

> dmb
>
> Please note the statement  "James seems to have fallen into the trap of
> reifying his own concept of a field of consciousness" :
>
>    "The asymmetry in James's view of mind and matter may be due in part to
> his advocacy of a "field theory" of consciousness, in contrast to an
> "atomistic theory," which he vigorously rejects.  I would argue, however,
> that the nature of consciousness does not intrinsically conform either to a
> field theory or an atomistic theory.  Rather, different kinds of conscious
> events become apparent when inspected from the perspective of each of these
> different conceptual frameworks.  Using James's field theory, one may
> ascertain an individual, discrete continuum of awareness; and using the
> atomic theory one may discern within the stream of consciousness discrete
> moments of awareness and individual, constituent mental factors of those
> moments.  Thus, while certain features of consciousness may be perceived
> only within the conceptual framework of a field theory, others may be
> observed only in terms of an atomistic theory.  This complementarity is
> reminiscent of the relation between part
>  icle and field theories of mass/energy in modern physics.  The crucial
> point here is that neither conceptual framework is inherent in the nature of
> pure experience.  James seems to have fallen into the trap of reifying his
> own concept of a field of consciousness, and this may have prevented him
> from determining, even to his own satisfaction, the way in which
> consciousness does and does not exist.
>
>       (Wallace, B. Alan, 'The Taboo of Subjectivity: Towards a New Science
> of Consciousness')
>
>
>