[MD] desires

[Ham Priday]

Hi Dan --

Please disregard my previous post.  (I inadvertantly pushed 'send' instead 
of 'save'.)

 [Ham, previously to Marsha]:
> I think I may have stumbled unknowingly upon MoQ's Waterloo.
> Pirsig defies epistemology by claiming that Quality exists
> independently of man. This leads his followers to believe that it is
> unrelated to desire, making desire a greedy, infectious state of
> mind. Why else would Dan associate desire with only selfish
> goals and motives?
>
> And, no, Dan; I do not believe for a moment that "Value and Quality
> exist without the desire to possess them." To value something is to
> desire it.  If Value could not inspire desire, we would have no way
> to realize it.  And if man lacked the capacity to discriminate between 
> good and poor quality, or to choose what is of value,
> he would be reduced to robotic status.

[Dan, on 3/15]:
> Thank you for allowing me to set the record straight here.  First of
> all, RMP does not claim Quality exists independent of man.  Quality
> is experience.  How can experince be independent of the experiencer?
> So no, his "followers" do not believe Quality is unrelated to desire.
> As I wrote Marsha, in the MOQ desire can be seen as biologically,
> socially, and intellectually driven.
>
> And if you've read my posts at all, you must realize I do not
> associate desire with only selfish goals and motivations. Of course
> you probably have no real reason to read my posts, unless they're
> addressed to you...

Then I have misinterpreted Pirsig's statement that Quality is the primary 
reality.  To me, "primary" means prior to and independent of existents or 
"patterns".  I know, of course, that he also equated Quality with 
Experience; but as I have always considered experience to be the patterns, 
which are  subsequent to the primary (source), the logic of the premise 
"Quality = Experience" still eludes me.

In order to appreciate Quality (or Value) the experiencing subject, it would 
seem to me, needs to perceive something more than raw experience.  He must 
possess the aesthetic or moral sensibility to discriminate between 
excellence and mediocrity as well as goodness and evil.  I assume that 
Pirsig considered "value-sensibility" to be a function of conscious 
awareness.  But I must be missing something in this epistemology, because he 
also suggests that experience is not limited to conscious agents,  By what 
faculty does he propose that inanimate objects sense Quality?

[Ham]:
> The concept of individual liberty and social morality is derived from
> the desire of human beings to better their collective situation, not
> "wreck" it. The development of science and medicine was motivated
> by desire for the knowledge to alleviate suffering, not "cause" it.

[Dan]:
> Agree.

[Ham]:
> Of course unbridled desire can lead to gluttony and aggrandisement. Too 
> much candy can cause a stomach ache. Too much power can breed
> tryanny. But must it be sinful to "want" something?  How can human
> civilization progress without it?  Besides, human beings have the rational
> capacity to temper excess craving.

[Dan]:
> Again, I agree with you here, though with the stipulation that most
> human beings haven't the rational capacity to temper excess craving.
> Hundreds of thousands of people die every year from smoking cigarettes
> and drinking alcohol to excess. Obesity is rampant in developed and
> even developing countries. Social and intellectual patterns have
> evolved to curb excess biological cravings but many people suffer the
> effects anyway.
>
> Have you ever been to an art museum and witnessed some unbelievably
> incredible work of art?  Did you feel the need to possess it; did the
> desire arise to make it yours?  Or did you simply feel a sense of awe?
> And if you felt that sense of awe, wasn't that value? If you understand
> what I am saying, then you see that Quality and desire are not necessarily
> linked in any way, Ham.

What we "want to possess" is the Value of what we sense, not the experienced 
object that represents it.  The magificence of the Venus Arising or the Ode 
to Joy is what arouses our sense of awe (i.e., desire), not the painting on 
canvas or the score on paper.  A sense of Value, nurtured by exposure to and 
familiarity with such works, is required of the observer for the full 
appreciation of quality in any form.

I maintain that value-sensibility is the "core self" (sometimes called 'the 
soul') of man.  Desire is the individual's realization that spiritual 
fufillment does not lie within himself but in the "otherness" from which he 
was created and to which he bears witness.  It is the Value of this other 
that he seeks to possess; but he can only do this provisionally -- by 
differentiating Value experientially into the "many and many things" that 
constitute his being in the world.  Now, I know this isn't Pirsig's 
worldview or epistemology, for which I apologize.  That said, however, I 
think you'll agree that it accounts for human value awareness in a more 
immanent and substantive way than the Experience = Quality equation.

[Dan]:
> Well, as far as the Quality thesis goes, I don't speak for others,
> only myself. But I do have some little grounding in the MOQ, so I
> appreciate the opportunity to expound on it.

As a long-time priest of the inner sanctum, you are much too modest, Dan. 
There is no doubt in my mind that your interpretation of the MoQ has the 
author's approval and is spot on.  Had I not developed my own concept of 
Value before discovering Pirsig, I might well now be echoing your words. 
While positing Value as the ground of existence is a significant step 
forward in the development of philosophy, I frankly feel that the Quality 
paradigm skips some fundamentals that are needed for a cogent metaphysical 
thesis.

Many thanks for your interest and for setting the record straight for me.

Sincere regards,
Ham