[MD] Free Will

[Matt Kundert]

Hey Dave,

DMB said:
Yes, Dennett is probably best described as a compatibilist. And I have 
been saying that freedom and constraint are both real so I agree with 
you and Dennett on that. But determinism and the causal chains that 
the idea rests upon would deny any freedom. I mean, causal relations 
are law-like and the determinist is a determinist precisely because he 
extends these causal relations into the realm of human action, into the 
realm of moral reasoning.

Matt:
I don't want to debate what an ism really is.  As far as I can tell, not 
many people have agreed on (nor consistently used) a particular 
definition of any isms in this dialogue.  Nor do I think it matters all 
that much (i.e., we can be upset about conversational clarity, but I'm 
not going to be at the moment).  So: "what is a determinist?" I'm 
pushing to the side.

Where I want to intercede to clarify what I mean further is the idea 
that the concept of a "causal chain" denies freedom by being 
"law-like."  What I want to say follows along the lines of what I said 
to Dan yesterday:

Dan said:
Value implies preference while causation implies certainty, and if we 
are looking at philosophy as predicated on every day life, nothing is 
certain. So to use a causal chain of events to explain that philosophy 
lacks the necessary grounding in what we are seeking to explain, 
doesn't it?

Matt said:
Oh.  I guess I don't think causation implies certainty.  You might say 
that in my set-up of how stuff works, I incorporate "the uncertainty 
of life" at a different level.  A causal relationship itself doesn't imply 
certainty, because certainty only comes up for persons attempting to 
adjudicate questions of causality.  "Hey Bob, did Sally cause Steve's 
death?"  "Oh, yeah, I'm certain of it because I saw her do it!"  The 
causal relationship itself doesn't establish certainty, but rather the 
certainty of a causal relationship is established by something else 
(e.g., observational evidence).

Matt:
The idea of a "causal chain," I want to say, does not--by itself--give 
you certainty (and because you need something else, say 
observational evidence, that's why it does not by itself imply it).  In 
saying the relation is "law-like," I take that to mean that if P obtains, 
then if "if P, then Q" is true/obtains, then Q necessarily obtains.  It's 
law-like, or mechanistic in that way.  _However_, because I also 
take the status of "P obtains" and "'if P, then Q' is true/obtains" to be 
_challengable_ (another way of saying that this is where I place the 
_adjudication_ of certainty), the law-like nature of a causal relation 
does not seem to me to deny freedom.  All a "causal relation" charts, 
as I define it, is _responsibility_.  And responsibility is a necessary 
precondition of assigning moral responsibility (so it seems to me), so 
that's why I said the thing about causal chains being necessary for 
moral reasoning and also saw what Dennett was awkwardly saying 
by supposing that moral reasoning requires one to be a determinist 
(because, I take it, he can't mean what you mean by determinist).

Let me also say, though I cannot provide the warrant for this, that I 
am not willy-nilly defining causality in this way to win an argument 
(particularly since I don't really take myself to be in an argument) or 
to just avoid the troubles of a free will debate.  Based on a line of 
reasoning I've learned from mainly Robert Brandom, I think we can 
actually _do all the work_ we need from the notion of causality if we 
define it as simply charting responsibility.  One's _predictive_ 
capabilities based on the concept of causal _laws_ is, I take it, a 
separate issue (that concept being derivative from the general 
notion of a causal relation).

I also didn't use the idea of "determination" in the above.  When you 
say that "Determinism is not compatible with moral responsibility 
precisely because of our actions are determined by causes," I want 
to avoid the entire issue embodied in that incompatibility by seeing 
if I can do without the notion of causes _determining_ our actions, 
while retaining the notion that our actions have antecedents.  I think 
the skeletal notion of "causal relation" I've tried to articulate helps 
move in that direction.

DMB said:
Well, if the relation between events is described as "causal" then the 
effect is said to follow from the cause in a law-like way. If A causes B, 
then B is determined by A and B always follows A. In that sense, the 
phrase "causal responsibility" is contradictory because causality 
precludes responsibility.

Matt:
I don't quite see the contradiction here.  If we agree that A caus_ed_ 
B (notice), then A was responsible for B coming about.  This is 
retrospective.  I've established the causal chain of how B happened.  
I'm not sure how I've mangled standard notions here.  What I have 
not gone towards saying with this notion of "causal relation" is that 
it gives us ironclad abilities of prediction, such that I can now say 
that "A _will always cause_ B" (a notion of material implicature 
analogous to logical implicature). To move in that direction would 
require additional premises and philosophical commitments.  I think 
most people agree that moving in this direction with rocks makes 
sense, though with human activity, much less so.

DMB said:
It's not a terrible word [i.e. causality] and I'm sure judges and 
lawyers use it all the time but in the context of this debate, where 
determinism rests on the notion of causality, it seems like morality 
and causality are diametrically opposed.

Matt:
I think what you are seeing with respect to Steve, Harris, Dennett or 
I in our various ways is that we agree substantively about 
morality--as far as I can tell (particularly after your bit about "efficient 
cause" and motives and intentions) the only thing disagreed on is the 
best rhetorical strategy for avoiding/defusing/concluding "this debate" 
of free will vs. determinism.  For example, I issued a qualm about 
Dennett's strategy.  The strategy I've kind of deployed is to articulate 
a notion of causality that doesn't on its face reject freedom.  The 
full-blown strategy would be to interrogate the notion of causality and 
what we need it for, pare it back to its bare bones before constructing 
more sophisticated notions that use the stripped-down notion of 
causality.  That's how I see the relationship between a "causal 
relation" and a "causal law."  We need to understand the former first 
and separately before we can conceptually get to the second.

I apologize to everyone, but I'll be gone for two weeks, so don't be 
surprised when I'm unresponsive.

Matt