[MD] Free Will

[X Acto]

Steve said:
...I can only believe something if I actually think it is true. Clearly we don't 
choose beliefs freely. In fact there is no "I" outside of such value patterns. 
Rather we ARE our beliefs (as well as our other patterns of preference.)

Ron jumps in:
I agree, but that is not to say they are determined, set in stone, unable to 
change. As proponants of an MoQ
we ought to be re-examining our reasons for our values, reflect on why we hold 
certain values that make
up the "I". In my own experience it's the knee-jerk prejudices that I examine 
most. It is not easy because
as you say we are invested in certain beliefs, we dedfine ourselves by them 
ALTHOUGH we CAN change
them we may exercise the choice, difficult as it is. Having PTSD, it is 
essential to work on those patterns
of value or those values dominate your life. The fundemental belief in freeing 
ones "self" from rigid values
is the belief in the power of choice and change. That is why I think the term 
"derminism" does not hold
an accurate assessment pertaining to ALL static patterns of value and why I 
disagree with Dan.

dmb says to Steve: 
Right, we can only adopt new beliefs if they fit. They have to harmonize with 
existing beliefs, our temperament and purposes, etc.. It has to be plausible, it 
has to work and it has to matter. The new view has to be a "live option", as 
James called it. We are "wedged and controlled", he said. Our truths are wedged 
between sensible, concrete realities and the whole set of existing beliefs. But 
to say there are controlling factors is not the same thing as saying they are 
determined. Determinism is a pretty strong word. In fact, we don't need to 
exaggerate or use hyperbole to paint it as a rather drastic view. It says all 
events are determined by a perfect chain of causality, going all the way back to 
the big bang or to God, conceived as the First Cause.

Ron inserting his 2cents:
Agree, it really is an inaccurate portrayal of what we mean by "static patterns 
of value" in a broad general
sense of the term. It is so drastic, and the philosophic consequences so great 
that to claim that it holds
foundational meaning pertaining to the MoQ is disaterous to the whole meaning of 
the word "Quality".



Steve said:
The above had the problem I always had with Pascal's Wager. Even if we think it 
would be good to believe something we think is false, we can't simply will 
ourselves to do so.

dmb says:
Yea, and Pascal tries to motivate us to place a bet on God by arguing that 
eternity is a long time and so there is a great deal at stake. It begs the 
question because you have to believe in eternal heaven to think there is 
anything at stake. I can't think of a less pragmatic way to frame it. The 
consequences of our beliefs will be felt in the afterlife? This is the sort of 
thing that gave rise to James's notion of beliefs as either dead and living 
options. For me, pearly gates and golden streets are impossible to believe. 
Sure, that would be nice and I'd like to believe that I'll live forever but what 
I CAN believe is that life will go on for millions of years. Hope it includes 
human life of some kind for a long while. I think we shouldn't say anything 
about "eternity". I also think mortality has always been a fact of life for 
everything that has ever lived. It's about time we got used to it.

Ron:
I think thats why the belief in betterness, cuts away all the rational 
explanations and leaves with a verifyable
empirical reality that is also an answer to those rationalist appeals for ethics 
and morality, it gives reasons
for good besides eternal social appeals to ideals of reward and authority.



Steve said:
My point was to say that free will/ determinism is an issue with no practical 
consequences and therefore a fake philosophical problem not that we ought to 
"choose free will." What could it ever mean to behave as though you don't have 
any choice in the matter at hand? It is to ask, what would you choose if you had 
no choice? A nonsensical question.

dmb says:
Well, the issue sort of dissolves for MOQers because, like you said, the 
autonomous subject and causality itself are no longer assumed starting points. 
But the determinism would have profound moral consequences. Nobody could ever be 
held responsible for their actions and nothing we say or do could ever make a 
difference. All we can do is play the roles exactly as they were written. 


Ron:
I think You have really touched on the value of holding such a view, the reasons 
why one would preffer such
a belief and why one would hold to it strongly and it all hinges on personal 
responsibility.

DmB:
And yes, the debate lends itself to all sorts of seemingly paradoxical claims 
about being determined to believe in free will or being free to choose 
determinism. I think these aren't much more than linguistic card tricks. The 
consequences of believing one or the other would be felt in practical 
situations, like the courts. What does democracy and political freedom mean in a 
determined world? In that sense, it's not a fake problem. 


Ron:
Again Dave, a sound conclusion and the reason why I am choosing to disagree with 
Dan on the issue.

Steve said:
Outside of a religious context I can't see how the free will/determinism 
question is one we ought to feel like we need to solve. It is purely 
philosophical in the derogatory sense of the term unless you need to sort out 
the theological problem of evil.

Ron:
True, but as Dave stated above it does support a point of view of not being 
responsible for your values
or reasons for holding them having large philosophical consequences, especially 
when one claims
that it composes a rather large portion of the framework of the MoQ. I agree, 
MoQ does render the
Problem moot that is why I contend that it can't possibly reflect the broad 
general framework of
Pirsigs ideas.