[MD] The use-mention distinction

[david buchanan]

Ron wrote to Steve:
The fact that you reference Bo for an arguement, sigh, you really lost me. That guy is about as clueless as they come..sorry.



Steve replied:
You've misunderstood my intention. I wasn't making an argument let alone using Bo's words to help make one for me. I was referencing Bo to highlight a problem that most of us have with Bo's thinking and asking if anyone has enough knowledge of the use-mention distinction to say whether that is a good way to describe the problem.



dmb says:
I'd say the mention/use distinction is not relevant to Bo's problem.


It's a handy distinction if you're an analytic philosopher because their task is to analyze language and they have to use language to do that. The liar's paradox, for example, is a case of using language while at the same time making a claim about that language use; "Everything I say is a lie."  The paradox is produced by the sentence's ability to preform at two levels simultaneously. But normally it's not at all a big deal. Sometimes we talk and sometimes we talk about talking. Analytic philosophers talk about talking as a profession so they might make good use of the distinction in subtle ways, but I think most people can easily understand the difference.



This distinction cannot in any way be equated with the MOQ's distinction between concepts and reality, however. Since the primary empirical reality is pre-verbal and pre-conceptual, there is as yet no term to use or mention. Reality (DQ) is outside of language but the mention/use distinction is entirely within language, is entirely conceptual. The MOQ and analytic philosophy go together like peanut butter and jealousy. There's your category error.