[MD] Free Will

[Ham Priday]

Hello David, Steve, Dan, and All --


On Sat, Jun 11, 2011 at 9:42 AM, david buchanan <dmbuchanan at hotmail.com> 
wrote:

> Steve said:
> It's not the we don't have free will. It's that free will probably
> can't even mean anything. What does it mean to say that not
> only are you capable of acting out your will but that on top
> of that your will is free?  Free of what?
>
> dmb says:
> I don't get it. How is free will different from the ability to act
> out your will? And the last question seems a bit odd since the
> question of free will hardly makes sense without some kind of
> determinism to oppose it.  I mean, when we're talking about
> "free" will we are talking about the absence of physical,
> biological, psychological, theological determinism, etc.. We're
> talking about the causal factors that would constrain that
> freedom. That's what free will would be free from, no?
>
> Steve said:
> Harris is not saying that we have no choice. The question is
> where do choices come from?
>
> dmb says:
> I don't get that either. Isn't the controversy all about whether
> or not persons are moral agents? Isn't the whole question about
> whether or not the choices actually come from persons - as
> opposed to coming from causes beyond their control?
>
> Steve said:
> Whether we like the consequences of believing in free will or
> denying it's coherence as a concept is beside the point of
> whether or not free will is intelligible.

Later, Dan says:
> What choice does a traveler have but to follow the route?
> ...The world is Quality (morality), and there are differing
> degrees, high and low, that correspond to responsibility vs
> non-responsibility. ...
> But it doesn't necessarily follow that we are free, unless we
> follow Dynamic Quality, which is free of any patterns.

Free will is the power to choose.  It is unintelligible only for 
determinists who believe that human actions, like all evolutionary events, 
are the consequence of prior causes.
This would be true if human beings were controlled by their "beingness", 
enslaved by their genetic propensities and biological instincts, or 
programmed by a moral universe.

Statistical conglomerates pay tribute to deterministic forces.  But this is 
not the case for singularities such as human beings who possess a unique, 
highly developed, and sensitive perception of diversity.  This affords man 
the unique capability for enacting his intentions, which is the basis of his 
active intelligence and which, as James Fletcher Baxter says, makes man 
"earth's Choicemaker."

The "singularity" I allude to here is that man is created as a 
'being-aware', an entity that stands apart from his Creator.  As a free 
agent of the Absolute Source, man has an autonomy that transcends the laws 
of biological survival in the existential sense, as well as the "packaged 
choices" paradigm of statistical probability.  This is why Protagoras 
declared that "man is the measure of all things," (an axiom that, as Marsha 
reminds me, I incorrectly credited to Parmenides in my response to Ron 
yesterday).

So, although I haven't read Harris on this subject and don't know DMB's 
position with regard to determinism, David is justified in raising these 
important questions.

dmb:
> I think freedom and constraint are both intelligible at the same
> time. I mean, experience isn't just one way or the other. The
> notion that we are determined and the question of freedom is
> traditionally generated by an all-encompasing worldview,
> particularly theism and materialism. But I can't quite see where
> Harris is coming from. He denies that his objection entails a
> materialistic assumption but we know that he's an atheist and
> a brain scientist and something like a moral realist. I just don't
> see how that adds up.
>
> ...You want to eat Boston creme pie every night for dinner but
> also want to be healthy. The question then is whether or not
> you really have a choice between these conflicting values or if
> they determine your decisions and acts.  I mean, freedom is
> always going to be mixed in with constraints, a finite range of
> options. ... Which ever way he goes, the determinist seems to
> be saying that going left or going right was already decided and
> the traveler didn't really have a choice. I don't get that. On what
> basis is this common occurrence denied?  How am I not free
> to decide on going left, right or backwards? Why can't I choose
> fish instead of candy for dinner?
> If there is no free will, then there is no such thing as being
> responsible. If that were true, serial killers and philosophical
> novelists would be morally equal.  How intelligible is that?

How intelligible, indeed, within the framework of the MoQ.  The battle lines 
are being drawn as we speak, and I see this topic coming to a nasty climax 
in the near future.
Thanks, gentlemen, and may Freedom prevail!
--Ham