[MD] Free Will

[Steven Peterson]

On Thu, Jun 30, 2011 at 3:04 PM, david buchanan <dmbuchanan at hotmail.com> wrote:
>
> Dan said:
>  ...What some contributors seem to be saying is that determinism entails a lack of responsibility for one's actions. That is only so if we insist on believing our actions cause outcomes in predictable ways. They both do and do not.
>
> dmb says:
> Well, yes, that's how the issue is framed everywhere I look, from simple dictionary definitions to Siegfried's scholarly analysis of William James. In each case, determinism precludes responsibility. Determinism is the claim that our actions are caused by forces beyond our control. It's a claim about the causes of our actions, not the predictability of the consequences of our actions. In the former, our actions are the effects of causes while in the latter our actions are the causes of effects. See what I mean?

Steve:
Pragmatically I think this "effects of causes versus causes of
effects" is a meaningless distinction. It reminds me of Dewey's
critique on the Kantian notion of ends not justifying means. Effects
are always also causes just as means are always also ends.


> Steve said:
> For what practical reasons do we want to know whether we are responsible or determined? We would still need to condemn the intention to do harm and praise the intention to do good whether or not we think of people as subject to a chain of causality or free of such chains (for the practical reason that we think that doing so has predictable effects on others).
>
> dmb says:
> On top of practical matters of moral and legal responsibility

Steve:
How is there a difference in the notion of moral or legal
responsibility depending on how someone feels about free
will/determinism? We still judge a person by his/her actions either
way. We still need to incarcerate people who are likely to do others
harm. As Sam Harris noted, even though we know tornados don't have
free will, we would still put them in jail if we could.

The only difference that I can see is that if we get rid of the notion
of free will, we would focus our justice system on rehabilitation and
prevention rather than punishment. We would be more compassionate
since we would have to look at the less fortunate (including the
morally less fortunate) and say, there but by the experiences that I
have been lucky enough to have had go I. That person and I are no
different beyond our genetics and environment. There is no secret
interior that makes that person evil and me good.


dmb:
...there are also concrete situations like the one we're in right now.
Are we free to adopt a point of view on these issues or are we caused
to believe the things we do by forces beyond our control. Is your
perspective culturally, psychologically or physically determined?


Steve:
I would think that the answer to that is obvious. We believe what we
believe because we think we have compelling arguments in favor of one
position or another. We can't simply will ourselves to believe
something we think is false. What arguments we find compelling is a
function of the experiences we have had including our culture
background and more specific experiences as well. Just what else do
you think COULD explain the differences in what two people find
convincing? You've already ruled out a metaphysical entity--the
private interior that is unaffected by such things.

dmb:
And if it is so determined, on what basis can I praise or condemn you
for seeing it that way?

Steve:
None at all. Why would you want to praise or condemn someone for their
view on free will/determinism?  First of all, that would be trying to
apply a social level tool of control over someone's intellectual
patterns. That's an MOQ no-no. The intellectual concern is whether it
is true or false (a question we are putting aside as we discuss any
pragmatic consequences of either side of the issue).

Do you ever think to ask what a political candidate thinks about the
issue of free will/determinism? If not, then that should tell you just
how important this issue is.


dmb:
> How can our "intentions" have any meaning if they are determined by a chain of causality or anything else? If they are caused by forces outside of our control, in what sense can we even say that they are OUR intentions? Isn't that exactly what determinism denies?

Steve:
We have a subjective feeling of intending some of our actions. That is
all that is meant by "our intentions." They are "ours" because we are
the ones feeling them.

dmb:
> And then your parenthetical comment seems to be saying that we ought to convict those who act with bad intentions in order to deter others from doing the same, even though the convict did not act freely and neither can those who are supposedly deterred by that conviction.

Steve:
We ought to incarcerate those who do bad things first of all because
they may be likely to do those things again. Secondly,other people
knowing that our policy is to incarcerate such people has the effect
that other people are less likely to do bad things. I don't see where
we need to imagine freedom from a chain of causality to implement this
system. In fact, we do such things because we think we think actions
often have predictable effects. Our system depends on a notion of
causality. What gets added to this system with the common sense notion
of free will is the bad idea of justice as punishment.

dmb:
I guess this could make sense if you think of deterrence as putting a
new cause in place so that others respond to it mechanically and
otherwise get determined by it. But this begs the question of moral
responsibility precisely because we have no choice in the matter. We
can't rightly blame or praise any action unless the actor was free to
do otherwise, unless the actor was NOT determined by causal chains or
any other determining factors.


Steve:
Here we are again with social level praise and blame as though there
were a practical difference between praising or blaming a person and
praising or blaming a person's actions. There is no secret interior of
a person who intends and does bad things that is nevertheless good. We
are what we intend and do. For example, even though your mother told
you that despite all the dickish things you do, you are really a good
person somewhere deep down inside, that is a completely nonsensical
notion. There is nothing deep down inside that matters worth a darn if
it doesn't ever cash out in action. If you act like a dick all the
time, you are a dick. If you act like a dick sometimes and not others,
then sometimes you are a dick. Freedom from causal chains has nothing
to do with it.

Pirsig had a quite different notion of freedom in mind...

"The hippies had in mind something that they wanted, and were calling
it “freedom,” but in the final analysis “freedom” is a purely negative
goal. It just says something is bad. Hippies weren’t really offering
any alternatives other than colorful short-term ones, and some of
these were looking more and more like pure degeneracy. Degeneracy can
be fun but it’s hard to keep up as a serious lifetime occupation.

This book offers another, more serious alternative to material
success. It’s not so much an alternative as an expansion of the
meaning of “success” to something larger than just getting a good job
and staying out of trouble. And also something larger than mere
freedom. It gives a positive goal to work toward that does not
confine. That is the main reason for the book’s success, I think."

Best,
Steve