[MD] MOQ and Gödel's incompleteness theorems

[Ham Priday]

Hello again, Mark --

You write well and your analogies are superb, but I'm now convinced that 
your attachment to the Quality paradigm is too strong to even conceive of a 
primary source.  Since I have already outlined the reasons why my ontology 
fundamentally differs from the MoQ, I can only respond to your comments with 
criticism, which is unpleasant for both of us.  Please understand that I 
don't mean to be disrespectful, and that my objections basically refer to 
the euphemistic (analogous) concept of reality that Pirsig calls a 
"Metaphysics of Quality".

On Mon, Mar 21, 2011 at 2:18 AM, "118" <ununoctiums at gmail.com>wrote:


> My experience is that we observe something, and then we create
> a logic to describe it.  So the observation comes first followed by
> the logic.  From that comes prediction.  If new data does not fit
> the prediction, then a new logic is created.  No formal system in
> science is ever complete, but it keeps on growing with our
> imagination.  Often when a theory is accepted, there are those who
> do everything they can to make the observations fit the logic.
> While this is not uncommon, eventually the logic fails.  Current logic
> in things such as the big bang, and evolution are constantly under
> reconstruction.  It used to be thought that things learned in this life
> could not be passed on to our offspring.  It is now thought that they
> can (epigenetics).  The big bang theory has had to expand to
> support data to the point where it really does not make sense anymore.
>
> In the same way that observations can be interpreted to fit theory,
> theory is changed to fit observations.  Much of empirical science
> depends on how one interprets the data, and opposing views can
> result from the same set of data.  There is much more subjectivity in
> science than you may be aware of.

You are complaining about the failures of empirical science which has raised 
our standard of living to a level unimagined by our forbears and taught us 
more about the physical universe than Aristotle or Galileo ever dreamed of. 
Like any methodology, Science has its lapses.  But why focus on the
negatives?  I see little need to condemn scientists for their pragmatic 
interpretation of the world we live in.  After all, they weren't trained to 
be philosophers, nor would their methods be as effective if they were.

[Ham, previously]:
> I might accept Intent in your ontology if you could identify the
> "intender". However, I have a problem understanding intent as the
> "nature (i.e., essence) of reality", if that's where you're going.
> So far you seem to be making a case for Quality as the "active agent"
> of creation. ...I can only assume you have assigned that role to
> Quality, thereby rejecting man as the value agent.

[Mark]:
> Yes, Ham, humor me for a little while.  It helps me think.
> Is it not possible to have Intent without an intender?  Can we have
> expansion without an expander, or direction without a director?
> What intent means to me is similar to drive or will.  As humans we
> are imbued with will from the moment we are born, it does not arise
> from us.  We cannot create it, since there is no place to create it.
>
> I have trouble imagining Quality in an anthropomorphic way.  That is
> as something with human attributes.  The only time it does have such
> attributes is when it is being expressed in humans.  So active means
> something different to me than the way you are using it.  I assume
> that the sun is the active agent of sunlight, and that a tree is the
> active agent of an apple.  So if we point to the active agent of
> everything (that we are aware of), yes, that would be Quality.  What
> we see as reality is the appearance of Quality.
>
> You are correct that I do not believe that man is a value agent.  I do
> not believe that man is the measure of all things.  Man expresses
> measurements, but does not create them.

No, we cannot have "intent" without an intender.  "Intention" is defined in 
my dictionary as "determination to act in a certain way: RESOLVE; what one 
intends to do or bring about; a concept considered as the product of 
attention drawn to an object of knowledge."  Since inanimate objects have 
neither brains nor knowledge, they cannot be cognitive agents of intent or 
attention.  Even in Pirsig's 'Experience = Quality' vernacular, objects 
arise as the "static patterns" that experience creates.  Thus, objects are 
the insentient "constructs" of subjective agents, not the intentional agents 
themselves.

[Mark, after admitting he can't say what reality consists of]:

> What to you is the fundamental difference between a man's brain,
> and a river or a beehive?  It is all matter put together in different
> ways, and interacting through communication.  So, how is it that we
> have free will and nothing else does?  I certainly do not believe in
> some kind of divine spark provided to us by some supernatural being.
> We are chemicals all thrown together in a specific way through a
> process of self-assembly.  So I would say that your conception of
> man being the only thing with free will, to be higher in the superstition
> category.  Tell me Ham, how does free will come about?  What are
> its components?  Why does only a jumbled up mass of nerves and
> glial cells have it?  ...Where does free will reside, is it a protein?

This demonstrates why it is impossible for you to understand man in any 
other way than as a bio-chemical organism.  Rational or moral intent is no 
more biological than free will, yet you reject the 'psyche' or 'soul' as 
superstitious myth while regarding the 'knower' as illusionary.  I suppose 
your thoughts are synaptic activities of your brain cells.  The bottom line 
is that you dismiss the very thing that separates you from the animal 
species and that could make your life existentially meaningful.

Neither a construct of experience nor the evolving universe possesses free 
will, because their behaviors are determined by another agency.  An entity 
whose being and dynamics are dependent on the laws of nature cannot exercise 
free will.  Only an autonomous agent that is separated from the cosmic 
source has the power of independent choice.  That agency is the human psyche 
or self.  It is created by the exclusion (negation) of Essence, which 
exempts it from predetermination, thus affording free choice.  And, yes, I 
do believe that man is a unique creature -- "a little spark of the divine" 
as Eckhart describes him -- and, furthermore, that experiential reality is 
anthropocentric.

> Think about it, where does your choice come from?
> Does it start at the nerve level?  Why start there?  Do you think
> that our choices come from non-material places.  If something is
> painful, do you choose it to be?  Do you continue to have a
> chooser when you are asleep?  If not, then is choice a function
> of brain activity?  If so, then what part of the brain controls the
> rest of the brain? ...

All this talk about "places" only shows that you do not recognize being and 
nothingness (space) which, along with time, is the mode of human experience. 
The psychic self knows nothing of space/time and cause/effect because it is 
free of experiential precepts.  It is aware only of the Value of otherness, 
not its dynamics, and of its desire to reclaim it.

> Just because you have created an elaborate system using words
> and concepts (magentism etc.) does not mean that you have come
> any closer to what is behind the cosmos, all you have done is create
> some structure that has meaning to you.  A planet could care less of
> your invention.

I cannot argue with that, nor would I expect any more of an insentient 
planet that is a construct of my experience.

[Ham]:
> "There is no imperfect knower"?? Well, then you're talking to one,
> since I don't know how you can say this!  I am unaware of any
> perfect knower, and if there were one, we would have no need for
> philosophy. Kindly explain why an imperfect knower "would have
> to assume a better way of knowing."

[Mark]
> I can see that this concept is a tough one.  I guess it boils down to
> what perfection is.  Something is imperfect if it could be better.
> What defines better?  This, of course, gets to the heart of Quality.
> If I were to be teleological, I could say that Quality goes towards
> better, so the future is always better than the past.  But this would
> be like saying that a mouse is better than a dinosaur.  In the moment,
> which is timeless, there is no better.  Therefore everything must be
> perfect as it unfolds.  I could of course twist this into all sort of
> silly circles.  So, how about if we drop this topic for a little while?
>  My bad.

Fine.  It makes no sense to me anyway, since what is "perfect" does not get 
better and what gets better cannot be perfect.

[Ham]:
> Reality isn't what you "call it"; it's what IS. That's why I call it
> 'Essence'. As I understand your Quality, it is an aggregate of
> differentiated qualities. Again we have Quality containing subsets
> of itself, which you previously agreed was illogical.

[Mark]:
> No, you are right, reality is not what you call it, words are simply
> analogies.  I do not think I implied that (of course I snipped my
> statement, so who knows (heh, heh)).  I preferred your question
> concerning Quality being active.  As I have suggested in other posts,
> matter is a metaphor for Quality.  So Quality is not made up of itsy
> bitsy little pieces of Quality.  I think this is a difficulty in this 
> forum
> when people talk about static quality as being objects.  Objects
> have quality, they are not quality. We mistake what Quality presents,
> as forms that contain quality.  This would be like mistaking a
> shadow for the real object (but not exactly like that, of course).
> I would prefer to say that Quality is an expression which can come
> in many different forms.

If matter is a metaphor for Quality, a clump of elephant dung is Quality, or 
contains it.  So much for aesthetic value discrimination!

Sorry, Mark.  This is the best I can do under the circumstances.  You mind 
is simply not open to an alternative worldview, and this disappoints me.  I 
agree with much of what you've written on other topics, but I think it would 
be futile to continue this dialogue, as we are no longer on the same page 
metaphysically.

I admire your communication skills and respect your loyalty to Pirsig. 
Let's not spoil the fruitful exchange we've had up until now by wrangling 
over our differences.  Okay by you?

Sincere best wishes,
Ham