[MD] MOQ and Gödel's incompleteness theorems
Tuukka Virtaperko
mail at tuukkavirtaperko.net
Sat Mar 12 15:45:23 PST 2011
> Tuukka said to dmb:
>
> ...What even are these "camps" that, apparently, contain sworn defendants of
> this kind? Who belong to these camps? I'm quite sure that no one in their right
> mind does.
>
> dmb says:
> Pirsig and William James both invoke Coleridge to describe the rival camps. On
> that account, everyone is either a Platonist (rationalism) or an Aristotelain
> (empiricism), although Pirsig and James both think that Protagoras (Man is the
> measure) represents empiricism much better than Aristotle. As you may recall,
> the dramatic structure of ZAMM is centered around the conflict between the
> Aristotelian narrator and Phaedrus, the Platonist.
>
Tuukka:
So the attempt to solve the problem of analytic and synthetic
propositions can be seen as an attempt to unify Aristotle and Plato, as
the scholastic western philosophers, who were occupied doing this, had
no better ideas of their own? How sad! But could be true? Never thought
of that.
John:
Part of my fascination lies in your direction - brain structure. The
bifurcated, two-way brain IS how we think. My hypothesis is that this
dichotomy is necessary so that self-knowledge is possible - without "another
way of looking at things", we wouldn't be able to be aware that there is
another way of looking at things.
How fun would that be? Not very.
Tuukka:
I've heard that the right hemisphere of the brain is capable of treating
the left hemisphere as an object, but the left is unable to do the same
to the right. These are simplifications, and an expert of
neuropsychology could be more clear about this. Wish we knew one!
-Tuukka
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