[MD] Free Will

[Ham Priday]

On Monday, June 26, 2011 at 9:55 PM, "Joseph Maurer" <jhmau at comcast.net> 
wrote:



> Hi Ham and all,
>
> Pirsig proposes a metaphysics of DQ/SQ.  DQ is indefinable not
> unknowable. The independent agent is DQ/SQ. There is something
> in our actions that enable the indefinable.  Free will enables action
> and an evolutionary scenario limits free will.  I can't jump on my horse
> and ride off in all directions!  Predetermination denies a DQ/SQ
> metaphysics.  I know the indefinable and can act on it through
> analogy and metaphor.

I wish I could say that your response answers my questions.  I had asked:

1)  How can free will exist without an independent agent?
2)  How can we be morally responsible if our values (and consequent actions)
     are predetermined?

Instead of addressing moral responsibility or the subjective agent, you talk 
about "our actions" relative to an indefinable source. "Something" in our 
actions, you say, "enables this indefinable".  If DQ is indefinable, and 
goes about its course independently, why do we have to enable it?   I take 
it that the MoQ denies determinism.  But if you can't define either the 
source or the enabler, of what use or meaning is this metaphysics?  (Analogy 
and metaphor aren't very helpful when we don't know the entities or forces 
we are trying to expound.)

You can't "ride off in all directions" on your horse because it would 
violate the laws of nature which support the design and dynamics of 
existence.  These laws afford us a consistent, logical, and predictable 
ground for cooperative effort and rational decisions.  And, while you may 
not "ride off in all directions" on horseback, you can ride off in any 
single direction you choose, because you are a free agent.

Thanks anyway, Joe.

Regards,
Ham