[MD] Free Will

[Steven Peterson]

Hi John,

John:
> You seem to me to be missing a very important point.  Is this a choice on
> your part or is it the end-result of a long chain of causes over which you
> have no choice and no say?  Hmmm...

Steve:
What you are missing is that the above dilemma (the traditional free
will/ determinism problem) is a false choice that arrises only when we
accept SOM premises. The MOQ denies both horns.



>> Steve:
>> No doubt people change their minds. But are they _free_ to change
>> their minds, or do their minds change because of forces beyond their
>> control or for reasons that can't be explained?



> John:  Which hypothetical offers us the most good?  The most freedom of
> action and moral culpability?  It seems to me on pragmatic basis alone, the
> idea of being completely constrained would lead to a sort of intellectual
> dead-endedness.


Steve:
Pragmatism is not a matter of believing what you wish were true.


John:
 Why strive or attempt to learn?  What reason for even
> living?  If it's all pre-determined by cosmic inputs and causes, then all
> you are doing is unrolling your robotic existence as planned, and you have
> no reason to try and make any real effort.  That's what one hypothetical
> position leads to, in my analysis.  Who cares if its true or not if it leads
> to such a dead end?  I operate on the assumption that my will is free - that
> this is me, and on that assumption I am able to be far more effective than
> if I just waited for the universe to deal my causal cards.


Steve:

I would say that a Jamesian pragmatic evaluation of the situation goes
like this: if determinism were true, we would behave exactly as we
already behave and have no choice in the matter even though we have
the feeling of willing some of our acts. If free will is true, then we
would behave exactly as we behave but _do_ have a choice in the
matter. If determinism is true, then your belief in free will is
causally determined. If free will is true, then I am freely choosing
not to be able to make sense of it. Either way, we behave exactly as
we behave. This so-called metaphysical problem is a difference that
makes no difference in how people behave in practice. The feeling of
having a choice points to something that is either real or illusory,
but either way, we still do what we do, so this problem is a fake
problem with no consequences.




>
> Steve:
>
>
>> You assert that we are free to act upon our values, but I
>> read the MOQ to be saying that someone can't help but to act upon his
>> values.
>
>
> John:
>
> Yes, but the MoQ also opens our eyes to the fact that we CHOOSE our values.


Steve:
That's news to me. Please demonstrate you ability to value something
you don't value as a matter of will by, say, willing yourself to value
theocracy over democracy or something simpler like willing yourself to
prefer chocolate when you already prefer vanilla.

We don't choose our values, we are our values.




> Steve:
>
>
>> In fact all a person is is a bunch of values, so it is even
>> wrong to say that they are _his_ values. Lila doesn't have Quality,
>> Quality has Lila.
>>
>>
> John:  Right.  All a person is is a bunch of choices, is another way of
> saying the same thing.  Choice is as fundamental as Value.
>
> duh.


Steve:
But I've always granted that we make choices. My question for you has
been, what does it mean to say that this choosing is "free"? We
certainly have will. We have moods, preferences, intentions, etc. But
where do these come from? In what sense are they "free"?