[MD] Free Will

[Ham Priday]

Hi Ron --

After complimenting Steve on resurrecting this topic, you said:

> I think Harris is drawing his conclusions based apon the
> application of the basic general primary explanation of the
> good, the act of preference to defend the notion that freewill
> is not present because we are composed of various levels
> of prejudical choices.
>
> It seems illogical to base the assertion of no choice in the
> act of choice.  If we exist in the eternal action of choice we
> exist in the eternal action of freewill.
>
> Only by encapsulating the good does Value or Quality cease
> to become an act of freewill and become an eternal absolute,
> once this is done, yes there is no freewill.

This is the first time I've heard the notion that "we are composed of 
various levels
of prejudical choices."  Is choice, or the ability to "encapsulate the 
good", now about to become the MoQ's fifth level?

I'm glad you realize that an "encapsulated good" (or what I would call 
"universal" or "fixed" goodness) obviates the need for free choice.  I've 
been saying for years that the universe is amoral and that all moral systems 
are man's creation.  Of course, if you don't accept Parmenides' principle 
that "Man is the measure of all things," you deny man the agency of choice 
which is the very core of free will.  This seems to be the general consensus 
here.  We even have Steve asking: "Free of what?"

If I were a conspiricist, I'd be inclined to think there's a concerted 
effort here to reduce the individual  to an automaton of Nature.  After all, 
if the universe makes man moral, the "social level" makes him a "cognizant 
subject", and the "intellectual level" makes him wise, there doesn't seem to 
be much for man to do but play out his existence as programmed.

When will we ever learn that subjective individuality is the only 
perspective whereby Absolute Value can be realized differentially and 
without bias?

Essentially speaking,
Ham

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

The philosophic consequences are far reaching and I'm not sure Harris
has weighed this out entirely.

It weakens the explanation for change in experience and supports a static
existential meaninglessness toward the good.

Not to mention is seems to be detremental to the arguement of evolution
and natural selection.

What is good is always changing. Harris seems to maintain that what is good
stays the same does not change and that the perception of mystic experience
is an illusion. Quite the opposite of RMP who states that what is static
unchanging and determined is illusion.

To me what Harris points to and what RMP points to are two different 
meanings
with huge differences in philosophical consequences.

-Ron