[MD] Free Will (causation and the problem of induction)

[Ham Priday]

Steve and Matt --

On Fri, June 24, 2011 at 9:52 PM, "Steven Peterson" 
<peterson.steve at gmail.com> wrote:

> Matt, all,
>
> I think whether the issue with regard to causation or determinism
> comes up as problematic is whether one thinks of causation as an
> epistemological issue (certainty/uncertainty) or as somehow
> ontological/metaphysical (things actually follow laws that can be
> spelled out or are otherwise written into the fabric of the cosmos).
> When the "law-like" issue comes up it is because someone is thinking
> of causation as a universal obligation rather than a causal law being
> merely descriptive and therefore innocuous as far as stealing our
> humanity in some metaphysical way.  In the MOQ, causality is an
> intellectual pattern concerned with predicting and controlling our
> world.  It has epistemological rather than ontological standing.
> How could getting better at predicting and controlling the world make
> us less human?  But if causality is thought to be a metaphysical reality
> then we may worry about really being nothing but meat puppets.

Again, Steve, you have unwittingly nailed the problem.  Causation is not 
epistemological; it is ontological, or more properly "teleological".  Which 
means that the laws of nature -- including evolution, the conservation of 
energy, thermodynamics, relativity, action and reaction, and quantum 
physics -- are teleologically determined, as opposed to autonomous agents 
which are free to act in accordance with their will.  In this way, 
determinism and free will complement each other.  We cannot control the 
world, but we can adapt it to our needs by predicting dangers and avoiding 
them, by understanding the causes of energy generation and utilizing them, 
by investigating palliatives for diseases and curing them, by studying the 
principles of societal evolution and applying them, etc., etc.

Where you draw the line of metaphysicality vs. existence depends on your 
philosophical persuasion.  However, I think you misrepresent the intellect 
in your analysis.  You are correct in saying that the MoQ treats causality 
as an "intellectual pattern", which implies that the "pattern" is the agent 
of control.  But intellect is a function of human reasoning based on 
experience, so it has nothing to do with ontology or cosmology and 
everything to do with epistemology (i.e., how we learn from experience). 
Also, causality is not metaphysical but the "processing mode" of existential 
reality.  Only in a differentiated, relational system can there be 
cause-and-effect.  So, far from being "meat puppets", we humans enjoy the 
best of both worldviews: the predictability and reliability of determinism 
as "created beings", as well as the autonomy and freedom afforded to 
conscious agents.

Essentially speaking,
Ham