[MD] MOQ and Gödel's incompleteness theorems

Tuukka Virtaperko mail at tuukkavirtaperko.net
Sat Mar 12 15:45:23 PST 2011


> Tuukka said to dmb:
>
> ...What even are these "camps" that, apparently, contain sworn defendants of
> this kind? Who belong to these camps? I'm quite sure that no one in their right
> mind does.
>
> dmb says:
> Pirsig and William James both invoke Coleridge to describe the rival camps. On
> that account, everyone is either a Platonist (rationalism) or an Aristotelain
> (empiricism), although Pirsig and James both think that Protagoras (Man is the
> measure) represents empiricism much better than Aristotle. As you may recall,
> the dramatic structure of ZAMM is centered around the conflict between the
> Aristotelian narrator and Phaedrus, the Platonist.
>

Tuukka:

So the attempt to solve the problem of analytic and synthetic 
propositions can be seen as an attempt to unify Aristotle and Plato, as 
the scholastic western philosophers, who were occupied doing this, had 
no better ideas of their own? How sad! But could be true? Never thought 
of that.


    John:

    Part of my fascination lies in your direction - brain structure.  The
    bifurcated, two-way brain IS how we think.  My hypothesis is that this
    dichotomy is necessary so that self-knowledge is possible - without "another
    way of looking at things", we wouldn't be able to be aware that there is
    another way of looking at things.

    How fun would that be?  Not very.



Tuukka:

I've heard that the right hemisphere of the brain is capable of treating 
the left hemisphere as an object, but the left is unable to do the same 
to the right. These are simplifications, and an expert of 
neuropsychology could be more clear about this. Wish we knew one!

-Tuukka



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