[MD] MOQ and Gödel's incompleteness theorems

Tuukka Virtaperko mail at tuukkavirtaperko.net
Tue Mar 8 19:24:24 PST 2011


Hi, Mark,

you say:

"I have heard the analogy that we dip our ladle into the stream of
Quality and get experience (or something similar).  This is a fine
analogy, except that it is also true that the ladle, the manner of
dipping, and the one doing the dipping is also part of Quality.  In
terms of the infinite set theories, I am still working that one out.
My example of the "set of all sets", is more just simple set theory.
This particular example is similar to a map within a map..., or a
reflection of a reflection...  It points to the limits of logic."

This sounds like something I tried to do some years ago. If it is indeed the same thing (I'm not saying it is), then you are doing the wrong thing. There are numerous sources which explain, why this is the wrong thing. I will first try to express it with my own wording.

Let's define the concept "allness" as "everything that exists". I was trying to formulate a theory that goes something like: "Allness is Quality". But here, I was using the word "allness" in a way that we shall now call "disproportionate".

If a concept is used in a disproportionate way, it is not specified, which language system dictates the meaning of the concept. If we use the concept "a number whose successor is 0" proportionately, we have specified whether we use this concept in the set of natural numbers (the concept then refers to an empty set) or in the set of integers (the concept then refers to -1). But if we use the concept disproportionately, we do not specify, in which set do we use it, and as a result the meaning of the concept can be changed arbitrarily. Because of this, using a concept disproportionately allows us to, for example, "prove" a contradiction.

But any ontological theory is of the logical form "Allness is X". And this concept of allness cannot refer to the thing, that it clearly seems to be intended to refer to, unless it is used disproportionately. So ontology is bound to language. Whenever you have language, you also have a constraint in your thinking, which prevents you from perceiving the existence of certain things, unless you experience Dynamic Quality.

After I realized this, I ceased to understand what is the point in ontology. I thought ontology was investigating things that are beyond language, but I began feeling that the very existence of ontology prevents it from investigating the things it is supposed to investigate.

This idea, that ontology is bound to language, can be found in the following works:

The Diamond Sutra
Carnap's "Überwindung"
"Logic and Ontology" in the Standord Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-ontology/)

However, most mainstream publications are written like nobody ever thought of this, which is highly confusing!

Does anyone know, taking this into account, what on Earth is the point of ontology? I honestly don't. Ontology becomes simply a subset of moral philosophy, in that it is probably slightly more moral to believe in materialism than cartesian dualism, or in MOQ than materialism, as the former allegedly provides a better framework for actually making decisions than the latter, but there seems to remain no criteria for judging, which ontological system is the best, except moral criteria. However, ontology has not been universally recognized as a subset or moral philosophy.

A supporter of MOQ is surely not surprised to hear that ontology becomes a subset of moral philosophy, because in MOQ, everything belongs to the realm of moral value. But conventional philosophers apparently don't think this way, and it puzzles me. What -do- they think?

"There is a dogmatic side to this forum, which along with other things states that
Quality should not be defined."

My more formal view of Quality goes something like this: The least theoretically possible amount of Quality is 0. Not, for example, minus infinity. In this sense, any act is good, but some are more good or less good than others. This is not how the words "good" and "evil" are commonly used. Therefore let it be so that after an evil act there is less Quality than there was before the act, and after a good act there is more Quality than there used to be. So the pair "good" and "evil" cannot be contemplated without taking time into account.

Here, I do not think I'm really defining Quality, but a way of speaking of it. So how is it relevant to tell me, that Quality should not be defined?

I'm not saying my view is the only correct one, but I'm saying we need to share a way of speaking, or there's no point in speaking.

-Tuukka





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