[MD] [Bulk] Re: desires

[Andre Broersen]

Marsha to Andre (posting this for a second time obviously waiting for a 
response):

Stating that "sq is not other than DQ"  and that "DQ is the fundamental nature of sq", does not exclude sq.

Andre:
Quite frankly I was waiting for you to make some other adjustments to your understanding before I would respond but now you are putting all your money on the part of: 'DQ is the fundamental nature of sq'. If you'd have read my responses with any care you would have noticed that I never disputed this. Yes, the fundamental ground stuff of static patterns of value is derived from/ abstracted from experience (DQ).

This does however NOT equate to 'DQ is not other than sq', put more simply: 'DQ is sq', which is what you maintain!

As Horse, Adrie, David and others have pointed out, you cannot state that the differentiated is the same as the undifferentiated. The conceptualized is the same as the unconceptualized. This makes a farce of the evolutionary program called MOQ which is a static intellectual pattern of value.

'In the MOQ, then, [and this is, after all, what we are discussing here]reality (as a whole) is denoted by the term 'Quality' which Pirsig divides into Dynamic Quality and static quality. Quality (with a capital 'Q')is used to denote reality (by which Pirsig regards as the totality of what exists) in addition to its traditional context as a term for excellence... while Dynamic Quality denotes the unconceptualised part of reality. Consequently, the term 'Dynamic Quality' is not meant to be a concept but a referring term:

It's important to keep all 'concepts' out of Dynamic Quality. Concepts are always static. Once they get into Dynamic Quality they'll overrun it and try to present it as some kind of a concept itself. (Pirsig, 1997e)

[Note:this is the danger of your perspective/conflation Marsha!]

See below:

"This comments reflects Pirsig's concern that a shift from considering the Good as an ineffable 'unconditioned' to a Platonic idea would entail leaving it open to a metaphysical devaluation. This type of devaluation is located by Pirsig (1974a, p 380) with Aristotle's development of dialectics...
  
'Once the Good has been contained as a dialectical idea it is no trouble for any philosopher to come along and show by dialectical methods that arete, the Good, can be more advantageously demoted to a lower position within a 'true' order of things, more compatible with the inner workings of dialectic. Such a philosopher was not long in coming. His name was Aristotle.

'Once such a process occurs, mind or matter is usually returned as ontologically fundamental instead of the Good and, as such, a metaphysics ceases to be a 'metaphysics of quality' but becomes a form of SOM' (Anthony's Phd, pp34-5).

Come to think of it, didn't you agree with Bodvar that the intellectual level IS SOM?

Okay Marsha, deny everything, say that I misinterpret you and dismiss all the above with a one-liner!