[MD] Free Will

[Ham Priday]

 Steve, DMB, and All --


 On Tue, May 3, 2011 at 10:24 AM, Steven Peterson peterson.steve at gmail.com> 
wrote:

> ...I can only believe something if I actually think it is true.
> Clearly we don't choose beliefs freely. In fact there is no "I" outside
> of such value patterns. Rather we ARE our beliefs (as well as our
> other patterns of preference.)

[later, to DMB]:
> I am only saying that we cannot as a matter of will make our beliefs
> other than what they are. That is not to support the notion of
> determinism. The causal chain "all the way back to the big bang" you
> mention is a story about how we got from the past to the present.
> The fact that it is possible to weave such a narrative (or narratives)
> does not mean that the future is already determined. It only means
> that we are likely to be able to tell such a story about the present
> day from the perspective of the future once we arrive there just as we
> were able to tell stories explain the past in terms of causal chains
> before. The future is determined by the present only in this very
> innocuous sense that we will some day tell such stories about today.

Right, and well articulated, Steve.  I only wonder why you can't see that 
believing in "what you think is true" demonstrates your will to believe.  A 
belief is not forced on you, it does not (as David insists) "have to 
harmonize with existing beliefs," nor does it even "have to work".  What you 
believe is your choice -- your preference -- based on your value 
orientation.  And it can change, as your values change.

> My point was to say that free will/determinism is an issue with no
> practical consequences and therefore a fake philosophical problem
> not that we ought to "choose free will." What could it ever mean
> to behave as though you don't have any choice in the matter at hand?
> It is to ask, what would you choose if you had no choice?
> A nonsensical question.

No practical consequences?  If you hear a ticking sound in a room you 
suspect might be wired with a detonation device, and you decide to ignore it 
rather than exit the room, is your death from an explosion not a practical 
consequence?  If Obama, despite evidence that Osama Bin Laden was hiding out 
in a targeted compound in Pakistan, had believed the intelligence was 
insufficient to risk a strike on the target, would that not have had a 
practical consequence?

Would you say that Value (or Quality) predetermines such choices?  Or that, 
in David's words, "All we can do is play the roles exactly as they were 
written"?  I don't think so.

And yet you say, "a denial of the autonomous agent and a view in terms of 
causes and effects rather than unmoved movers would tell us that everything 
we say or do makes a difference, and that knowledge itself would make a 
positive difference."  Inasmuch as it is theoretically impossible to know 
the "causal chain" that leads to an individual's choices and behavior, how 
can you doubt that human actions are the exercise of free will by autonomous 
agents?

I can only wonder at the "reasonableness" of a philosophy that is determined 
to undermine man's innate freedom.

--Ham


>> dmb says:
>> Well, the issue sort of dissolves for MOQers because, like you said, the 
>> autonomous subject and causality itself are no longer assumed starting 
>> points. But the determinism would have profound moral consequences. 
>> Nobody could ever be held responsible for their actions and nothing we 
>> say or do could ever make a difference. All we can do is play the roles 
>> exactly as they were written.
>
>
> Steve:
> True. I suppose this is why the scientific materialistic determinism
> debate you described is at all of isssue.
>
> Would that actually be such a bad thing with regard to our philosophy
> of criminal justice to see things in light of explanations that don't
> merely cease at the free choice of a moral agent? The past really can
> be used to understand the present far better than the notion of an
> unpredictable autonomous agent that chooses freely how to behave in
> all circumstances. Understanding the causes of crime is the best hope
> for curbing it. Does that mean that criminals ought not be
> incarcerated? Of course not, but our focus would be on prevention and
> rehabilitation (as it should be) rather than punishment. Such a view
> would make us far more compassionate and more moral rather than
> leaving us with a nightmare version of no one being responsible for
> their actions. On the contrary, a denial of the autonomous agent and a
> view in terms of causes and effects rather than unmoved movers would
> tell us that everything we say or do makes a difference, and that
> knowledge itself would make a positive difference.
>
> Best,
> Steve